

Chapter One. The Logical Discourse and the Modern Cultural Climate

National Dogmatism or the Logic of Consociation?

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Abstract: The text examines the contemporary social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a basis for understanding the social and historic presuppositions of the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. The basic thesis is that the status functions of the social ontology in Bosnia and Herzegovina lack a rationally acceptable structure because they produce contradictory institutional objects, facts, processes and states of affairs, while the status functions of political ontology fail to produce deontic values/rights because they create separate intentional contents and a contradictory attitude to them. These contradictions are connected to a hyper-national attitude and lead to nationalism. The thesis is argued through the confrontation of the contents of three dogmas of nationalism and three conditions for a normal consociation of the nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The text suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a paradigm for a rigid-ideological, militaristic or religious state community in EU member states, rather a paradigm for consociation of nations and a state of free citizens who, through their social and political ontology, need to collectively accept common deontic capabilities/rights, which the European Union also accepts through its status functions.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The research of social and historical presuppositions which lie in the basis of a process such as the transition from one political system to another, from one social ontology to another, provides an opportunity for social and political objects/phenomena, facts, processes and states of affairs to be classified differently and rearranged so as to free the field of the possible, which is narrowed between political contradictions and political tautology, between absolutely true and absolutely untrue explanations of ontology of the social world of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A logical path needs to be discovered to symbols and status functions for which those symbols are used and at the same time ensure that the identified objects, facts, processes and states of affairs are the bearers of meaning.

Phenomena/objects of social ontology such as “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and “Republic of Serbsca” currently exist at the same time in Bosnia and Herzegovina; we have *facts* within that ontology such as “to be a citizen of a country which has neither a president nor a government,” “to be a refugee in your hometown,” or “to have a National Museum which no nation wishes to finance,” “to have a peace agreement, yet be unable to return to your home,” “to be a member of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and be in a unit with those who do not wish to see Bosnia and Herzegovina exist;” we have certain *processes* of social ontology such as “to change a constitution which does not exists” or “to participate in elections in a neighbouring country;” we have certain *states of affairs* such as “to be a 100% member of a national political party whose representatives in the authorities control 20% of the state territory” or “to be a person who is unable to see the borders of his/her own country” or “to be a person unable to cross the borders of other countries.”

To sum up: to be a civilian in a country which is not civil, with a president and government which exist neither nominally nor in reality, to have citizenship of another country in order to be able to travel from your own country. Besides current, there are also *potential* political objects/objectives such as “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” then “the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been adjoined to one of the neighbouring states,” followed by “the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has split from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” and only finally, as an option “the European state of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” or “a member of the European Union, the consociation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

with its own, rather than with the Dayton constitution, with a president and government instead of a tripartite Presidency and Council of Ministers.”

In the logical or rational comprehension of phenomena, processes, states of affairs and facts a “network of beliefs” and a “network of concepts” [7, pp. 95–105] exist, as well as their logical association in depth and breadth, which emerges in the expression of a certain thought, the expression of a certain belief, or simply in the purposefulness and sequencing of physical behaviour. In order to know (understand/interpret) what a theatre is, for example the “Sarajevo War Theatre” one needs to have a concept of theatre, a concept of war and a concept of city. The concept of theatre contains the concept of art, the concept of stage performance, the concept of mimesis, the concept of script, the concept of space, the concept of time, the concept of character, the concept of moral, the concept . . . In order to possess/understand/interpret the concept of war we need to have the concept of conflict, the concept of warring parties, the concept of violence, the concept of defence, the concept of aggression, the concept . . . In order to possess the concept of city . . .

A single syntagm comprising only three terms, such as the “Sarajevo War Theatre,” reveals a profound and logically associated structure of concepts which concept down to experience, to mere things, and on the other hand reaches deep into our mental architecture, into our semantic history and linguistic competence. In order to understand objects/social ontology phenomena such as “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” “State of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” or just “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” we need to possess/understand the concept of citizen, the concept of society, the concept of state, the concept of republic, the concept of ownership, the concept . . . In order to understand the status function present in these concepts, for example in the concept of state and the concept of republic, we need to possess/understand the concept of organised society, the concept of law, the concept of monopoly on the use of force, the concept of government, the concept of elections, the concept of transfer of power, the concept of parliament . . .

Once we exit the conceptual network and enter the plane of experience, i.e. when we leave the logical structure of the language of phenomena and things, then we enter the network of convictions or beliefs which lie in the basis of opinions in general. That’s where we need to raise the question: why does someone believe or possess the conviction that a state which is divided into sovereign national entities has better status functions than a civil democratic republic? Why does someone believe that it is better to have a tripartite presidency in a “triune” state community than a single president elected by all citizens of one republic? Why does someone believe that it is better to have three entity, thirty cantonal and a hundred municipal governments than a single common government? To simplify things even further we can ask: why does someone believe that speculative reasons are better than rational reasons, that the principles of national or religious or militaristic or rigid-ideological communities are better than the principles of civil life and a civil society?

Is it even possible, considering all that has been mentioned, to enter an open field where the structures, facts, states of affairs and processes of the social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina would cease to be signs of contradiction, signs of denial, signs of logical and semantic improbabilities which are persistently produced by the political ontology of a hyper-national attitude and brutal nationalism? In other words: is it possible to find a way for the intentional content of one identification and the logical structure of one conduct based on that intentionality to meet in an un-conflicting way in one representation or in one uncontradictory status function, be it social or political?

It is my intention to bring the “historic” and “social” of the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina into connection with the mental, cultural, economic, social, philosophic, ontogenetic and psychogenetic, the elements on which assumptions are built, from which they are deduced, and which lie in the basis of an identity which establishes itself as a *network or collection of interactive reactions* (individual or collective) to an ideological description of that reality, a reaction to a physical and psychological stimulation, a reaction to communication, a reaction to the interpretation of self and “to self-different being” within the same kind of being. That means: to enter the background of presuppositions of a process, which are realised and which act (produce a physical effect) always and only as ideological consequences of one’s historical and social interpretations. By entering the mentality background one problematises a complex concept of identity, which is related to both political and social facts, as well as facts of cultural and historical ontology.¹

1.1. Rational and Speculative Social Ontology

It is evident that the issue of institutions and the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the background of the mentioned contradictions. If social and political ontology produces such senseless objects/phenomena, facts, states of affairs and processes, then it is necessary to return to rational argumentation which cannot be denied by rational means (a principle which, according to T.M. Scanlon, lies in the basis of rational understanding), and that means providing a rationally acceptable and collectively sufficient answer to the question what is the content and form of institutions. What is in fact an institution and what lies beneath that concept? Is it based only on a collective acceptance (of what?) or is it necessary to define the character of that acceptance: rational or mythological, normative or speculative, based on knowledge or emotions? What are the other social and historical presuppositions of collective acceptance or rejection of some inherently contradictory approach to institutions?

John R. Searle, whose concept of describing an institution we adopt here, states the following: every society is based on collective acceptance, on ascribing functions and on status functions. Collective acceptance is the basis of every society and it consciously and intentionally creates values, relationships, states of affairs, facts, which when ascribed a status function become institutional facts. Status functions are the glue that keeps a society together. *Deontic powers*

lie in the basis of the identification of values and their representation and these powers are created from status functions: rights, duties, responsibilities, permissions, authorities, requests, approvals and certificates. What allows these deontic elements to be legally distributed to society and every individual is the normative structure of institutions which defines the structure of social ontology. What is then an institution? “An institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts” [14, p. 26].

I think that it is now necessary to expand certain terms and to introduce certain new ones. Why do people ultimately identify with such values and relationships which are collectively acceptable? What makes certain themes or forms of certain relationships between people and the relationship of people towards nature more collectively acceptable than others from the background of collective mentality? One possible answer is that every individual wishes to be treated fairly, morally, legally based on recognized, clear and certain rules of behaviour even when that individual avoids such behaviour towards another individual. Or perhaps, and I will anticipate here, because every individual wishes to be understood in his/her actions, opinions, expressions and attitude in the same way as he/she understands himself/herself.

I wish to underline only one thing here: collective acceptance depends on collective intentionality (focus on one common object of identification), on collective identification and on collective representation. I also wish to suggest an application of Davidson’s interpretation concept [6, pp. 125–39] connected with the concept of identity: all these concepts or primary notions stand in the background of human need for radical interpretation of their own identity which is no longer a primary concept, but an interactive network of concepts. What does one mean under radical interpretation of identity? *Radical interpretation or understanding of an identity (individual or collective) is the interpretation/understanding which interprets an identity in a way that it interprets/understands itself.* One more thing, this type of interpretation or understanding needs to be distinguished from charity or generosity (Davidson’s Charity Principle) on the basis of its rational structure which adds to understanding also a network of understanding consequences. To understand someone’s identity means (1) to have a concept of identity in general (2) to have a concept of personal identity and (3) to have a concept of interpretation or understanding of concepts of identity or another person or another nation, i.e. principles according to which they interpret/understand themselves.

A still more profound question is: what is the character of this radical interpretation in relation to representation, expression, social logic and knowledge of people. Is the existence of an institution a substantial sign that a society has a rational or logical structure, or, that it should have and aspire it? The basic idea behind this analysis is that institutional facts cannot be in collision with institutional structure if the logic of social and political ontology is to be functional.

1.2. Social Ontology and the Character of Collective Interpretation

The peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina have several times in their history created a new social ontology, which provides the only possible basis for the development of a single or complex cultural and civilizational world of values compatible and convergent with the world of values of the European nations. The failure of one social ontology and the development of a new one does not leave the cultural and civilizational standards of a nation unchanged. Destruction, reconstruction or restoration of a social ontology always emerges from a new political ontology (new political intentions, aims, objectives). Until now Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a part of some larger entity comprised of different nations (a part of imperial ontologies), but within those entities it always had long periods of progress towards civilizational standards of coexistence, much longer than the periods of conflict produced by hyper-national ideologies. An understanding of a consocial community, its form and substance has always existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, ultimately, it is written down in the birth certificate of this country since its conception.

Political ontology (political subjects, political objectives, political means, political organisations, political systems, political will) has the responsibility to create a new social ontology when the old ontology is destroyed or when it fails to provide firm ground for constitutional, legislative, executive, cultural, economic or education institutions of a certain community. Social ontology is not God-given (even though certain philosophers such as Aurelius Augustin and Ibn Khaldun thought that it was) and man is therefore responsible for an entire world which he creates in accordance with a convention, collective intentionality and status functions which he ascribes to forms of organisation of life which he himself creates.

Is the man-given social ontology rational or speculative, is it a result of the capacities of a man's mind and experiences, or of comparison with the experiences of other nations; or has it gone beyond the limitations of every experience and therefore collided with intellectual principles? This is not an irrelevant question. To be concrete: within the framework of the European mind and European experience, the existence of one republic, one state community of several nations, one consociation, one social ontology which has its structure in its objects (institutions) and has its content in states of affairs and facts (institutional facts) is rationally acceptable. It is entirely speculative to even attempt to prove the impossibility of coexistence, to create totalities and absolute organisations which cancel out and terminate unidentical, different, distinct practices.

Rationality proceeds from certain presuppositions, possible forms, facts which have a certain structure which homologise all levels of a certain idea and granulate into all forms of a certain practice; speculation proceeds from a certain absolute and develops to the level of an absolute, regardless if it takes nothing as something or something as nothing as its starting point. Rationality is subjective and creates an objective ontology; the ontology whose rational argumentation "cannot be disputed by rational means" [5, p. 8] without ending up in a contradiction. The speculative mind rejects exactly this rational argumentation and demands a beginning from a speculative nothing (not the nothing from which

the God of monotheistic religions created the world) which evolves, denies itself and everything else and is aware of its existence because of this denial. Rational argumentation is conducted within the boundaries of what is possible; speculative begins when it crosses the boundaries of possible, when it reaches absolutely true or absolutely untrue reasons for a certain action or decision. That absolute beginning and absolute end comprise the structure of dogmatic thought.

In relation to social and political ontology this text has so far mentioned the general features of two contrasting European approaches to considering the world within the intellectual culture of the world. Speculative criticism of the European concept of rationality, from the standpoint of negative-theological, idealistic-materialistic, nihilistic-positive archaic self-consciousness which first denies itself and then everything else, recognizes no subjective social or political ontology, but only the objective ontology created from the movement of the absolute spirit through history. This absolute or world spirit has manifested itself in our region as a mythical catalyst, as an architect of all our misfortunes, as an ethno-nationalistic spirit which terminates (ethnically cleanses) all other existences (all unidentical ethnic and national identities within its region). How was it possible for speculative interests to block, prevent and disqualify a rationally acceptable structure of one social ontology?

It is visible from several cited examples of objects, facts, processes and states of affairs of the social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina that either a normal (collectively accepted) institutional structure does not exist, which results in non-existence of normal institutional facts (ones that realize deontic relations between people), or that what exists are institutions which produce deviant institutional facts. In either case, the structure and substance of the social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in contradiction and clearly show that the problem lies in institutions, which are neither collectively accepted nor do they produce deontic institutional facts, those that are first chosen as an expression of free will and then of political will of one community, or as a result of collective intentionality, as the content of status functions: legal order, economic security, civil rights and freedoms, religious rights and freedoms, individual prosperity, social prosperity and a high quality of life.

On the other hand, the most speculative segment of European social ontology does not arise from speculative philosophy, from German Mysticism or German Classical Idealism, but from European economic empiricism. Capital and the relationships it creates represent its most speculative element. European political economy has promoted itself through “sociologisation” rather than politicisation of social ontology and through “ontologisation” rather than ideologisation of social knowledge in a historical and geographical materialism designed for capital and profit. Dogmatism of Eurocentrism has always made its social ontology a rational construction within which a new scenario was always discovered for speculative capital. That scenario of capital today is an entirely speculative version of neo-liberalism which in essence means “placing profit ahead of people” [11, p. 35].

Within the rational social ontology of the European community capital controls all sectors. In fact, only a handful of European philosophers and sociologists have realized so far that European speculative capability rests on the interpretation and manipulation of capital, in the world of economy and law, not in the world of philosophy and pure ideas.

1.3. Institutional Facts and Status Functions

The social and historic facts concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be discussed in modal categories and “middle terms” which reduce the risk of anti-thetic argumentation which leads nowhere. The facts of political ontology and the facts of social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be discussed. Certain facts need to be put into statements which can determine the truth value and for which the dependence on some other set of true conditions can be established. For example, to say that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state community of three constitutive nations” is a true and objective statement which has the conditions of its truthfulness in its historical ontology and social ontology of Europe, which recognises the status function of “being a community of three or more nations.” In that status function “Bosnia and Herzegovina” is a normal value, a value of a variable or an argument of that function. However, that historic fact is no longer an institutional and political fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore fails to produce institutional structures. In other words, the ruling ideology (the ruling historic and social interpretation of social ontology) does not ascribe to this fact any status function and no normative consequences derive from it.

Social ontology is a collection of status functions of one community, a collection of conventions which allow a certain society to function as a social community, and the characterisation of social ontology is determined by political ontology. I am certainly not talking here about some immaculately conceived social and political ontology of Europe, which itself is polarised and in constant need of strong corrections in humanistic and revolutionary movements, in anti-globalisation and environmental movements. I am talking about the compatibility of the social and political ontology of BiH with the European. As a consocial community, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a part of the European community of nations which recognises such societies and status functions (institutions) of such societies.

Status functions of social ontology (social institutions) have their *logical structure* in statements/declarations, laws, normative assertions, sanctions, in the integration of the collectively, generally and broadly accepted rule of social organisation, and also in the distribution of the generality and necessity of that rule down to the last individual member of the society. If one status function ascribes the status of a president of state to a certain individual, than that status function is ascribed because it is collectively accepted that he should perform his duties in that function. If a certain piece of paper or a plastic card are ascribed the status function of money, than that piece of paper and plastic card are money, an

institutional fact of a certain society. If one man is at the same time ascribed and denied the function of president, if a piece of paper at the same time has value and does not have value, than the logic of social ontology is contradictory, it is not even modal.

Status functions of political ontology (political institutions) acquire their shape through expressions of political will, expressions of political decisions, selection of political instruments, programmes of political objectives, facts produced by political institutions. If political will for the existence of a certain state as a republic is expressed at a referendum in that state, than that community of nations is given a certain status function of political ontology. If at the same time every possible effort is being made to depreciate that political status function on the territory of that republic, if there are parallel referendums for its independence and confederation with a neighbouring state, if people vote at elections, both in that state and in a neighbouring state, than the logic of that political ontology is paradoxal and speaks volumes about the mentality of that people.

I wish to make a clear statement here: the political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its social ontology are in collision with what is rationally acceptable and with the historically achieved model of a developed society and politics in Europe. Prior to that, they are in an internal collision with the logical structure of a normal society, with the functioning principles of any practice as part of which man purposefully uses certain means for achieving certain objectives. In the background of the creation of these collisions (external and internal) lies dogmatism and it is always connected to the absolute concept. This means that the political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina is formulated on tautologies and contradictions, on the opposition of “absolutely true” (tautological, hyper-national) and “absolutely untrue” (contradictory, anti-national) ideological concepts, rather than on *possible forms of existence* of a normal society compatible and convergent to the communities of nations united within the European frameworks of partnership and cooperation.

2. THREE DOGMAS OF NATIONALISM

Opposition to rational belief or the logical explanation of matters rests on dogmatic belief. Dogma is in the core of claims that deny the rational explanation of a certain occurrence, either physical or social. It denies every other explanation which rests on the connection between causes and consequences which are rationally acceptable, while dogma itself represents a part of a whole which can be either rationally refuted or is refuted by spatiotemporal events. Dogmatic concepts are those which aspire to become an absolute, eternal, final and unchangeable explanation and they constitute a system or a network of unquestionable claims which always lean on a rigidly homogenized context within which they only function.

In the function of instituting the “rescue” or “preservation” of national identity, for which, besides nationally self-awarenessed people, nationalists are also recruited, it is never a single isolated dogma, be it a national economy, national

literature or national education, that is employed. Hyper-national dogmatism cannot exist without a *network of dogmas* which are connected in all directions, along their “logical” structure and semantic intentionality. Dogmatic concepts have their structure, in the same way as non-dogmatic concepts, i.e. those which possess the ability to rearrange their forms and adapt to new content. Nationalists are not dogmatists in only one field or sector of social ontology, but always and in every field.

In a national social ontology or in a national state, an intentional content of all social and cultural possibilities is always set, national content always prefixes deontic content. *Nationalism appears only as additional homogenization of that content in all sectors of social ontology, as a hyper-national point of view or attitude towards other national identities and that homogenization is then politically instrumentalized in the exclusion and denial of others and all that is different from the national content.* What makes that hyper-national point of view or attitude characteristic is that it never exists when there is only one isolated dogma, but only in a network of dogmas which establish a hyper-national belief. A certain dogma justifies itself by citing a broader dogmatic structure or a network of connected “truths” which in a certain culture are justified by specific social development of identity.

Rational self-awareness of a nation on the primary culture and primary language differs from a hyper-national point of view, in the basis of which lies a speculative dogmatic structure of absolute grounding of rights, freedoms and social relations. In the basis of a rational self-awareness lies a rational or logical network of a set of values which a culture in its grounding and expression adheres to and ascribes status functions to facts of the cultural world based on those criteria. These idioms of identification and representation are ground psychogenetically and ontogenetically within an established social ontology which is depend on language, the level of abstraction and generalisation it mediate (from logical granulation and unification) and on the triangulation of the comprehension of individuality, the world and the other within it.

The hyper-national point of view or attitude, or *nationalism*, is unable to provide a basis for a radical interpretation of the other national identity because it is unable to reflect the other identity without resorting to the political primacy of its identity, the primacy of its culture, the values of only its model of living practice, customs, religious facts, its interpretation of history and the exaggeration of its moral system and system of values. At the same time, members of a certain national community can have a partial interpretation of another national community, for example an economic interpretation, formed on the basis of economic standards and the quality of life, which, if they are higher from those of the community interpreting then become acceptable for the majority of that national community, regardless of the differences in culture, language, religion and mentality and this then translates into economic migration and, in modern times, the rapid development of immigrant societies. Later, these differences begin to take centre stage.

2.1. The First Dogma of Nationalism: National Isolation Strengthens National Identity

Ontology of a national identity has its reflection in national institutions: political institutions, cultural institutions, social institutions, education institutions, economic institutions, which serve for the establishment, protection and preservation of national values. National institutions serve for the establishment, protection and development of national facts (historic, geographic, military, civilian, linguistic, ethnic, anthropological, psychological, moral, cultural) which define a national identity as a form of behaviour and a collection of interactive reactions to the natural environment and the international environment. *National identity is a spatiotemporal and a geographical and historical self-awareness of a certain nation which collectively expresses its will for a specific social, political and cultural ontology with which it can identify and the semantics of which it adopts as its representation, seeking that it be accepted and interpreted by other collectives in the same way as members of a certain nation interpret it for themselves.*

This self-awareness on primary culture and primary language, on primary historical and geographical background permeates all national facts in all sectors of social ontology: in national literature, in national philosophy, in national spiritual and social production, national geography and national education, in the national defence system. These are the facts, objects and states of affairs of a national ontology which is built on social ontology. This self-awareness, its semantics, logic and ontology are revealed in the content and structure of institutions of a society. A state-orientated national community territorializes the boundaries of the validity of its identification and representation within the state borders and they become objects of a social ontology.

However, political ontology created by a hyper-national attitude, which at times of crisis in the development of a nation turns into *brutal nationalism*, tasks itself with conservating/isolating a national ontology through national institutions in order to protect the national identity as a national interest, be it by glorifying or monumentalising the background of its nation, or by minimising interaction and association of members of its nation with other nations for different reasons (religious differences, differences in the political system, racial differences, social differences, cultural and other differences), cannot achieve its objective: ideas cannot be stopped at the borders of entities or at the borders of national states. Human society is homogenized in two ways: through practices that are transferred and through ideas that are shared, through universal principles that are transferred and through deontic values that are shared.

People are connected by the living world which they shape with their own hands and opinions according to their needs and principles of their moral. This change, this transition from one practice to another cannot be stopped, nor is it possible to keep those changes only for one nation or for one geographical and historical materialism. The Pythagorean theorem is not merely a rule discovered by a Greek, it is a product of human knowledge which today belongs to human-

ity in Western Europe and America, in the same way as the Chaldeans from Egypt and Syria were unable to preserve it in their mystical temples from Pythagoras who learned survey from them. What is the reason for this? As Gottlob Frege says the Pythagorean theorem is not true because it was created by some special man or special nation, but because its truthfulness is permanent and universal in the human bounds of identification and representation.

Preserving a national identity means protecting it from external influences which would weaken its rigidity or soften some of its components. This means preventing changes in mentality, language, culture, understanding and interpretation of that identity. National elites take upon themselves the protection of national interests as part of the power they exercise and as part of the political ontology they produce. The primary self-awareness of a *national elite* is economic might and based upon it power in the society. They possess economic identity and economic freedom and in this sense an elite of one nation is no different from an elite of another nation.

Because of that economic freedom and economic identity, national elites make transnational alliances, as well as economic and monetary alliances in an easier and faster manner, and also overcome cultural differences faster. Masses of people, without economic identity and economic freedom, mostly rigidly react in all components of identity. One could ironically say that the national elites strengthen cultural identity of the society members who are not in a possession of the economic power, and also weaken their economic capability and freedom, the same way they, through connecting with other national elites, strengthen their own economic power and freedom in international transactions and weaken their cultural identity (culture is for the poor!). The call for protection of national interests is made by the national elite to the people once its economic power is threatened, whether from within or from outside.

Isolation of the identity in a hyper-national self-relationship and attitude does not necessarily lead to strengthening or even to unequivocal and undevelopmental perseverance of a national identity. Within and from the outside of such a unit, the capital-based interests are at work and the disintegration is primarily made to the capital-holding elite (national wealth, or the former state-owned companies which are in a safe possession of profit) and to the ones dependent on their work. On the other hand, identity is a phenomenon characterized as spatiotemporal, conditioned social reaction which shows itself in several different components, as professional, civic, cultural, moral, political, aesthetic and world-view.

Within an individual identity, individualism is expressed through the *network of individual components* which are, at some levels and in some situations, contradictory. Some are capable of change and adaptation, change of the living conditions, while others are less capable of that; they are rigid and are mostly the base for traditional and conservative evaluation of human practice which is constantly innovative. Rejection of changes, especially the ones in practical field of activities, like the use of contemporary information and communication technology, inactivity and incapability of functioning in the intelligent space ambience

full of collections of the new technologies, new methodologies which demand interpretation and interdisciplinarity, shows that the basic cultural habits, semantic history and mentalist perspective are initially connected to the psychogenetic and social formation of an individual.

But that isolation does not strengthen, develop or promote the identity; it is the cause of its weakening and degradation. Failure to accept the modern practice decreases the capability of an individual and people isolating themselves from the usage of modern means for solving problems and for functioning in the daily life. Reduction in the use of means leads us directly to the reduction of mental competence and capability of life activities and social consciousness and contributes even more to the degradation of identity. It is known in anthropology, cognitive psychology and cognitive science that the human rational capability, both cognitive and linguistic, develops faster through social intelligence than through mere instrumental intelligence [2, p. 10].

It is not possible in national isolation to either protect national identity from acceptance of a bad practice or from negative interpretations of the national identity. Identity has always been an interactive phenomenon, even at the level of personal identity. Reduction of work of the people to the primitive way of production, to the traditional expression of life's interests and to rigid implementation of the religious practice, without adjustments to the space, time and knowledge achieved, archives the world which is, by its functional nature, connective, and which, naturally, asks to be formalized in the status functions of a society. A smart, skilful and educated man who has isolated himself from others does not exist, the same way that a smart and productive nation, isolated from other nations, does not exist. Human being is a being which, apart from consciousness possesses self-consciousness. A nation is also a being which shows self-consciousness through its language and interprets itself as a nation in its political ontology.

The biggest advocates of hyper-national attitude and the closest of the collectives have the need of a radical interpretation of their individuality, their identity and cultural ground of their collective intentions, which realize their objectification within a social and political ontology. *Radical interpretation of the national identity demands that one's individual or national identity is interpreted and understood in the way it interprets and understands itself.* Isolation of a people from others in an area (whether linguistic, cultural, religious, political, educational) can never lead to a radical interpretation or radical understanding of that people, its cultural and political will, its physical and psychological reactions, its social and political ontology; for isolation annuls the conditions which make possible for the other people to interpret it in the way it interprets itself.

Absence of the radical interpretation of the identity of a nation, culture or civilization leads to conflict predispositions, to prejudice which are always a subject of manipulation. A man is never what he thinks himself to be; nor is a nation or its culture what it perceives itself to be. Without comparative consciousness which is formed in the comparative practice of exchange of cultural

ontology and cultural capital, it is not possible to set the standards of evaluation, the standards of development of a nation in the future; it is not possible to develop the immunity of identity and capability of adaptation to the future changes within an isolated environment and in the world.

Reduction of cultural and personal identity to a single component, for example, religious, out of which the entire essence of a people is interpreted, both in theory and in practice, will first lead to isolation in all other components and the people's identity, without leaving any possibility of an individual to show his priorities in relation to the quality of life.

2.2. The Second Dogma of Nationalism: Multicultural and Multinational Communities are not Possible

The concept of a multicultural society followed after the concepts of *assimilation*, *integration* and *pluralism*, which were created and introduced as political facts of political ontology in multiethnic countries, formed after the great immigration processes, completed by mid-twentieth century in Europe, failed to successfully subserve ethnic differences in a society to the members of one national identity. Assimilation, in the form of amalgamation, failed, the same way as integration, to eliminate the need of different ethnicities to preserve their culture and language in the territory of a country which accepted those peoples and within which the ethnic niches were made. Experience from the United States and Canada, which are pots for fusion of cultures and ethnic particularities, as well as the growing nationalist movement in the European countries [8], have shown that it is necessary to continue looking for a model of the society which will not result in the balkanization of the area (ethnic cleansing and genocide).

The concrete social state of *multiculturalism* was necessarily joined by the terms of *multiculturalism* and *interculturalism*. As the concept of social ontology or the *de facto* state of affairs, the concept of "multiculturalism" should be differed from "multiculturalism," which is the concept of political ontology, that is, a normative demand of a society towards ethnicities and individuals, meaning to respect the right of other ethnicities to use their culture and language. Different theories observe multicultural societies differently [8, pp. 27–41], but inevitability of different ways of social interweaving and blending of peoples in the process of accelerated and mass creation of "immigrant societies" as a "model of coexistence and possible tolerance" [3, p. 30] in the world and in Europe is of the essence.

It should be stressed that, in today's world, owners of the international companies and multinational corporations, who act via the bureaucratic centres of their associations, are the bearers of the idea of transnational identity and, at the same time, advocates of theories on possibilities of existence of multinational, multicultural, multiconfessional states. Owners of the capital are, as a matter of fact, now internationally connected national elites, representatives of the "weak theory of identity" (transnational identity), of the social theory based on the knowledge and of the theory of creation of the intelligent space ambience

[13, pp. 17–47]. Of course, they will support such an option as long as it brings them profit and as long as it reflects their economic power. No philosophy and no sociology may guarantee that they will always want it, on the contrary.

Neo-liberalism paves way to the *international capital*, which tears down the borders in Europe, changes the state constitutions and creates conditions for an undisrupted travel around the world in the form of merchandise, money and information, and for return in the form of profit. It is, actually, that speculative substance of the society of Western Europe, which takes the rational form of political and social ontology. The most prominent philosophers and sociologists of today have characterized the cooperation between neo-liberalism, pragmatism and international capital as the “new imperialism” [9], [11].

That is one view of multinational and multicultural society. Owners of capital, economic and political power have always been able to find an ideology to increase their capital and make the rich richer and the poor poorer. The way to put an end to that is not rejection or negation of the possibility of survival of multinational, multicultural and multiconfessional communities, although there is a danger for those ideas to be abandoned, just like factories from which the capitalists have withdrawn production and moved it to the other part of the world, once they found cheaper labour. Multinational communities are possible primarily as social communities of citizens and then as consociations of constitutive peoples.

Multinational and multicultural society is possible as consociation of partner (non dominant, non exclusive) nations who share the same territory and who participate in the spiritual world which is a result of their radical interpretation of political, cultural, economic, social, physical, psychological and professional identity. Passing a constitution and laws of a country which has a rational consciousness on the primary culture and consciousness that there is the other man, the other people which also has the right to an identity and consciousness on the primary culture and language is simple. The functioning of such a society is simple, until the political elites start creating the hyper-national (dominant, exclusive) political ontology which leads towards nationalism. Economic liberties of the people, political and human rights, decrease the power of national elites and neutralize their rhetoric about the threatened peoples and their call to the people for protection of the national rights which are sent at the time when their economic power is threatened.

Membership in transnational organizations may ensure such practice, as well as implementation of standards for separation of one practice. According to Peter Kivisto,

Existence of the European Community has strengthened the idea of a multicultural citizenship. The issue is not that we have stepped forward into the post-national world in which transnational organizations, such as the EU, corrupt the nations' prerogatives. The issue is that the European Community, in the context of Western Europe, had to play a role in the adjustment of a variety of national practices and policies for the sake of the interest of a coherent position of the EU [8, p. 185].

Radical interpretation of an identity in multinational and multicultural societies has its foundations and reasons, for it develops a different form of tolerance from the indifferent relation of bureaucratic structures towards some non-canonical practices and enables their reoccurrence until a moment in which they could be codified. The shape of tolerance which is necessary in the radical interpretation of identity of the other, other individual or other nation, liberates the space and possibility for selection of the identity preferences. In what way? In the way that the radical tolerance, not an indifferent tolerance, tolerates itself what it tolerates to others; that is, it is aware that consequences of tolerance also mean change of the position or status in a society or position in a community.

Identity is a dynamic spatiotemporal phenomenon, a network or collection of reactions interconnected and mutually conditioned. It is possible that someone supporting an X football club is not an avid supporter of the hyper-national attitude characteristic of a supporter of a Y football club, because the persons of different nationalities play at the X football club, while the Y club is one-national. It is possible for the X person to marry a Y person because he/she possesses a consistent moral behaviour and attitudes, regardless of the ethnic or national affiliation, not preferred by that particular community. It is possible that the X person is religious and studies logic and philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, for he/she is of the opinion that it is necessary to be able to rationally argument one's attitudes. Rigidity or softness of this network of identity components or collection of identity reactions, which is positioned differently in every individual, is always conditioned by psychological and social preferences of an individual, and is not always and in every situation subjected to the criteria of hyper-national attitude and national affiliation.

Individuality of human rights and liberties is the principle which ensures the rational "initial equilibrium" which the society owes to all members of the social agreement [5]. Identification with a national community and expression of affiliation to culture and symbols of that community is an individual human right. However, it is also an individual human right not to identify with one's national community, or to identify with some other national community, or not to consider national identification and representation to be the decisive element of human relations. Voting for the most capable candidate at elections, regardless of his/her nationality, is an individual human right. Otherwise, the once-destroyed concept of an isolated national identity, which determines the "dynamics" of every individual in isolation, will fail to enable the rights, liberties or their dynamics.

This is where the issue of deductive or inductive politics opens time and again: is it necessary to form a legal state based on individual human rights and liberties or rather on collective rights and liberties? Can individual human rights be deduced without trouble from the collective rights and liberties or is it necessary to build all that is collective from that which is individual? If one considers private property and individual happiness of people to be at the very foundations of progress towards any kind of collective ownership and collective well-being,

then the question is if it is necessary to support the inductive political logic. The most important issue is existence of both kinds of rights and the possibility of consuming those rights. "Existence of both kinds of rights" here means practicing the rights on the daily basis, not their mere existence in philosophical and social theories which, as appears, represent an obligation to no one.

Multinational and multicultural societies offer more opportunities to an individual to freely form his identity, through choices, without the pressures of collective, especially national criteria. A multinational society such as the one existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the environment it exists and functions, did not necessarily have to go the way it had gone through from 1992 to 1995. No one has profited from going that way, not in Bosnia and Herzegovina and not in the region. Results of that "voyage," to which the peoples were pushed by force of brutal nationalism, and which were displayed in the ethnic cleansing and genocide, are proof that, in comparison to the coexistence and tolerance of differences that are not as huge, the one-national madness has no value and cannot lead to positive facts, neither in political, nor in social, nor in historical and cultural ontology.

2.3. The Third Dogma of Nationalism: Transnational Society Annuls National Identities

To understand a national social ontology means to understand the global social ontology; to understand the global social ontology means to master the technique of constitution of social objects, facts, processes and situation of things which constitute the social institutions. The technique of constitution of a society is actually always made up of procedures of passing and implementation of laws which protect the human identity in all the sectors of society, not only and primarily national identity. To understand a national economy or a national literature means to understand the global economy or world literature; to understand the global economy and world literature means to master a technique of managing the capital or a technique of managing the language or literature forms.

There is nothing strange about that: the concept of identity is exclusively holistic, interactive, interpretative, communicational, spatiotemporal phenomenon which has its dimensions and rules of constitution. Are we now in a position to expand that approach and say: to understand a national institution means to understand the institution in general or the concept of institutional organization of social and political life within which some facts may appear as social and historical themes, as possibilities of functioning of a social system within wider social systems, wider social and political ontologies. Acceptance of rational cognitive principles and acquisition of rational linguistic and cognitive competences enables the narrowing of space for arguments of hyper-national attitude and hyper-national interpretation of political and social relations.

The idea of a transnational society is not new, although it has never been realized outside the works of some philosophers. Today, it has become the leading

social idea which comes not only from the philosophy of freedom, but also from the metaphysics of capital, from political economy related to the fluctuation of capital, merchandise and people in the world; from the neo-liberal philosophy of market and globalization processes. It has again been proven that the most influential philosophical ideas of the West are actually economic ideas and concepts: it is not about the movement of spirit and function of concept; it is about the speculative phenomenology of the capital which necessarily keeps finding itself a new form. It is specifically the case that the European documents and the European science-related research projects (creating the excellence networks, project integrations) insist upon the identity research in globalization processes, that is, upon the research of possibilities of formation of a transnational identity.

In the process, information and communication technology help eliminate certain borders in Europe: language, culture and religious differences. Those borders remained after the unification of the 25 European countries with a single parliament and constitution. How is it possible for technology to eliminate those borders? Behind information and communication technology, there is another kind of language, which is different than the one which built the national society institutions: that is the artificial language, the language of expert systems, the language of computers, the language of a new world process in Europe: it is the language of assembling, processing and manipulating information. Information is now the raw material. Anyone attempting to participate in a profitable work process needs to learn to assemble, store, process and use a piece of information. Muscles and the natural languages of industrial halls are of no use; it is IT education and artificial languages that the programs are developed on.

Globalization has made the international society desirable not only for the owners of capital, but also for the ordinary people who have a possibility to participate in a post-modern compression of space and time which has brought the worlds, cultures, nations, languages and civilizations closer together. The fact that those processes have mobilized and made the identity reactions of the modern society more dynamic, dependable and interactive is undisputable. Information and communication technology, when used globally, enables the society engineering; creation of a knowledge-based society, creation of procedures and institutional algorithms for solving problems, which are available only to the users of the new technologies. New institutions and a new social ontology, in which only the technically/functionally literate members of the society, regardless of their national affiliation, cultural, religious or language differences, may participate, are formed from the artificial languages and logical syntax. An intelligent space ambience is created, encompassing all the human surrounding; inhabiting all the spaces and components of the human identity.

Man changes both as a practical and theoretical being. He changes through his ideas and actions which are brought to life with new ideas. New ideas and new actions are formed from a new approach to solving problems and from a new way of using the rational competence in postulating the relations of cause and effect. That development cannot be stopped, for it comes from an identity of a human being as a member of a species, as a being producing his own species.

National identity surfaces in that relationship, because everybody partakes in it with certain capacity. Development of the human identity, as a species, defines also the development of national identity. Peoples who have, by the wholeness of their mentality, changed the way of production, improved the quality of life, ensured the economic power of the society, stopped the conflicts in their territory, found and produced medicine for diseases, are today called the developed world, a developed and rich society. Peoples who have wasted their substance to the metaphysical, mythological, religious and historic interpretations of the physical and intellectual world and of the human activities, failed to produce the means for actions in the world and they are today called the underdeveloped peoples and cultures.

This is, of course, only a simplified description of the “possibilities of the nation and society,” behind which numerous other factors exist, such as the unbalanced distribution of wealth in the world. However, both the cultural and national identity of a people also means the extent of freedom that people has been able to realize in the past and present, as well as the society that people used to live in and the leaders it has chosen. National identity is not God-given. There is a price for its stagnation and a price for its development. Numerous cultures, numerous peoples, numerous languages have disappeared in the history and others have been formed. Most of them did not disappear in the processes of assimilation, amalgamation, integration, pluralization, interculturalization, hybridization or creolization, but in brutal aggressions, conquests, genocide and ethnic cleansing of territories.

Transnational society has become the “casted” open net of the world, which may be a maze for some ethnic and national identities in which they can disappear from the stage forever, or in which they can become participants and partners in the process of creation of a better common practice which makes life easier and more attractive. The peoples who failed to create a better society within their state borders are incapable of creating a better transnational society, the same way the intolerant national societies are not able to create a tolerant international society.

3. THE LOGIC OF CONSOCIATION

The present social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina *does not have* the normal status functions characterized by logical, functional and *rationaly acceptable structure* that is comparable to the structure of status functions in the organized and developed European societies. That is the reason why its objects, facts, states of affairs and processes are constantly in contradiction with the normal status functions of the open and contemporary society. The present political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not possess a normal intentional and collective agenda (the deontic values); it does not possess the normal intentional objects and intentional activities because it produces the tautologically separate systems, or isolated consciousness of the separate corpus, which do not cooperate as a whole and which place the ethno national dogmatism ahead of the life

agenda (individual and collective freedoms, individual and collective economic well-being, individual and collective human rights, etc.).

In the history of development of nations, in the process of their positioning, identification and models of representation of their self-consciousness, two main forms of establishment of relations within a political geography have been defined. Primarily, the *adaptive national extension* (coexistence, entanglement, joint institutions) of two or three national communities in an area, whose social interests have become entwined to an extent that they necessarily produce a consocial political ontology. On the other hand, a divergent political ontology of the political geography is possible, as we have seen for ourselves; the *aggressive national extension* (seizure of territories, wars, aggressions, annexation, ethnic cleansing, genocide) of different national communities in an area, trying to isolate one from another because of the historic heritage or only because of the striving to become a part of another state community they consider to be their mother country.

Michael Walzer, in the book *On Toleration* talks about the *five social models of coexistence* and, in the chapter entitled “Consociations,” he gives the examples of Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon and Cyprus, as well as of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the recent history [3, p. 22]. I will shortly present the possibilities of consociation, according to Walzer:

1. consociation is a heroic program,
2. consocial societies are without bureaucratic distance,
3. different national groups tolerate each other in consociation,
4. consociation is a simple, non-mediated competition of two or three communities,
5. consociation enables free negotiation between the political parties,
6. consociation enables free agreement on constitutional arrangement,
7. consociation enables free formation of institutions,
8. consociation enables free conclusion of political agreements for the purpose of protection of divergent interests.

Examples of consociation named by Walzer do not go in favour of such a model of organization of the state community. Belgium and Switzerland are examples of a successful consociation, Lebanon, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from a society based on any kind of productive and development-oriented principle. Political ontology of a society, even consocial, is a result of the realistic relations of all the subjects of a society at a certain point in time and in a certain space, towards the social ontology of that society, that is, towards the existence of social objects, social processes and social facts. It is, at the same time, the ontology of values or ontology of deciding in favour or against, and the most preferred ontology of a poli-national community. Successful consociation is possible only as a consociation of citizens and peoples in a space and time.

It is possible to add the *difference in the type of consociation* to the test conducted by Michael Walzer: the *completed consociations* or organized consocial societies, like Switzerland and Belgium, stand opposite the *uncompleted consociations* or unorganized consocial societies, like Lebanon, Cyprus, Bosnia

and Herzegovina. One may say that, in the first type, social ontology has produced the political ontology, that is, the social interest of national communities in an area is realized as political will and political interest. In the second case, the divergent political ontology had preceded the destruction of a kind of the social ontology, and has still not offered a satisfactory construction of a rationally acceptable social ontology.

What kind of intentional and collective agenda is necessary to exist in political ontology in order to develop a normal social ontology with the status functions that have their logical and purposeful structure? Here I will mention the three key prerequisites a consociation needs to fulfil in order to be able to form economic, military, monetary, territorial and mentality associations. In that sense, one should keep in mind that the economic stability of all the peoples entering a consociation is vital for a completed consociation, which means a standard of economic performances of the citizens, a standard of political freedoms and human rights. Those are the criteria or the standards that potential members of narrow or broad consocial communities need to have achieved. But, in order to be able to realize the concrete demands of any “road map”, it is necessary to fulfil certain conditions in the sense of mentality of peoples and individuals. Here, I will mention only three conditions that are immediately connected with the notion of identity.

3.1. The First Condition for a Consocial Community: the Comparative Experience of Consciousness

It is possible to characterize identity, within the framework of social and political ontology, as an interactive collection of reactions (physical, psychological, linguistic, economic, moral, ethical, logical, social, mental, professional, working, etc.), individual or collective, which is formed in communication, in interpretation of oneself and the other, in exchange of representation and acceptance or refusal of value identification [13]. How is it possible to, in that context, characterize transnational identity? Transnational identity is a network or collection of reactions, which emerges from comparative intentionality and comparative collective consciousness. What is it that makes collective intentionality of an isolated national reaction, which stands in the basis of development of a national social ontology or national institutions, different from comparative collective intentionality and comparative collective consciousness which determines the status functions of an intentional society?

Comparative intentionality is at the very basis of human practice, practice of the being who knows it is not alone in the world and who draws, from the knowledge on existence of the other and different in the world, a possibility of existence of practices and values that are identical to or different from one’s own, which can be better or worse, which can be rejected or accepted, and which can trigger a reflection on one’s own practice. *Comparative reflection* is the main part of institutional development of a society, for it is this constant reflex-

iveness in a reflexive context that is an important characteristic of modernity lived by a being.

That is the context of complete reflexivity which is the third major influence on the dynamism of modern institutions. Reflexivity of modernity means sensitivity of all the aspects of social activity and material relations towards nature for a continual revision in the light of modern information and knowledge. Such information or knowledge is no coincidence for the modern institutions, but rather constitutive—it is a complex phenomenon, for many possibilities of reflection on reflexivity exist in the modern social conditions [10, p. 20].

The following question needs to be asked in this context: What conditions has Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfilled to join an association of peoples such as Europe? In other words, Why does Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the family of the European peoples? The second important question follows immediately: Why is Bosnia and Herzegovina not able to enter any kind of integration with the developed countries of West Europe? One should not spend many words on proving the claim that it would be better and more useful for the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have always lived in a community, and who can live in a consociation, to cease the speculative improvement of “the nothing,” to reject the hyper-national attitude, nihilism and sacrifice of an ordinary human life, in favour of living practices based on intellectual and cultural capital, values of which can be rationally explained, argued and accepted by a healthy human mind and used for creation of a better and more just society.

One simple answer to the first question is possible to find in characterization of the mentality of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who want to live a civilized life (I do not refer here to political or religious elites who have been “trained” somewhere outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, either in the East or in the West): the general image of the world in the minds of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is convergent; cultural values which have dominated in this area were formed interculturally; customs do not differ drastically and can be radically interpreted; confessional differences have been rationally accepted and can be accommodated with radical tolerance; languages of the peoples are compatible; grammar of those languages is the same regardless of the different terms used; and, finally, logical structure determining an identity and which is at the core of language structures is the same. That means that the mentality differences are bridgeable.

Furthermore, that logical structure is rationalistic, developed from top to bottom and laterally, the way the hierarchy of beliefs, opinions and actions is connected, via the principle of cause and effect. All that says that the ontogenetic and psychogenetic characteristics of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are generally compatible with the mental and more narrowly psychological structures of the European peoples, regardless of the fact that some elites want to connect the peoples with some closer or more distant cultures and mentalities. *A culture that is not lived and a language that is not thought in cannot serve as a basis for a rationally accepted identification, or as a basis for either personal or*

national identity. Comparative consciousness is formed naturally inside a spatiotemporal compression and that is why the phenomenon of cultural syncretism is formed within a historical and geographical materialism, not via connection with the remote paradoxical or even mystic and speculative practices.

Transnational comparative intention is the product of *global tangibility of human practices* within a “postmodern spatiotemporal compression” [1] and their interactive reflection. That global tangibility/accessibility of human practices or the interactivity of the living practices and their mutual reflection in a modern society is the glue which holds the international communities together.

3.2. The Second Condition for a Consocial Community: a Society Lead by Tolerance

It is exactly in the European social ontology that the need has arisen and a demand was formulated for an indifferent relationship of the authorities ranging from contrasting religious standards in one area, to certain differences in religious practice, the senseless opposition of which led to bloody and mass conflicts. The idea that the ruling structure adopts an *indifferent relationship* towards the differentiated religious practices supposed to result in relaxation for the society of Western Europe, whose invisible ontology of freedom in the area of beliefs drifted to Catholic and Protestant. Some theologians of the time (Calvin, Luther) and philosophers (John Locke) advocated an indifferent and neutral relationship of authorities towards certain religious issues. This indifference remained to this day a model of tolerance (as behaviour), although some theoretical attempts were made to expand the notion of tolerance (as a theoretical relationship) to the topics of justice.

But, is tolerance only a *neutral attitude* or an indifferent relationship; or do we need to talk about presuppositions and consequences of tolerance? Is a tolerant state possible without tolerant individuals? Is it possible to limit the tolerance to actions of individuals in a given social situation? Can one tolerate to others what one refuses to tolerate to himself? Presuppositions of tolerance are intrinsic and are integrated into the social consciousness of a human being as a member of the human kind. The man’s social being would not be possible without tolerance of the other and the different within the same kind.

Radical interpretation of the identity is, as a matter of fact, the non-indifferent form of tolerance, that is, radical tolerance is the way of actions and opinions in which the man reflects the consequences of his own actions and opinions in the relationship towards the other and the consequences of actions of the other towards himself. Tolerance is always connected to the issue of identity, for identity is always expressed as the conduct of value or attitude or reaction towards one’s own activities or activities of the other, whether practical or theoretical.

One should now ask: is distinctiveness, authenticity, self-consciousness on primacy of one’s own culture and language lost in the meeting with the other? What are really the consequences of tolerance of the other and of the different?

The consequences of reflection exist, as well as consideration of the status functions and intentional agenda, of the world that is one's own and individual to national and international. Tolerance without consideration and indifferent comparison which does not expand the human knowledge may result in negative consequences. Reflexive tolerance does not leave the man indifferent, for it includes both the subject and the object of tolerance in the same circle; for it contributes the adaptation of the people to their own and to the reactions of others.

Identity is not lost in that way, but rather, it is perfected, supplemented, rearranged and adapted to the new conditions of appearance. Those conditions cannot be removed by avoidance of civilized standards, for the phenomena through which they are brought into light imbue our conscious and involuntary reaction to the environment. The man has evolved from Homo Habilis to Homo Erectus, from Homo Erectus to Homo Sapiens, and all the way to Homo Informaticus. Speaking on the basis of the human prehistory and, on the basis of proofs of neurobiology, all the stages of the human identity the man has gone through until this very day are present in the human brain, but, more importantly, nobody today feels nostalgic about the stone, bow and arrow. The development of human society and transformation it brings, means development of the human identity, development and change of the human reactions, both individual and collective, in favour of the new values that are formed in a context and intercontextually, in a culture and interculturally.

3.3. The Third Condition for a Consociate Community: a Society Based on Freedoms

The leading idea of the contemporary Europe is the *idea of the knowledge-based society*. The result of that idea should be a new intelligent space ambience and a new society based on the knowledge that has, at its basis, neoliberalism, globalization and globally applied information and communication technology. That should lead towards the creation of an expert society, capable of being compared to the American society. In regard to those ideas, it is perhaps necessary to *differently centre the quality of human life*, which is never according to the rules prescribed by engineers of social ontology. Behind the procedures, both expert and theological, there is a semantic history and perspectivism of a mental background which is developed in accordance to the qualitative patterns. One of the most powerful archetypal patterns of individual and collective consciousness is freedom, and, within it, economic freedom.

There are two concepts of freedom in the European tradition: the *speculative freedom*, freedom of opinion, within a broader concept of the phenomenology of spirit which primarily determines itself and then the limits of its scope. Everything that is beyond the reach (the entire senses-felt reality) and that cannot be brought to the face of the Welt Spirit which happens only in Europe and in the West (the Eurocentrism) is not worth the recognition. That speculative, in essence, a theological concept of freedom stands opposite the *rational practical freedom* within a wider concept of conflict of differences, social, class and com-

petitive/individual differences, which realize the area of realistic freedom within economic freedom, private ownership and individual well-being. It is on these, “invisible” ontologies that the modern European societies are based.

Without the spectrum of freedoms which provide an individual with substantial power or capability, it is not possible to imagine the developmental concept of the society and it is not possible to construct the bottom-up ideology as “the sutcture of the society structure” [12], which endangers the human rights and political freedoms in the smallest extent possible. Without the spectrum of economic freedoms it is not possible to think of a potential or rational initial equilibrium for every individual in a society. Without the “capability approach” in economy (represented by Amartya Sen) the people’s autonomy in the decision-making processes related to daily issues or issues that concern the selection of social or political ontology is not possible. Economic freedoms and economic equality enable self-reliance, which is a part of the concept of individual and collective intention and individual and collective acceptance.

Amartya Sen, an esteemed professor of economy, a lecturer in Great Britain, India and America; Nobel Prize Laureate for Economy in 1998, comments in his book *Development of Freedom* on economic transactions in his surroundings, and gives an example from his childhood:

One afternoon, I was playing—I must have been ten or so—in the garden of our family house in the town of Dhaka, now the capital of Bangladesh, when a man ran through the door painfully screaming and bleeding extensively; he was stabbed in the back. Those were the days of riots (in which Hindu and Muslims killed each other), which had preceded independence and separation of India and Pakistan. The stabbed man, by the name of Kader Mia, was a Muslim, a labourer, who used to come to a house in our neighbourhood because of business—and for a miserable wage. He had been stabbed in the street by one of the city assassins within our wide Hindu area. As I was giving the man some water, crying for the adults’ help, and later, when my father transferred him to the hospital, Kader Mia said that his wife had told him not to enter the enemy area in such rough times. But, Kader Mia had to leave in search of work and money, for his family had nothing to eat. The toll for his economic freedom was death, because that was what happened later in the hospital . . . The lack of economic freedom can give birth to a lack of social freedom, in the same way as the lack of social and political freedom can give rise to a lack of economic freedom [4, p. 8].

Understanding the social development through institutions is not really possible without understanding the interactive tangle of individual and collective freedoms, that is, political freedoms and human rights which constitute the human freedom. Those freedoms determine the quality of life and mental perspective of a society. In the “freedom-centred development” approach, Amartya Sen is advocating, freedoms are taken as the constitutional and instrumental principles of development of the human society, that is, as goals and means. In the process, it is necessary—as Amartya Sen states—to clearly define instrumental perspective of the human freedom, which consists of (1) political freedoms, (2) economic

benefits, (3) social opportunities/chances, (4) clear guarantees and (5) safety of protection. In the same way, a coherent and rational development of a society is not possible without social consciousness, without solidarity and without universal ethics of responsibility. Without a philosophy of freedom and without its categories, economic freedom is impossible to realize; it is also not possible to claim or use freedom, whether within a national state or for the construction of a consocial community of citizens and peoples.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not Bosnia and Herzegovina meets the historical presuppositions for membership in the European union of nations should no longer be an issue. Its social and historical ontology has a *possibility* of the status functions which such a community recognizes, accepts and according to which it functions. Political ontology is the issue, that is, the issue is the political construction of the state ontology. What do the political forces of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina plan to do with the country? What are the means at their disposal? What are the political programs of the ruling political parties? How powerful is the opposition? Which concept is supported by members of the European Community? What are their final intentions?

The *political ontology of hyper-national* attitude and open nationalism is at the scene today; the same nationalism which had brought about the aggressive events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the national mimicry in the present time. National parties hold the power and are unable to create a consociate society. Instead, they organize national territories/reservates whose representatives cooperate in the process of destruction of the idea of multicultural and multinational societies, of tolerance and comparative consciousness. Without rearranging the political ontology, it will not be possible to rearrange the social ontology. Neither is possible without the reconstruction of the existing logical structure of the society and without centring the practice onto freedom and quality of life.

Perhaps it is necessary to ask: what is the periphery and what is the centre of political ontology of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina? What is necessary and what is accidental in that social structure or in the structure of the very core of our existence here and now? What can the political ontology, as a social practice of making decisions, solving problems, creating positive intentional agenda, enabling the function of the daily life of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, do? It can do everything. It can do nothing. It can pretend to be deaf and blind to the existence of logic and the axiom of social life. It can also find a functional, simple algorithm for passing decisions on what the education should be like, what the human rights should be like, what the economy should be like. Political ontologists of a social ontology may be deaf or blind, educated or uneducated, trained in democracy or in despotism, progressive or ruthless and intentionally negative.

It is possible that the *hyper-national elites* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which create social and political ontology, “know all this but do not want to un-

derstand.” It is possible that they “know everything but they are unable to change the situation right now.” It is possible that they are waiting for “a right opportunity” or for the “right possibilities” for something else. What is the opportunity? Should we wait for it? Or maybe there is no opportunity, for they simply hate the peoples living with them. They have, as they have stated themselves, led the war because of that hatred, they killed and got killed because of it. They need not be called for logic and rationality. *A pointer on their nationalistic compass always shows them their historic and social presuppositions.* Their semantic history and mental perspective are set and oriented differently and they developed differently. That is why their reactions are rigidly expressed identity components.

Are the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina capable (economically, socially, psychologically, communicationally, culturally, politically) of realizing an acceptable consociation, a community which is not without risks and in which paper roses do not grow; in which the ministers do not wear neither black nor pink glasses, in which the family and mafia clans, nepotism, unbearable tolerance of indifference, intolerance, lack of freedom, depravation, religious exclusiveness and the lack of economic power do not rule? It is necessary to stop dreaming about coexistence as the immediate cause one should not invest in, as the cause not worth knowledge or education, as the cause in which it is possible to isolate oneself and preserve one’s own identity in a collective or individual isolation.

Social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be equivalent of a *wider social ontology* and a *wider historical ontology*, namely, the ontology of the European community and the history of the European nations. That is because Bosnia and Herzegovina has a possibility of satisfying the status functions which could be equivalent to the status functions of the European countries. As a civil state community of nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina has references in the European political ontology. As a religious or militaristic or rigidly-ideological state community of nations it has no references. There is no religious or militaristic or rigidly-ideological form accepted in Europe as a state structure, as a social ontology providing all the citizens with the *equilibrium of initial freedoms and chances* which is something every society owes to an individual. As a community of equal peoples and free citizens, its political ontology could be equivalent to the European political ontology.

It was necessary to make a distinction between (1) self-conscious national attitude, (2) hyper-national attitude or behaviour which rests upon a network of dogmas and (3) an openly nationalistic behaviour which is brutally realized through aggressive politics of destruction of the other and the different. What modern society imposes by its existence is a way out from a closed, isolated and inner experience of the people and individuals and an immediate entrance to reflection, determination and comparison with the experiences of other peoples and individuals. There is a wider ontology and knowledge than is the ontology and knowledge of the first person or primary culture or national identity. It is only through opening towards the other and the different that a logical answer to

the following question is possible: Can one rationally form an idea of (4) a transnational attitude or behaviour and what are the disadvantages and the advantages of such an idea?

Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to conduct a serious rational reconstruction of its social and political ontology, and not only because it needs to enter the European Union. That needs to be done because of the mental health of the peoples and the quality of life of the peoples and citizens in this area. It is certain that such a reconstruction cannot be planned or realized by the people who do not accept the laws of thinking, the laws of human organization, the standards of modern life, the good and evil of the postmodern society, the standards of the information and communication technology, the standards of religious tolerance, the standards of economic freedoms, the standards of political rights, the standards of quality of human life. The speculative interests of capital owners, be they national or transnational, can only be caught into a rational network of convictions and a rational network of opinions based upon it. Without such an understanding, it is not possible to start a new practice which would eliminate the contradictions from the daily lives of people. Those contradictions arise every day: to possess only on paper not in reality, to exist only on paper not in reality.

NOTES

1. The question of identity is a part of every question of logic, ontology and epistemology of society, but issues mostly related to the notion of national identity in the broadest sense, as the central notion from which different modules of interpretation follow, and in a more narrow sense related to the concept of hyper-national behaviour, nationalistic behaviour and the possibilities for a transnational attitude or behaviour will be discussed here.

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Chapter Two. The Cultivation of Logical Traditions: the Beginning

Bosnia Porphyriana: An Outline of the Development of Logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract: The essay is a short outline of the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina through several periods of history: period of Ottoman occupation and administration of the Empire, period of Austro-Hungarian occupation and administration of the Monarchy, period of Communist regime and administration of the Socialist Republic and period from the aftermath of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day (the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina) and administration of the International Community. For each of the aforementioned periods, the essay treats the organization of education, the educational paradigm of the model, status of logic as a subject in the educational system of a period, as well as the central figures dealing with the issue of logic (as researchers, lecturers, authors) and the key works written in each of the periods, outlining their main ideas. The work of a Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry, *The Introduction* (Greek: Εἰσαγωγή; Latin: *Isagoge*; Arabic: *Īsāgūǧī*), can be seen, in all periods of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the main text, the principal textbook, as a motivation for logical thinking. That gave me the right to introduce the syntagm *Bosnia Porphyriana*.

1. Introduction

2. Period of occupation and administration of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463–1878)

2.1. Educational paradigms, schools and subjects

2.2. Works on logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina written in Arabic

- 2.3. *Works on logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina written in Latin*
- 3. *Bosnia Porphyriana*
 - 3.1. *Porphyry's Isagoge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in works written in Arabic*
 - 3.2. *Porphyry's Isagoge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in works written in Latin*
 - 3.3. *Porphyry's Isagoge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnian*
- 4. *The period of occupation and rule of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878–1918)*
 - 4.1. *Clerical institutes, medresahs and ruzdijas in the Monarchy*
 - 4.2. *Individual works and authors*
- 5. *The period of Socialist regime in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1945–1992)*
 - 5.1. *Authors and works in logic*
 - 5.1. *Authors and works in logic*
- 6. *The Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2009)*
 - 6.1. *Separate educational institutions*
 - 6.2. *Authors and works in logic*
- 7. *Conclusion*

1. INTRODUCTION

*Man tamanṭaqa tazandaqa.
He who practices logic becomes a heretic.¹*

It would be impossible to elaborate the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina without reflecting on cultural, political and social occasions in different stages of the country's development: the Bosnian Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina; each of them being, in fact, historical, cultural, political and ideological sequences that have collided and confronted in this area; an area in which their interests and political geographies are intertwining even today and which cannot be rationalized as a single-principle continuum, be it of cause and effect or descriptive.

Effort placed in the production of this essay is limited on the presentation of information about facts related to a scientific and philosophical discipline and the educational position it occupied or occupies in a dynamic social and political interaction. The very *dynamics of interaction between political and social ontology*, their logical structure and intentional character, ideological matrix as a regulator of contradictions and tautologies of cultural and political geography in this area, theory and history and interactions in the mentality background, will not be discussed in the essay, although some reflections are inevitable.²

It should be stated in the introduction that research and authorship in the field of logic as a science has not been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina outside schools and universities, and that the first civic Society for Development of Logic and Analytical Philosophy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not formed until July, 2, 2007 in Sarajevo.³ That is why it is reasonable that a natural frame

for the studies of the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that very status of logic as a discipline in the system of education of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the society which has lived through different ideological and regime systems. The content of the development worth mentioning is entitled *Bosnia Porphyriana*, which is, by itself, a cultural and spiritual syntagm introduced here for the first time (and with good reason, I hope!). The syntagm originates from the syntagm *Arbor Porphyriana*—the Porphyrian Tree, which contains all differences, in a single vertical, from bottom to the top and from top to bottom.

Just as well, broader research conducted by a significant number of authors or research papers on the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be found. There are, however, two specialist research papers worth the attention: one by Prof. Dr. *Amir Ljubovic*, entitled *The Works in Logic by Bosniak Authors in Arabic* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, 1996), and other by Academician Dr. *Serafin Hrkac*, OFM (Ordo Fratrum Minorum), entitled *Philosophical Manuscripts in Latin in Bosna Srebrena* (Mostar: Ziral, 1998). These works are, in fact, a source for understanding the activities of Bosnian writers in the field of logic in Arabic and Latin, within a broader cultural heritage created by members of the Islamic and Catholic denominations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a longer period. These two research papers will be used in this essay extensively.

2. PERIOD OF OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1463–1878)

After the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom (1463) and after its territory had been occupied by the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Turks imposed forms of administration on different principles. The empire introduced, in all its conquered territories (Eyalets), institutional procedures and institutional laws, in place of the customary, unwritten laws. In that way, a category of state apparatus—administration was introduced together with subjects to the empire who had, on the basis of being a part of a single administration in a wider territory, both rights and obligations. On the other hand, the Ottoman administration privileged certain social classes according to their origin, wealth, administrative position and religious denomination.

2.1. Educational Paradigms, Schools and Subjects

Ottoman Turks, being Muslim, took over the form and content of cultural and religious life of an Arab state and so continued erecting *mosques*, *mektebs* and *medresahs* which were all built through donations of the sultan and other people of wealth and power. Only religious teachings had been practiced at mosques, mektebs and medresahs until Suleiman II (1520–1566) came to power and amended a decree thus enabling secular teaching, primarily grammar and logic, which could have contributed the understanding and interpretation of Quran. Within such political, confessional, and cultural compression, other religious

denominations existed (Jewish and Christian), tolerated by the empire and which provided education for members of their faith through administration of their own and which had frequently been in conflict with both their own hierarchy outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely, in Vienna and Venice, as well as with the Ottoman administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina [18, pp. 7–45].

The principal *educational paradigm* of the Ottoman Empire had been founded on the basis of religious denomination of the ethnic communities formed in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Empire favored Islamic faith and the entire institutional educational infrastructure was governed by that fact. Separate mektebs were formed, for men and women, providing elementary education. Logic was taught in medresahs and *ruzdijas*, together with subjects related to religious teachings, which was considered important for the understanding of religion-related issues. At the same time, Bosnian Franciscans, present over 700 years, were denied in that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina their students and educational institutions (students of grammar, philosophy and theology existed in parts of the Provincial under the administration of Vienna and Venice) in the time of domination and exclusiveness of the Islamic confessional community, but they organized on their own training for their members in *monasteries* (Kraljeva Sutjeska, Kresevo, Fojnica) and sent their students to study abroad [18, p. 251].

However, one can see in students' syllabi from other parts of the Provincial, which had organized the above-mentioned educational institutions, or in the school *Elenchus Materiae* that was taught at the Franciscan institutions of education, the extent to which theological science was linked with the study of logic (*summa logicae, summulae logicales*) in different periods and with different authors. In that way, studying language and logic, that is, studying structural, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of language of the holy books played a significant role in the development of spirituality in this area in general.

Between the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom to the Ottomans (1463) and the Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878), a significant number of Muslim schools (mektebs) had been established in bigger towns, mostly in Sarajevo. It is reasonable to believe, according to some authors, that over 100 mektebs existed in Sarajevo alone, since mektebs were erected together with mosques. As a matter of fact, every *mahala* (a town's neighborhood), which reached the number of 104 in the second half of the 17th century, had its own mekteb.⁴ Mektebs were either all-male, all-female or coeducational.

In towns, during the first period of the Ottoman rule, those were the institutions which most directly participated in the gradual cementing and spread of the Oriental-Islamic culture, by introducing basic elements of Islamic education into this milieu [20, p. 143].

Mosques and *masjids* gave rise to the first high schools and collegiate schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely, medresahs and *darshanas*, in the early 16th century. Constant opening of the new schools had to do with the increasing

number of conversions of the domestic population (mostly *Bogomils* and members of the Church of Bosnia) to Islam.

Medresah, as the Bosnian kind of junior high school and collegiate school, appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 16th century and, just like mektebs, mualimhanas (schools for future teachers) and other cultural and educational institutions, they were erected at the initiative by individuals to function as foundations, which was a common practice in the entire Empire. To be precise, the majority of education was financed, in accordance with the organization of the Empire, from a fund known as Sandik/Beytul-Mal il Ganaim (Spoils of War Fund) which collected incomes from spoils of war, mines and from prisoners (one fifth) [20, p.152].

According to Dr. *Ismet Kasumovic's* research [20], activities in medresahs were organized in three levels: beginner, focusing on the basics of grammar and syntax of Arabic; arithmetic and geometry; logic, rhetoric and apologetics. The same subjects were taught at the second level, but with more extensive textbooks. At the higher level, certain branches of the Sharia law, interpretation of Quran, corpus of the Islamic tradition, etc. The following subjects were taught in medresahs:

- a. *traditional sciences, a higher degree of science* (al-ulumu l-muqaddima),
 1. morphology (as-Sarf),
 2. syntax (an-Nahw),
 3. science on notions (al-Wad),
 4. etymology (al-Ištiqāq),
 5. geometry (al-Handasa),
 6. calculus (al-Hisāb),
 7. disputation (al-Munāzara),
- b. *logic* (al-Mantiq),
 1. Isagoge (Isāgūgī),
 2. Fanari's Commentary on Isagoge (Šarhu l-Fanārī),
 3. Compendium of Logic (Husāmu l-Kātī),
 4. Matali's commentary (Šarh-i Matāli),
- c. *apologetics* (al-Kalām),
 1. Glosses (Hāšiyātu t-tagrīd).

The first state, secular schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina were *ruzdijas*, "open prior to the occupation and accessible to members of all denominations in Turkey" [5, p. 139].

Official language of the schools was Turkish and they were of the same rank as junior high schools; they were civil schools preceding the enrolment to medresahs.

In Turkey, *ruzdijas* were considered to be newer schools, according to the period of their origin. The 1287 AH (1870–1871) salnama (Ottoman government's yearbook) mentions *ruzdijas* to have been founded in 1263 AH (1847 AD), which means they date from the time of Sultan Abdul-Medjid. In Bosnia

and Herzegovina they are dated to the second half of the 19th century, the oldest being that in Sarajevo [5, p. 140].

Over 30 ruzdijas had existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the 1878 occupation. They served a special function compared to mektebs and medresahs as schools of a nature that is less confessional and more secular. That is why they were not as popular among Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had preferred enrolling their children to confessional schools. Ruzdijas were considered a novelty from Constantinople in which the “giaur subjects” and the “Turkish language” met. That was not a respectable program for Muslim people of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. It is these schools that would later be transformed into first state schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the decision of the Federal Government. Author Curic lists the subjects taught at ruzdijas: Turkish, Arabic and Persian languages were the focus of teaching, together with calligraphy; apart from religious teachings and morality, secular subjects were taught, including history, geography, algebra and geometry. Logic was taught together with all those subjects. Textbooks for logic were *Isagudži* and *Risale-i erbea*. *Risale-i erbea* is a short textbook comprising of four parts: 1) ‘Dede Džengi’ (On Logic), 2) ‘Risale-i vadije’ (Introduction to Logic), 3) ‘Feride’ (On Metaphor in Arabic) and 4) ‘Isagudži’ (On Logic) [5, p. 156].

It can be seen from the above-listed subjects [20, p. 154] that most attention was given to the instrumentarium for exegesis and interpretation of the sacral texts and religious truths. The study of language (morphology, syntax, etymology) and science on notions was connected to the study of predicative forms and structures in logic and was, altogether, applied in the field of apologetics. Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were educated at the prestigious schools and institutions of learning in Istanbul/Constantinople, Baghdad, Syria; where they gained knowledge on Arabic logic and Islamic law, and where they themselves would frequently lecture (like *Mustafa Ejubovic-Sejh Jujo*). During their pedagogical engagement in medresahs, they would pass that knowledge into Bosnia and Herzegovina by transcribing the leading scientific works of the time and by writing useful notes and commentaries.

Primary schools for members of the Orthodox faith were least documented. Existing data shows that the first separate school building for children of Orthodox faith was built and opened in 1727. Schools that opened in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Brcko, Gracanica, Prnjavor, Stari Majdan, Cajnice and Travnik, by the approval of the Ottoman Government in 1832, “. . . were at a poor educational level. Elementary literacy was taught in those schools with some of the Orthodox faith moralities” [8, p. 23]. In 1854, all-female school opened in Sarajevo. Tradesmen initiated the opening of a high school (1855) which was called *general* or *trade*, later *general* (1864) and *secondary school* (1879). Staka Skenderova founded in 1858 in Sarajevo a private Serb female school and in that same year, the *preparatory spiritual school* was founded in Zitomislici, aimed to train priests for the area of Herzegovina. The Serb seminary in Banja Luka (the Pelagic Seminary) was formed in 1866. Two English women, Adelina Irbi and Mis

Makenzi formed the first female high school in Sarajevo in 1869, known by the name of *Mis Irbi's Institute*.

Convents and churches were centers of literacy and spiritual life of Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bearers of such life and literacy were Franciscans who founded the first schools in Olovo, Kraljeva Sutjeska, Kresevo and Fojnica. In this, as well as in the case of content and forms of education of members of Islamic faith in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one can see the synergy (sometimes also asymmetry and even confrontation) of the local and regional history of education, of the system and its part, regional pattern (once: the norm) and provincial application.

The paradigm (norm, pattern, standard, regulation) of education of Christian (Catholic) candidates, that had been defined in institutions of the Catholic Church in Rome, acted in parts of the provincial under the authority of Vienna, Venice, Istanbul/Constantinople; while the concrete educational life was led in accordance with the local cultural and political situation which was, in the area of Bosnia Argentina under the Ottoman rule, in contradiction with the situation in the territory from which the paradigm originated. In that sense, one cannot talk about the “borrowed identities” consumed by ethnic and confessional communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but instead about the homogenous and interactive identities, which functioned within a paradigm, as well as those which adjusted to the local conditions, outside the paradigm boundaries.

Many arguments were led between members of the same ethnic and confessional community, that is, between those who lived within a homogenous core community and those who lived outside it, in an interactive community of several ethnic groups. Rules, will and standards were imposed by regional or core organizations, whether political or confessional, onto the local communities in the field, which, like the Franciscans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often disapproved them or even refused their implementation [18, pp. 7–45].

However, once a paradigm or standard or norm of education was set, it functioned in both the homogenous and the interactive area.

Pope Clement VIII issued a bull (*Decet Romanum Pontificem* (June 26, 1603) approving the demand that in every province three schools be founded—namely, grammar, school of philosophy and of theology. Franciscan education classified schools according to kind and degree. The following kinds of schools were differentiated: grammar (ranking as high schools with the task of providing the basic forms of education), philosophical or schools of logic and theological (moral theologies or dogmatism). Schools were classified as provincial (*studia provincialia*) or general (*studia generalia*), according to the degree [18, p. 29].

The very content of subjects was largely determined by and compatible with Christian doctrine, which means that it served the establishment and strengthening of Christian dogmatism. The aforementioned Pope also determined in the bull which subjects should be taught in the general schools.

He allowed three professors to teach in each of the general schools. The first taught the first book of the Four Books of Sentences by Peter Lombard (called *Magister Sententiarum*), the second taught the second and third and the third taught the fourth book. In Franciscan schools of the 13th and 14th centuries, a significant role was played by the *Summa* of the first teacher of the Franciscan Order, Alexander of Hales, who at the Paris University, despite the dominant Platonic orientation of Peter Lombard, promoted Aristotle's dialectical method and included many Aristotelian elements into the *Summa* [18, pp. 29–30].

In an extraordinary study on this topic, Academician Dr. *Serafin Hrkac*, OFM, clearly names the Franciscan order and Bosna Argentina as the leaders of educational life of Catholics, emphasizing in several places the conflicts between this Order and bishops, their decisions and intentions in this area. (This tension has remained present till this very day). Since wars and conflicts divided Bosna Argentina into three parts (1757), governed by different political authorities, education was also of a different character.

In a cultural sense, in the part of the provincial governed by Vienna, and later in the part of the provincial governed by Venice, schools and educational institutions were established in accordance with the guidelines of the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and constitutions of the Franciscan Order, which, until then, had mostly depended on initiative and ingenuity of individual monastic administrations. In the part of the provincial under Ottoman rule, Franciscans had only three monasteries (Kraljeva Sutjeska, Kresevo, Fojnica) and had no education institutions, but continued to send their candidates abroad, or to the provincial schools governed politically by Vienna or Venice. For that purpose, a school of philosophy was founded in Slavonski Brod (1712–1783), so that the candidates from Bosnia would not have to travel far [18, p. 251].

Friar Ilija Starcevic from Orasje founded in 1823 the first common Croat primary school. Most credit for spreading education and literacy amongst the Catholic population belongs to friar Ivan Jukic and later friar Grga Martic. One of the best known primary schools founded by traders is in Livno and has existed from 1820. "Secondary schools were, for the first time, mentioned in the early 18th century in monasteries of Fojnica, Kresevo and Sutjeska" [8, p. 31]. *The General Catholic Schools* were founded in monasteries of Siroki Brijeg and Guca Gora near Travnik (relocated later to Visoko). According to Mitar Papic, friar Grga Martic founded the school in 1865, which was attended by both boys and girls [8, p. 32]. *The Junior High School of Fojnica* was founded in 1874.

In the mid-sixteenth century, Jews exiled from Spain and Portugal started settling all around Europe, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they introduced the Spanish language and literacy. Some reliable data state that only one primary school had existed prior to the late period of the Ottoman rule, which was mentioned in *The Bosnian Herald* (Bosanski Vjesnik) in 1866. There is also data on a Jewish religious school, founded around 1768. Sephardic Jews arrived to Bosnia and Herzegovina having been exiled by Christians from Spain and Portugal (in the 16th century), mostly from Cordoba and Toledo, places in

which they had had intercultural development with other confessions, primarily with Islam.

Sephardic Jews were mainly educated religiously, in the spirit of teachings of the Bible and Talmud. With the help of a language named *Ladino*, a mixture of Hebrew, Arabic and Spanish, they were able to quickly adjust to the environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to create works of art and literature. The first Jewish community was founded in Sarajevo in 1565, which at the time served as the educational centre for Sephardic Jews; while the first synagogue was built in 1581 in Sarajevo (and met its doom in Eugene Savoy's tilt). Three centuries later, during the period of Austro-Hungarian rule, Ashkenazi Jews settled and formed their own municipality, practicing different cultural habits and language (German). A number of Sephardic children were schooled in Constantinople, where they studied Turkish and other oriental languages, thus acquiring education necessary for clerical work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other Sephardic children attended *Meldar* (primary school), studying Talmud, Torah and Hebrew.

2.2. Works on Logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina Written in Arabic

In order to gain a comprehensive insight into the origin, development and kinds of works on logic written in Arabic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being familiar with the origin, development and ways works on logic, logical problems, logical applications in theological apologetics and legal practice (the Sharia law) were handed on, through quite a long period of development of spiritual and cultural world of Islam, is a necessity.⁵ Works on logic written in Arabic in Bosnia and Herzegovina directly take their pattern, in terms of content and form, from the commentaries on *Aristotelian logic* and *Porphyrian isagogics*⁶ (logical classificatory propaedeutics) written by the Arabian logicians (al-Farabi, al-Kindi, Ibn Sina/Avicenna, Ibn Rushd/Averroes); that is, Arabic commentaries of these comments (written by their pupils, al-Urmevi, al-Katibi, al-Ebheri, al-Fenari, and others).

This *writing based on a preexisting pattern* (rewriting, note-taking, adjusting, sectioning, interpreting, recommending, interpretative adjusting) or *commenting* is not only significant for the works written in the East, in Arabic, but also for commentaries written in Greek, in the neo-Platonic school, both in the pagan Athens and in Christian Alexandria; written by Porphyry, Ammonius, Dexippus, Philiponos, Simplicius, Iamblichus, David, Elias and other followers of Plotinus. Both here and there existed the form of such *pattern based commentary* which included the well-established practice of accepting and passing over a number of *constant* questions and answers, from one commentary to another, on: what is (the real, the first, the main) issue of the work commented, where is the (real) beginning of the discussion, which is the (real, original) title of the work, what is the (genuine) content, what are the (true) meanings of some notions, why did the author of a work or discussion introduce new notions, what

should the relation towards the whole and parts of Aristotel's work be, what were the reasons for writing a work in one way or another, etc.⁷

Hasan Kafi Pruscak (*Hasan Kāfi b. Turḥān b. Dāwūd b. Ya'qūb az-Zībī al-Āqḥiṣari al-Bosnawī*, b. 1544, Prusac, d. 1615, Prusac) is considered to be the most significant author in the field of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who wrote in oriental languages during the Ottoman occupation of the country. Several sources say that he was considered highly educated in several fields of science and was a well-known commentator of different works. In the field of oriental studies in Europe, Hasan Kafi was known for his work *Basis of the Wisdom of How to Arrange the World*, which has been translated into French, and which had been presented by the author himself at the sultan's court in Istanbul/Constantinople, in Arabic. Immediately after that, the author was given a recommendation to translate the work into Turkish. That piece of writing led the sultan to give him a province in Prusac, which was Pruscak's lifelong pension.

As a professor, he writes comments and glosses on issues of linguistics, even logic. As a theologian, he writes about the basic postulates of the Islamic belief. As a quadi, he is involved in legal issues. As a thinker, in the domain of politics and society, he clearly and openly criticizes the shortcomings of the society and recommends ways of healing. Finally, as a writer, he writes down significant data on himself as well [21, p. 10].

Hasan Kafi Pruscak is the author of two works in the field of logic:

Kafi's Compendium of Logic (*Muḥtaṣar al-Kāfi min al-mantiq*) was written in 1580. A copy of the work is preserved in Gazi Husref-bey's Library in Sarajevo; the size of the manuscript being 19.5 x 13 cm. In this work, written as a textbook typical of Islamic tradition, Kafi deals with the issue of what logic is and what is its field of study, methods and tasks. According to him, science ('ilm) is, ". . . a tool with the property of law, and its use secures the mind (ḍihn) from mistakes in thinking (fikr)" [17, p. 65]. In that same place, the entire insight into *Kafi's Compendium on Logic* can be found:

1. *On Words* (fi-al alfāz);
2. *On Outcomes of Notions—the Five Universalias* (fi mabādi' at-taṣawwurat-al-kulliyāt);
3. *On Outcomes of Notions—Interpretative Speech* (fi maqāṣid at-tasawwurat al-qawl aš-šāriḥ);
4. *On Outcomes of Claims—Judgment* (fi mabādi' at-taṣdīqāt al-qaḍyya);
5. *On Goals of Claims—Sylogisms* (fi maqāṣid at-taṣdīqāt al-qiyās);
6. *Apodictic* (al-burhān);
7. *Dialectics* (al-ḡadal);
8. *Rhetoric* (al-ḥitāba);
9. *Poetics* (aš-ši'r);
10. *Sophistic* (al-muḡālaṭa).

The Commentary on 'Kafi's Compendium of Logic' (Šarḥ Muḥtaṣar al-Kāfi min al-mantiq), was written in 1583. Apart from an extensive introduction, this work contains the following parts:

1. *On Words* (fī-al alfāz);
2. *On Outcomes of Notions* (fī mabādi' at-taṣawwurāt-al-kulliyyāt);
3. *On Goals of Notions* (fī maqāṣid at-tasawwurāt al-qawl aš-šāriḥ).

Ljubovic states to have found this work at the Cambridge University Library, while “motifs for writing this work . . . are the same as before, that is, to help pupils overcome the issues of logic” [17, p. 36]. This work, just like all others, relies on the Arab logicians like Ibn Sina and others.

The Commentary of the Sunny Tractate (Šarḥ ar-Risāla aš-šamsiyya) was written by *Mohamed Son of Musa Allamek*. He was born in 1595 in Sarajevo, graduated at Gazi Husref-bey's Madressah, educated in Istanbul at the Sahn-i Seman educational institute, and appointed the supreme judge in Halep (Syria) in 1634–1635. He wrote all his works in Arabic which he also taught in different schools, together with logic. *The Commentary* consists of:

1. *Introduction* (al-muqaddima) which consists of two discussions (1) *On the Essence of Logic* and (2) *On the Subject of Logic*;
2. *The First Article* (maqala): *On Individual Notions* with four subsections: (1) *On Words*, (2) *On Meanings*, (3) *On Universalia and Particularities* and (4) *On Definitions*;
3. *The Second Article*, with an introduction (*On the Definition of Judgment and Its Segments*) and three subsections: (1) *On Categorical Judgment*, (2) *On Conditional Judgments* and (3) *On Rules of Judgment* (the direct forms of concluding);
4. *The Third Article, On Syllogism*, with five subsections: (1) *Definition, Its Parts and Forms*, (2) *On Mixed Syllogisms* (Modal), (3) *On Connected Syllogisms*, (4) *On Separated Syllogisms* and (5) *Supplementary on Syllogism*;
5. *Conclusion* (hatima), with two discussions: (1) *On Content of Syllogisms* and (2) *On Segments of the Science*.

Allamek's *Commentary* of the work *The Sunny Tractate* (written by *Al-Kazvani al-Katibi* and which, according to Ljubovic is one of the most significant works of the later period in the field of logic in Arabic) was used as a textbook in logic in some of the senior-level medresahs [17, p. 41].

The New Commentary of the Sunny Tractate was written in 1690 by *Mustafa Ejubović-Sejh Jujo* who was “our most fruitful and most prominent writer in Arabic” [17, p. 42]. He was born in 1651 in Mostar. The form and content he uses [17, pp. 47–9] completely goes along with Allamek's *Commentary*, although the pattern of commenting, in both cases had probably been taken from the form and content of *The Sunny Tractate* itself, which was written by *Nedzudin al-Kazvani al-Katibi* (d. 1295).

In the Ottoman Empire, logic was studied and taught, together with the basics of the Arabic grammar, speculative and scholastic theology of astronomy (*kalam*), geometry and rhetoric, in junior-level medresahs, known as *ibtida-i haridž* [17, p. 180].

In most cases, Al-Ebheri's *Isagoge* (Īsāgūghī) was used as the basic textbook or some other work of the similar kind, like Kafi's *Logical Compendium*, written

by Hasan Pruscać exclusively for his pupils, or some other “short” commentaries. At senior-level medresahs (dahil-medresahs, tetims, etc.), which are close to our notion of secondary education, logic was also a compulsory subject, for the study of which more demanding works were used, most frequently the already-mentioned Al-Katibi’s *Sunny Tractate* (ar-Risāla aš-šamsiyya) or some of the comments on this work. The highest degree of education (sahn medresahs) treated logic not as an individual subject, but as a part of speculative theology—apologetics [17, p. 180].

2.3. Works on Logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina Written in Latin

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, works on logic written in Latin, neither in the sense of form or content, have the character of commentaries. They do not directly rely on Aristotelian logic or Porphyrian isagogics (classificatory propaedeutics) but mostly on medieval resumes, summaries, logical summae or simmulae of the Christian writers, who for their needs adapted parts of Latin scriptures related to everything that was acceptable in Aristotelian logic (episteme). The most prominent medieval figures mentioned here are Duns Scotus, Petrus Hispanus, Petrus Lombardus and Thomas Aquinas but their thoughts are taken as a part of the accepted science of logic, not as a part of their teachings within logic.

The following manuscripts from Kresevo, dealing in most part with logic, systematized by Academician Dr. Hrkac, should be mentioned:

Manuscript 3-III-5: Philosophie notions. The text contains about 80 pages. No data on the author is available other than *I.M.S.* initials written on the top of the page. Based on a thorough linguistic analysis Hrkac concluded that “it was undoubtedly written by our man” [18, p. 59]. A special edition of the manuscript was published in 2000 in Mostar, since the

content of this manuscript stands out from all other manuscripts from the mentioned monasteries . . . Other manuscripts either deal only with individual philosophical tractates, or several joint tractates. Only this one, in a way, is an outline of the entire matter of logic and ontology. It was written in the form of questions and answers and contains a very short introduction to psychology (only one text-page) [18, p. III].

The manuscript is the work of a lecturer or philosophy professor, and it is his conscript of lectures for a year. In it, an ordered approach in logical and cognitive-theoretical sense to the whole of cognitive questions, in which logic dominates, can be seen.

Manuscript 3-III-23: Introductio et prolegomena in universam Aristotelis logicam. The manuscript contains about 236 unnumbered pages. The name of an unfamiliar author is written on the first page: *I. Pluit*. According to the available content, the monument comprises of two main parts: 1. *Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam*, which contains five sections with the total of 50 headings, all of which focus on predicates, statements and their elements, on the kind of statements and modules, and on syllogism and method, 2. *Prolegomena in un-*

iversam Aristotelis logicam, which consists of nine headings, some in the form of questions on nature of reason and mind and on the nature of logic as science [18, p. 65].

Manuscript 3-III-25: Logica. Metaphysica. Pneumatologia. The manuscript contains 436 written, unnumbered pages. The page 182 states: *Finis Logicae perscriptus per me Fratrem Blasium Pardusic Anno 1877 Domini Mense junii.* The first part of the manuscript focuses on logic, the second on metaphysics and the third on pneumatology. In the segment on logic, the first part deals with notions and judgments, the second with statements and the third with method and proof [18, p. 69].

Manuscript 3-IV-29: Logica universa. The manuscript contains only 48 pages written in small letters. Top of the title page contains the inscription: *Prima pars Philosophie*, middle of the page: *Logica universa*, and bottom of the page: *Tomus primus Die 22 Septembris Anno ab Incarnatione 1832.* The following is written at the end of the page 48: *Ego Frater Jacobus Ivankovich finivi hucusque die ultima Martii Milesimi octingetesimi trigesimi tertii* [18, p. 102].

Manuscripts on logic preserved in the Kraljeva Sutjeska monastery that should be mentioned here are:

Manuscript 16. Logica. The manuscript contains 652 pages, written by friar *Antun Zderic* from Vinkovci, who was a philosophy lecturer in Slavonski Brod from 1735 to 1738. The manuscript consists of two parts. The first part was written in small letters on full 42 pages all dealing with *Elementa logicae parvae seu summularum*. The second part is entitled *Enchyridion philosophicum in universam Aristotelis logicam. Disputationes ad mentem subtilis doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti* [18, p. 163].

Manuscript 17. Logica. The manuscript contains 374 unnumbered pages. The first page contains the inscription: *Spectat ad quotidianum usum Patris Philippi Kordic m. pr. Anno Domini 1879. Logica San-Severino* [18, p. 170]. It deals with teachings on syllogism, methodology, and criteriology.

Manuscript 25. Systema philosophiae fundamentalis sive Logica. The manuscript contains 76 unnumbered pages. It was written in Czechoslovakia. The title page contains the inscription: *descripta per . . . Kopich* (name erased) in *venerabili conventu Nitriensi ad SS.AA.Petrum et Paulum.* The last page contains the inscription: *1831* [18, p. 181]. The first part is entitled *Logica theoretica* and it deals with definition, evidence and syllogism, as well as with the sophist presentation of evidence.

Manuscript 44B. Logica. The manuscript contains 153 pages. It opens with: *Philosophia sive Logica perscripta per fratrem Ioannem Turbic de Tesevo clericum simpliciter professum Anno Domini 1879. Sutiskae die 24 octobris Anno Domini 1880.* Written on page 101 is: *Ego Petrus Turbić m.p.*, and on page 117: *Ego fr. Raphael Barisic de Ocevija m. p. a. 1880 die 5 octobris* [18, p. 191]. The part of the manuscript stating *Pars prima: Logica formalis* contains sections on ideas and notions, on judgments, propositions and syllogism.

Manuscript 53. Intraductio in philosophiam. The manuscript contains 126 pages, written by friar *Mihael Franjkovic from Vares* in 1866–1867. It deals with the subject and notion of logic, judgments and syllogism [18, p. 193].

Some of the manuscripts on logic, preserved in the Fojnica monastery, include:

Manuscript 65. Logica. Academician Hrkac reports that the title page of this well preserved and readable manuscript contains the following inscription: *Logica auctore I. B. Bouvier. Descripta per fr. I. Vujcic, lectorem philosophiae in Livno 1874. Reliquit P. Hieronymo Vladic Lectori Philosophie et suo sucesori.* One can see from the very content that this is a modern interpretation of medieval doctrine *proprietas terminorum*, which is preceded by discussions on definition and division, on judgments and their classification, etc. [18, p. 249].

The very content of the above-mentioned manuscripts, both in Arabic and in Latin, shows that the philosophy (logic) lecturers in medresahs and monasteries focused primarily on syllogistic and formal logic, that is on instructions on the basics of logic in which the students were introduced to the notion, judgment, evidence, syllogism and method. Some newer manuscripts in Latin introduce into lectures the elements of medieval logic (*Proprietates Terminorum*) and, later, Cartesian logic. The manuscripts show and provide evidence of the content of the subject of logic taught at lower levels, and which was available in Latin in this region.

In general, the *educational paradigm* in which Muslim teachers and students participated was compatible with the educational paradigm of Catholic teachers and students in *Bosna Argentina*, in their colleges (whether grammar, philosophy or theology) which were founded in parts of the Provincial under the administration of Vienna and Venice.⁸ Catholic students from *Bosna Argentina* under Ottoman rule, had studied and accepted this paradigm during their schooling abroad, only to later introduce it into educational practice in monasteries (Kreševo, Fojnica, Kraljeva Sutjeska), upon their return. During their stay in foreign countries, they were exposed to leading figures, texts and atmosphere of the European education of the age, all of which had influenced them greatly.

Istanbul/Constantinople (in some instances, Baghdad and Syria) and Rome (in some instances, Vienna and Venice) may be considered regional centers of intellectual gravity and production of educational paradigm and practice which strongly attracted people from Bosnia and Herzegovina to different sides. It is also possible to see that on that road of education, *schooling and training for the primary vocation of religious teachers and pedagogues*, those people accepted in the centers both the theoretical and practical part of education achieved by that point in history, as well as the norms of civilization that had been determined in ancient heritage through *Aristotelian logic* and epistemology and *Porphyrian isagogic*. Hence, that heritage came to Bosnia and Herzegovina from two directions, written in two languages, Arabic and Latin, and has been preserved, as we shall see, to the very day.

3. BOSNIA PORPHYRIANA⁹

Porphyry [Gr. Πορφύριος; Lat. Porphyrius] is described by some authors described as “the last of the Greek philosopher” [9, p. xi], [7, p. 286], or as a great Hellenistic erudite and pagan philosopher, “the most intelligent of philosophers, although the most fierce enemy of Christians” [16, 1995, pp. 72–3]. Porphyry wrote a book entitled *Κατά Χριστιανῶν λόγοι* “Evidence against Christians,” better known as “Against Christians,” as translated from Latin *Adversus Christianos*, which was burnt in 448 by an edict issued by emperors Valentinian III and Theodosius II.

That was not a reason to forget or reject Porphyry, either in the East or in the West. His attempts to reconcile in Plotinus’ Academy Plato’s and Aristotle’s followers through hermeneutics of his works (neoplatonic amalgamation), as well as his comments on Plato and Aristotle, became and have remained a pattern for other comments that later appeared. But, Porphyry as an educator and a great erudite who persistently applied logic (the so-called “Emperor logic,” “Roman logic”) to all aspects of spiritual and cultural life, by virtue of his comments had become a pattern for the use of this philosophical form. It is his comments of manuscripts on logic and philosophy that are a reason to study his opus even today, not his struggle to preserve the state (Roman) faith (polytheism) and laws, not his struggle against the formation of monotheistic beliefs (Christianity).

Porphyry’s works (he wrote about 75 of them) came to life 1700 years ago, in the 3rd century AD. From the time of Hellenic and early-Christian era, through the medieval period of scholasticism, until today, they remain in the center of attention: they were translated into ancient languages at first (Aramaic, Syrian, Hebrew, Latin) and then into modern languages; they have been commented and published. Already in the 3rd century, Porphyry had become a leading figure for commenting the works of Plato and Aristotle, for both commentators from the West (it would suffice to see the *curricula* of the European universities as early as 12th century until today) and from the East (see the list or index of books of Greek authors, as well as *Fihrist* compiled by Ibn al-Nadim), especially those works which concern logic.¹⁰

As a commentator of Plato’s and Aristotle’s pieces working and writing in 3 century AD, who was preceded by comments of Galenus, Aleksander Afrodisius, Celsus and other, Porphyry became an established figure for this genre of philosophy with commentators in the period from the 4th to the 6th century AD, like Ammonius, Iamblichus, Dexippus, Simplicius, David, Elias, Stephanus and other. Some of them had an overt pagan orientation, like in the Athens school, some were between the boundaries of paganism and Christianity, like in Rome, and some were Christian students at the neo-Platonic school, active in, for example, Alexandria. Their reception of Plato’s and Aristotle’s works had varied, but when Porphyry’s comments surfaced, a standard was established and followed since then [34].

Because Porphyry’s work *Isagoge* served as an active, common educational agenda in educational institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a special chapter

will be devoted to that phenomenon in this paper. In connection to this, Dr. Nijaz Ibrulj's translation of *Isagoge* from Classical Greek into Bosnian, published in Sarajevo in 2008, is important to mention [33]. The philosophical tradition of Bosnia has reception of Porphyry's *Isagoge* in two languages, *Latin*, in the works of Catholic professors of theology who teach philosophy-related subjects at faculties of Bosnia Argentina, and *Arabic*, in the works of Bosnian mufti, kadi and ulemma, educated in Istanbul/Constantinople and some other university centers of the East.¹¹ What is important to note is that exactly this Porphyry's work was in many cases used as the primary and common source for both of these versions: Arabic commentators of Aristotle approached this work via translations in Syrian, Aramaic, and Hebrew; on the other side, the medieval scholastics approached this work primarily through Boethius' 5th century translation.

The original Greek text *Εἰσαγωγή* was not known in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same way it was unknown to the Arabic commentators of Aristotle or Plato or Porphyry, who were of the Islamic confession and tradition of Quran. Arabic commentators who were not Christians or Jews had an insight to Syrian, Aramaic or Hebrew translations of the Greek manuscripts, which they had obtained mainly through Nestorians, Christian translators from Syria. Greek texts were translated from Aramaic and Hebrew into Arabic, that is, into Persian.¹² Commentators like Al-Farabi, Al-Kindi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) referred to those texts in their comments. Later, around the year 1200, the texts were translated into Latin, first in Toledo and then in Cordoba.¹³

A very important, if not decisive role in presenting and passing on the Hellenic heritage to the Arabic world, especially of logic, belongs to Christian sects from Syria and Persia, Nestorians and Monophysites, who greatly contributed to the translation of discussions on logic into Syrian and Persian, and then into Arabic [21, p. 26].

It was available to Bosnian students of Catholic faith at lectures in Rome, in the Latin language (probably Boethius' or Marcellius' translation). They were also exposed to the classic commentaries in Latin, for example, Ammonius, Elias, David, Alexander Aphrodisius, Simplicius, Philoponus. On the other hand, Bosnian students of Islamic faith, who studied in Constantinople, gained information about this text in Arabic, apart from having been acquainted with the commentaries of Arabic philosophers, primarily Avicenna and Averroes, who were the leading figures in interpretation of works they studied, that is, in the works of their students like Al-Ebheri, Taftazani, Al-Fenari, Al-Urmevi, Al-Kazvani.

3.1. Porphyry's *Isagoge* in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Works Written in Arabic

The most important work for the reception of Aristotelian logic written in Arabic in Bosnia, is *Isagoge* (*Īsāgūḡī*), written by an Arabic commentator of Aristotelian logic *Esirudin al-Ebheri* (d. cca 1256), which was a well-known compen-

dium of logic in the East. The work seems to have had the strongest influence on commentators of the Porphyry's work.

It is difficult to provide the exact number of comments, supercomments and glosses written about this work (all the collections of Oriental manuscripts in the world have not been catalogued as yet), but it is quite certain that the number exceeds two hundred. That is probably the most frequently commented work on logic in Arabic, which was used for a long period of time, be it the text itself or only some of the more successful commentaries, as a textbook at different levels of education [15, p. 217].

It should be mentioned that Dr. Amir Ljubovic holds that this work is neither an adaptation nor commentary of the famous Porphyry's work *Εἰσαγωγή*, but rather an original writing which talks about the same topic—the five universalia, in a concise manner, and that Porphyry's term *Īsāgūḡī* was only borrowed as a title for the introductory part [15, pp. 218–23]. This work was commented by all Bosnian writers who wrote about logic in Arabic. However, the domain of this reception was determined by educational goals: a new atmosphere in Bosnian madrasahs was brought in by the teachers who had been educated in Istanbul / Constantinople and who, upon their return to the country, changed the old way of teaching—some theological matters were to be described and explained to students on the basis of rational reasons.

The Commentary on Isagoge (Šarḥ Īsāgūḡī) or *The Commentary of 'Esiri's Tractate on Logic'* (Šarḥ ar-Risāla al-Aṭīriyya fī al-mantiq) was written in 1682 by *Mustafa Ejubovic* (b. 1651 in Mostar, d. 1707 in Mostar). It is a commentary of a well-known work on logic in the East—*The Isagoge* (Īsāgūḡī), written by *Esirudin al-Ebheri* (d. 1256). Contents of the work:

1. *The Isagoge*, pp. 6–24, containing short tractates on words, meanings of words, relationship between words and ideas, on notions and, especially, about the five universalia (species, genus, difference, property and accident);
2. *On Interpretative Speech* (al-qawl aš-šāriḥ), pp. 24–7, that is, on rules of forming definitions and descriptions;
3. *On Judgments* (al-qaḍyya);
4. *On Syllogism* (al-qiyās);
5. *Apodictic* (al-burhān);
6. *Dialectics* (al-ḡadal);
7. *Rhetoric* (al-ḥitāba);
8. *Poetics* (aš-ši'r);
9. *Sophistics* (al-muḡālaṭa);

A Useful Gloss with Al'Fenari's Glosses for Esirudi's Tractate on Logic (Hāšiya muḥida li al-Fawā' id al-Fanāriyya 'alā ar-Risāla fī al-mantiq) was written by *Mustafa Ejubovic*, too. The work was completed in 1692. The gloss (hāšiya) was completed in 1692 and contains the author's notes on margins, all written with a different intention [17, p. 45].

Uncovering Secrets in Comments on 'Isagoge' (Faṭḥ al-asrār fī šarḥ al-Īsāgūḡī). Author of this work was *Muhamed Cajnicanin* (b. 1731 in Cajnice—d.

1792 in Sarajevo). From 1781 to 1783 he lectured at the Djumisc Madressah in Sarajevo and was named Mufti of Sarajevo twice. About three quarters of this comment are exactly the same as comments in the work of Mustafa Ejubovic, which means that a significant part of the text was simply rewritten. At this point, Ljubovic states the following:

Although the entire opus in Arabic in the field of logic of the later period can be described as being in the spirit of idea and forms of the grand predecessors, Muhamed Cajnicanin, that is, 'his' work, may be described as typically epigon-ic [17, p. 55].

Commentary of the text "Isagoge" by Mula Fadil Uzicanin (Šarḥ matn Īsāgūḡī li mawlā al-Fāḡīl Ūḡiḡawalī). Author of this work is *Fadil Uzicanin* and no data is available about him. The work was completed in 1657 and it is not possible to accurately and unambiguously determine who Fadil Uzicanin was. The work is considered to be medium-length commentary of Esirudina al-Ebheri's *Isagoge* [17, p. 58]. Content of this work is almost identical to the above-mentioned work *Commentary of Isagoge*, written by Mustafa Ejubovic.

Uncovering Secrets in Comments on Isagoge from Science on Logic (Faḡ al-asrār fi šarḡ Īsāgūḡī fi 'ilm al-mantiq) This work was written by *Muhammad the Son of Yusuf Bosnjak*. One can see from the contents that the model of commenting is the same—probably taken from Esirudin al-Ebheri's comment on *Isagoge*. A. Olesnicki found this, as well as the previous work and catalogued it among the Oriental manuscripts [17, p. 59].

Without going into details about the content of these works—which Prof. Ljubovic has done in his book—it will suffice to say that this work influenced the approach to logic in Bosnia, namely by writers who wrote in Arabic; leaving open a possibility that it was an individual research and original analysis of the same problem area.

A comparison of *Commentary on Isagoge* (1682) by Mustafa Ejubovic and *Kafi's Compendium on Logic* (written in 1580) shows that the form and content had been completely taken over, which leads to a conclusion that there had existed a primary model of content and form of the subject of logic, which was simply taken over and passed on with little changes to formulation. It is difficult to determine when and how that local stereotype emerged in Bosnia and whether Kafi was the first link in the chain, but it is clear that the stereotype can be traced back to the Arab commentators Ibn Sina (Eastern school) and Al-Farabi (Western school) and to some other Arab commentators of Aristotle and Porphyry.

In fact, it is possible to determine the algorithm of the genesis¹⁴ of the comments of Aristotle's and Porphyry's works because the part of that genesis are the Bosnian comments written on Arabic: 1) *on the first place* are Greek comments written from the 1st to the 5th century AD by Alexander Aphrodisius, Porphyrius, Ammonius, Syrianus, Dexippus, Iamblichus, Simplicius, Philonus; 2) *on the second place* are Latin comments written from the 5th to the

11th century AD by Themistius and Boethius and Greek-Byzantine comments written by David, Elias, Sophoniae and Michael Ephesious; 3) *on the third place* are the first Arabic comments written from the 11th to the 13th century AD by Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd; 4) *on the fourth place* are the second Arabic comments (the comments related to the first Arabic comments and not to original work of Aristotle and Porphyry) written by Taftazani, Al-Fenari, Al-Ebheri, Al-Urmevi, Al-Kazvani, and 5) *on the fifth place* in this chain are Bosnian comments of the second Arabic comments written by Kafi, Ejubovic, Opijac, Uzicanin and Bosnjak.¹⁵ All this is quite far from the original Greek works of Aristotle and Porphyry, which were translated in Arabic around 900. And if we say that neither Ibn Sina (Avicenna) nor Ibn Rushd (Averroes) knew the Greek language and that the works on logic they read were translated by Christian translators from Syria, who had approached these works through the Alexandrian neo-Platonic school in the 5th and 6th centuries, in which, from the time of Ammonius, Christian students prevailed, it becomes clear why Ibn Sina himself had stopped directing his attention to those texts, focusing instead on the spirit or idea they represented.

3.2. Porphyry's Isagoge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Works Written in Latin

Owing to a dedicated scientific engagement of Academician Prof. Dr. *Serafin Hrkac*, OFM, a Bosnian Franciscan, and his exceptional knowledge of the Bosnian philosophical heritage we now have information allowing us to reconstruct the presence of Porphyry's *Isagoge* in education conducted in Latin in Franciscan monasteries and high schools.¹⁶ How is *Isagoge* present in these works? In most cases, as an introductory part to the Aristotelian syllogistic or as the main part of teachings in logic, which preceded medieval texts (*summe*, *sumulae*) on logic that were studied in these institutions.

Isagoge in manuscripts from the Kresevo Monastery:

Manuscript 3-III-19: Compendium logicae Aristotelis, ex Organo eiusdem Summulisque Petri Hispani expertum. This is the work of an unknown author—probably scripts of a high school teacher. It can be seen from contents precisely mentioned by S. Hrkac that, in the first book, discussion 2 (*Incipit secundus tractatus*), the author of this textbook or notes deals with predictabilities in Porphyry's sense: *Caput primum: De praedecabilibus in communi. Caput secundum: De genere. Caput tertium: De specie. Caput quartum: De differentia. Caput quintum: De proprio. Caput sextum: De accidente. Caput septimum: De quibusdam dubiis circa praedicabilia emergentibus* [18, p. 61].

Manuscript 3-IV-16: Logica. Metaphysica. Physica. Ivan Tometinovic is the author of this manuscript. The First Book (*Liber primus*), which deals with logic, was written in 1785. In the second chapter, (*Caput secundum*), prior to the discussion on Aristotle's categories, the author talks about Porphyry's general notions: *De ideis universalibus Porphyrii* [18, p. 85].

Manuscript 3-IV-21: Logica. Metaphysica. According to S. Hrkac, these are student's lecture notes. The first part deals with logic (*Logicae pars prima*). In it, in chapter two (*caput secundum*), there is a title: *Appendix prima: De universalibus Porphyrii*. This is followed by a lecture on Aristotle's categories [18, p. 94].

Isagoge in manuscripts from the Kraljeva Sutjeska Monastery:

Rk. 12B. Traditiones in universam Aristotelico-scoticam philosophiam. The manuscript was written in the period from August 29, 1726 to May 28, 1729. Friar *Filip Lastric from Ocevija* (1700–1783) is the author. Problem area has been classified in the discussion (*disputatio quinta—decima*) of the so-called grand logic (*Incipiunt disputationes in Logicam magnam*).

Disputatio quinta: De universali logico: 1. An detur universale logicum et in quo consistat eius ratio constitutiva? 2. Per quem actum intellectus fiat universale logicum? 3. Quot sunt universalia seu predicabilia?

De praedicabilibus in particulari-Disputatio sexta: De genere: 1. Utrum genus bene definiatur a Porphyrio? 2. Quomodo genus praedicetur de individuis? 3. Utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie et species in unico individuo?

Disputatio septima: De specie, secundo praedicabili: 1. An species bene definiatur a Porphyrio? 2. Per quodnam constituatur species in esse universalis? 3. An individuum bene definiatur a Porphyrio? An ab omnibus individuis possit abstrahi aliqua ratio communis?

Disputatio octava: De differentia, tertio praedicabili: 1. Quid et quotuplex sit differentia? 2. In ordine ad quid differentia constituatur in ratione universalis et tertii praedicabilis? 3. Utrum differentia includat genus et differentia superiores, et e contra?

Disputatio nona: De proprio, quarto praedicabili: 1. Quod sit proprium et per quid constituatur in ratione quarti universalis? 2. An proprium distinguatur et possit separari suo obiecto?

Disputatio decima: De accidente, quinto praedicabili: 1. An accidens legitime sortiatur rationem universalis seu quinti praedicabilis? In qua et de eius definitione discutietur. 2. Quibus naturis conveniat universalitas accidentis? Et responsum quorundum.

Section dealing with Aristotle's categories (*Tractatus de praedicamentis seu categoriis Aristoteles*) follows the aforementioned part [18, p. 150].

Isagoge in manuscripts from the Fojnica Monastery:

Manuscript XXX. Tractatus logicae totiusque philosophiae cursus. In the work entitled *Incipit tractatus de universalibus Porphyrii, disputatio prima: De universalibus in communi. Disputatio secunda: De universali logico. Disputatio tertia: De genere. Disputatio quarta: De specie. De individuo. Disputatio quinta: De differentia. Disputatio septima: De proprio. Tractatus de praedicamentis seu categoriis Aristotelis* follows this part [18, p. 203].

Manuscript 40. Summularum libri tres. Author is unknown. In the work entitled *Dissertationes ad Logicam pertinentes, dissertatio septima, de genere* (127), *De specie* (127), *De differentia* (128), *De proprio* (129), *De accidente*

(130), Sectio unica: De decem Aristotelis categoriis (137) follows this part [18, p. 221].

Manuscript 51. Isagoge in ethicam christianam. The manuscript contains 168 pages. Finis is written in the end. Vacii scripsit Bon. Marainovich die 2. Ianu. 1827. In 3ii Anni Thgia. Continuatur. Sequitur ethica Prticularis was also written and traced over [18, p. 235].

3.3. Porphyry's Isagoge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnian

The original Greek text ΠΟΡΦΥΡΙΟΥ ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ ΤΟΥ ΦΟΙΝΙΚΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΑΘΗΤΟΥ ΠΛΩΤΙΝΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΛΥΚΟΠΟΛΙΤΟΥ (Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. A. Busse, CAG, Vol. IV (1), 1887) and its Bosnian translation, entitled *Introduction of Porphyry Phoenician, Pupil of Plotinus from Licopole (Isagoge)* were published in Sarajevo in 2008. The text was translated by Dr. Nijaz Ibrulj, professor of logic and methodology at the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy [33] Almost 17 centuries after Isagoge was written and after Muslim and Catholic scholars of Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote studies about it in Arabic and Latin, this work has been translated from Classical Greek into Bosnian.¹⁷

The translation of Porphyry's original text, written in Classical Greek, was complicated by the fact that at least three interpretations are possible: ontological (mainly followed by German translators, from Rolfes to Zekl), purely logical (characteristic of English translators) and language-analytical (found in Italian and French translators). Finding one's own way among the three keys of interpretation and translation of this short work had been necessary. It is somewhat of a peculiarity that the work has been translated into English three times so far (Warren 1975, Spade 1994, Barnes 2003), and in each of these works the name of a same location has been translated differently! The translation of Porphyry's Isagoge is a part of Nijaz Ibrulj's grand monograph entitled *Porphyry's Heritage*, which is in preparation. That edition of translations will also contain 250 notes with relevant localities of Greek and Arab commentators, namely, Alexander Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Simplicius, Porphyry (commentary on Categories), Philoponus, David, Elias, Iamblichus and Averroes and Avicenna (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV 3, Berlin, 1891).¹⁸

Academician *Vladimir Premec*, the professor of ancient and medieval philosophy at the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy since 1976, commented the Bosnian translation of *Isagoge* by saying:

Unlike the Latin who, owing to Boethius, had a translation of Porphyry's treatise as early as first quarter of 6th century AD, peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the entire region of South-East Europe and beyond, with the exception of Hellas—Greece, had waited for a Bosnian translation until early 2008. That is why Nijaz Ibrulj's translation is, per se, a manifold cultural and scientific fact and value [35, p. 129].

What is the status of these “Bosnian commentaries” of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*? One could say that they are *commentaries of commentaries*, i.e. that the textual base of these commentaries are some of the Arabic or Latin commentaries, written in Baghdad or Istanbul, that is, in Rome or Padua, not only commentaries on Porphyry’s work (in any language). Perhaps it would be best to say that the contents of this text has been accepted as part of education in confessional communities, which functioned within curricula as an obligatory content of a textbook.

For example, in the collection of manuscripts of the Sarajevo Institute for Oriental Science, out of 5263 caudexes, about 300 manuscripts were in the field of logic. It would be interesting to mention that, out of that number, about 80 manuscripts are either Al-Ebheri’s *Isagoge* (*Isagugi*), or commentary or super-commentary of this work . . . This, in a way, shows which authors in our area were most widely read [21, p. 30].

What I have named in this essay as *Porphyrian isagogics* or *Porphyrian propedeutic classification* could also be named as *Porphyrian definitorium*, an ability of determining meanings of terms and their relations in a logical and linguistic sense, their ontological status and use, characteristic of these commentaries. I will here mention only two introductory sentences from his work *Isagoge* [1, p. 1]:

[1.1.] Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, even for the doctrine of Aristotle’s predicates, to know what is a genus and what a difference and what a species and what a property <of an substance> and what an accident [substratum] <in an substance>, and when reasoning about those <terms> is useful for determining [defining] and, in whole, for division <of terms> and for demonstration, I will try to briefly summarize, as is suitable for an introduction, a short description of discussions of the old <predecessors> sayings on those <terms>, refraining from complex issues, still making judgments on the simpler ones.

[1.2.] For example, do genera and species subsist [exist] or are they only creation of empty thought, and are they, if subsistent [existent] corporeal or incorporeal, and, finally, are they are separate from or within something sensible: these <questions> I avoid to consider, since such an investigation is by far the deepest and requires some other, more complex examination. I will try now to present to you discussions on these and issues stated earlier by old <philosophers>, more prone to logical <way of thinking>, especially the Peripatetics [33, p. 2].

Bosnian philosophical tradition had the reception of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* available in Latin and Arabic. Today, the original Greek text and translation in Bosnian is available too. Sadly, the ones who indirectly knew *Isagoge* and used it in their lectures, both in Latin and in Arabic; both in monasteries and seminaries and in medresahs, considered translating that work, even from those languages into Bosnian (or into one of the languages spoken in Bosnia and Herzegovina), unimportant.

4. THE PERIOD OF OCCUPATION AND RULE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1878–1918)

After the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878), the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy came across a social structure which had collapsed from within because of the anarchy and corruption of authority in provinces. On the other hand, the monarchy introduced a new politically constructive ideology and new patterns of institutional life. Firstly, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had tried, for a long period of time and through their representative in Bosnia Benjamin Kalaj, to realize the project of Bosnian nationality (the process which continues to this very day!), but the resistance of both Serbs and Croats, that is Orthodox and Catholics, was immense. Secondly, the monarchy considered Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of the old Roman Empire and a part of Christendom, which is why it favored Christianity, primarily Catholic Church. Thirdly, during a century-long presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the monarchy failed to implement a unified system of civil education and a unified legal system, but succeeded in putting down all movements for religious-educational autonomy of Serbs and Muslims [12, pp. 367–429].

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy found highly developed confessional schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as poorly developed civil schools. By opening more civil schools, the monarchy tried to change that situation. Such attempts were resisted by confessional communities in different ways, although some of them, Catholic, for example and partly Orthodox, were favored by the regime. In the early days of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, there were about 54 Catholic schools with 56 teachers and about 2,295 students [8, p. 30].

4.1. Clerical Institutes, Medresahs and Ruzdijas in the Monarchy

Confessional schools were known as clerical institutes: Orthodox and Catholic theological schools in Sarajevo and Sharia Law Judiciary School.

East Orthodox Seminary opened in Reljevo, in 1882. The curriculum was based on theological subjects.

Lower class students of this school, as well as of Catholic theological schools, were granted special scholarships by the National Government, because of their decision to enroll seminaries. One can see from this example as well that the regime favored these over other schools [8, p. 151].

Roman Catholic Priest Seminary in Sarajevo was formed under the influence of the Monarchy, which wanted to control activities and work of the Catholic Church from the Vienna Court and in that way decrease the influence of Rome onto the local population. Bosnian Franciscans were, in fact, constantly in opposition to such attempts because the act of nominating the Vrhbosna Archbishop by Vienna deprived them their parishes, while the Jesuit order supported the

Archbishop and the regime (in Vienna), not the Church authorities (in Rome). Prior to the opening of the seminary in Sarajevo, the Catholic Archbishop High School in Travnik had been formed in 1890. It is interesting that the curriculum contained, apart from theological subjects, many courses in Oriental languages (Hebrew, Arabian, Syrian-Haldeic) and in philosophy.

The Sharia Law Judiciary School in Sarajevo was formed by the National Government's Decision in 1887 and existed for five years. Its curricula contained, among other subjects, Logic, Rhetoric and Stylistic, Dogmatic, European Law and Sharia procedural law.

Majority of ruzdijas that had been formed in the period of Ottoman rule, and which had been financed from the *meriaf-sanduk* fund (adopted and transformed by the Austro-Hungarian regime) ceased to exist, with the exception of the reformed ruzdijas in Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Brcko, Bihac, Banja Luka or Travnik. In 1906, a special, unified curriculum was prescribed to these schools (religious instruction, Turkish, Arabic, Reading of Quran, Arabic alphabet, Serbo-Croatian, calculus, geometry, calligraphy, geography and history, natural sciences). Ruzdija had been founded in the time of the Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a special kind of school, or as "a peculiarity in education of Bosnia and Herzegovina" [8, p. 156], that is, as a preparatory school for medresah, characterized by a more secular curriculum. However, in 1906, a new curriculum was introduced, giving these schools a more confessional character, an increased number of lessons in oriental languages and Islamic religious instruction. In 1913, the National Government passed an order on the abolition of these schools and their transformation into regular primary schools, open for pupils of all denominations [8, p. 157].

Madressahs were financed from the local foundations (Tur. *vakuf*), while the National Government showed no interest in their work, treating them exclusively as confessional schools.

The majority of medresahs existed in and around Sarajevo and Tuzla and the least in and around Mostar and Bihac. Gazi Husref-bey's Medresah in Sarajevo was the best organized. This school is peculiar because it has been continuously open for over 430 years, which is rare both in this country and in the world. In its time, it was an institution of higher religious education. In the same way as Catholic teachings dominated the curricula of Western higher education schools in the time of their forming, so has Islamic teaching dominated the curriculum of this, in a way the first higher education school in Bosnia and Herzegovina [8, p. 158].

4.2. Individual Works and Authors

Josip Stadler (1843–1918) was appointed Archbishop of Vrhbosna in 1881. Stadler had previously been a professor of fundamental theology and philosophy at the Zagreb Theological Faculty. He graduated on philosophical and theological studies in Rome, at the Jesuit Collegium Romanorum. Upon arriving to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he developed good relations with Benjamin Kalaj, whose

children he secretly christened in Ilidza near Sarajevo, and it is largely thanks to him that the Catholic Church gained a favored status.¹⁹

While still in Zagreb, Stadler translated *Tongiorgi's Logic*, a textbook about which he stated the following in his Foreword:

. . . believe me, you will not find issues made clearer and better classified anywhere but in this logic, known to the whole of Europe, in this book written by praiseworthy Tongiorgi, in this book taught from at many a university. Because I am personally assured by this book, I did not want to engage into writing logic of my own (. . .). I felt obliged to add a note here and there and to leave out something here and there, and to give other shape to some things [3, p. 427].

Stadler's (Tongiorgi's) *Logic* consists of two parts:

Logic, Part 1. Dialectics. In Sarajevo: Published by Vrhbosna Chapter, 1904. In this part, Stadler deals with formal or basic logic and methodology, focusing on Aristotelian syllogistic, partially amending it with knowledge related to medieval theory on properties and roles of terms (*proprietas terminorum*). This part consists of four books. Book One: On the First Activity of Our Mind, that is, On Understanding; Book Two: On the Second Activity of Our Mind, that is, on Judgment; Book Three: On Third Activity of Our Mind, that is, On Conclusion and Its Meaning. Book Four: On Proving and Scientific Method. In a way, Stadler (or Tongiorgi) implicitly follows the structure of Aristotle's *Organon*, starting with Porphyry's tree and Aristotle's *Categories*, through meanings of words and sentences (*On Interpretation*), discussion on syllogism (*The First Analytics*), discussion on errors in concluding (*Sophist denial*). It is unclear why Stadler named this entire part of logic Dialectics.

Logic, Part 2. Critic or noetics. In Sarajevo, Published by Vrhbosna Chapter, 1905. In the second part of his logic, Stadler deals with issues related to the theory of cognition in widest sense of the word, from empirical, psychological and phenomenon-related, to cognitive and, finally, theoretical aspect. This part consists of three books. Book One: On Nature of Logical Truth and Security. Book Two: On Sources from Which the Truth of Our Mind Is Drained or on Way It Is Achieved. Book Three: On Meaning of Truth and Principle of Security. Unlike the first part (Dialectics), in the second part of his logic, Stadler provides referent names of authors cited. This part is mostly based on Descartes' attitudes presented in his manuscript *Rules of Method* [4]. Stadler's *Logic*, as he himself said, is not an authorial work, but it is a valuable compendium written in our language which could have been of profound use for a student of theology to get acquainted with the basic concepts of logic, theory of meaning, cognitive and theological nature of objects and cognitional subject. In that sense, it was, in its time, a valuable work.

5. THE PERIOD OF SOCIALIST REGIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1945–1992)

The University of Sarajevo was formed by a decree in 1949 and has a rich pre-history.²⁰

The Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo was formed on November 11, 1950, by the Decision of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Department of Philosophy and Sociology was formed in 1956, as the Department Section for Philosophy formally became independent, and the following subjects were taught: logic, dialectics, ethics, esthetics, philosophy, sociology, methodology, etc. Logic, as an individual subject, with its curriculum and certain number of classes, was introduced to the curriculum. *Muhamed Filipovic* taught logic from 1962 until his retirement in 2002. From 1990, *Nijaz Ibrulj* has been teaching the subject, together with analytical philosophy, philosophy of language, cognitive science, sociology of communication. Since 2008, *Kenan Sljivo* has been an assistant on the subjects of logic, epistemology and cognitive science.²¹

In high schools throughout the country a significant number of classes were provided for formal logic, philosophy and psychology. Although the socialist regime favored the Communist party and the ideological basis of Marxism–Leninism, from which all the dogmatic frames of philosophy, logic and scientific theory were inserted into curricula; although the orthodoxy of such ideology brought to life forms and contents of subjects taught in high schools, collegiate schools and faculties (dialectic materialism, Marxism, etc.), this regime never banned the formation and work of confessional schools, but had other means of controlling them, and at other levels.

The Islamic Theological Faculty was founded in Sarajevo, by the Decision of the Grand Assembly and the Grand Islamic Seniority of the Islamic Community of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1977. Today, logic is not taught at this faculty, unlike philosophy, psychology and research methods. The Franciscan Theology (Franciscan Theological Faculty) was formed in 1968 as part of the Sarajevo University. The Catholic Theology of Vrhbosna, formed in 1890, is active today, in full capacity.

5.1. Authors and Works in Logic

In 1968, a comprehensive study on contemporary logic entitled *Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Logic Theories* by Muhamed Filipovic was published in the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy's collection of works. The author, for the first time, presents in the article facts related to the contemporary theories of logic, which primarily developed from philosophy of mathematics and set theory, and then from philosophy of language, predicate calculus and propositional calculus seen in Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In fact, the article was written after a series of seminars on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which Professor Filipovic held in the period of several years at Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy [6].

Book entitled *Philosophy of Language—I* by Prof. Dr. Muhamed Filipovic was published in Sarajevo in 1987. The book provides a comprehensive insight into philosophical and theoretical discussions on the essence of language from

the point of view of ancient and medieval philosophical theories on language; as well as an insight into the nature of rational thinking, logical forms and connection between language and forms, through questions on the essence of nature and mental world of the man. The discussion on language mainly corresponds to philosophical theories of tradition and with development of modernist philosophical systems [13].

The first complete work on Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy entitled *Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein* was published in Sarajevo, in 1978, and is a result of Professor Jelena Berberovic's engagement in doctoral thesis. In the period from 1965 to 2007, Jelena Berberovic taught gnoseology (theory of cognition), at Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy's Department of Philosophy and Sociology. Her book encompassed all the crucial aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy and philosophy of logic in his *Tractatus* and in *Logical Investigations* (translation of this work was published in Belgrade, containing an introduction by Professor Berberovic) [10].

Influenced by the ideas and mentorship of Academician Muhamed Filipovic, an important circle of researchers and authors formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing an enormous interest in research on heritage. In 1984, Amir Ljubovic defended his doctoral thesis at the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy, entitled *The Works in Logic by Bosniak Authors in Arabic*, which was later (1996) published as a book, translation of which was published in English in 2008, by the Brill publishing house in Amsterdam. This monograph is the most important source on works in the field of philosophy and logic, written in Arabic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Amir Ljubovic, together with Fehim Nametak, also wrote two comprehensive monographs on Hasan Kafi Pruscak's thought and works²² [21].

In 1989, Nijaz Ibrulj defended his masters thesis at the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy, entitled *Philosophical Content of Gottlob Frege's Logical-Mathematical and Semantic Research*. The author proved in his thesis the claim that logical, mathematical and semantic research of the professor of mathematics from Jena, Gottlob Frege, who is also considered as the father of analytical philosophy, are undoubtedly characterized by philosophical content in questions on sense and meaning of statement, in concept writing²³ as language of pure thought, in observing the attitude or statement as function, in contextual definition, in differentiating the *signe* and *designatum*, in treating the true value of a statement as an object. This work, the first scientific account on Gottlob Frege in former Yugoslavia, introduced for the first time the original text and interpretation of the issue of logic and analytical philosophy, thus setting aside the Marxist and dialectic research on logic (as the property of material) of reflection [14].

6. THE DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1995–2009)

In the period from 1992 to 1995, the Yugoslav National Army of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and local Serb insurgents (chetniks) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, assembled around a national party—the Serb

Democratic Party, waged aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to exist and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had remained within its borders, was divided and reduced to a state community of two entities, one of them being the so-called Republic of Srpska, the authorities of which are continually conducting the policy of separation from Bosnia and Herzegovina; while within the other entity (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the political representatives of the Croat people are continually demanding the formation of a third entity, which means Bosniaks and Croats should divide their entity in two parts.

6.1. Separate Educational Institutions

In late 1995, the University of Sarajevo (which never ceased to exist or function formally) renewed its material activities at faculties and by curricula. After the Dayton Agreement defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state consisting of two entities, a number of ethnically clean schools were formed in the entity with Serb majority, while a phenomenon of separate educational systems based on ethno-national programs (two schools under one roof!) came to life in the entity in which Bosniaks and Croats share political authority. Ethno-national and ethno-confessional schools and universities were formed everywhere, as well as a significant number of private universities in recent times.

During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, on November 11, 1994, the Catholic School Center "St. Joseph" was founded in Sarajevo by the Archbishopric of Vrhbosna. Apart from this center in Sarajevo, the Archbishopric of Vrhbosna also founded Catholic school centers in Tuzla, Zenica, Konjic, Travnik and Zepce. As part of this activity,²⁴ primary schools have also been opened within the Catholic School Center, consisting of 28 classes, as well as the General High School and Medical High School, consisting of eight classes, with the purpose of preparing the students for two vocations: nurse-technician and physiotherapeutic-technician.

As part of bilateral cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Turkey, a significant number of joint educational institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has opened. Thus, the Turkish-Bosnian College was formed as a private educational institution which exists and acts within the Bosna-Sema educational institution, founded in 1996, with the aim of providing assistance to education institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the course of several years and within this institution, the Sarajevo College, the Una-Sana College, the International Primary School of Sarajevo, the International Primary School of Tuzla and Zenica were founded. At the fourth year of studies, one school hour of logic is planned in the curricula of the college and international schools. Two school hours are reserved for philosophy and sociology. Half of the teaching staff is from Turkey and lessons are held in Turkish and English.

After 1995, several new universities have been formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both "state" (cantonal, municipal and village (!) universities) and private. Apart from that, a number of new departments have been formed at univer-

sities which had formed earlier. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the bigger entity), University of Bihac, University of (West) Mostar (there, at the Department of Philosophy, logic is taught as a subject: *Logic I* and *Logic II*), University of Zenica, which also consists of Islamic Pedagogical Academy (Zenica), Faculty of Philosophy (Tuzla), Faculty of Humanities (East Mostar). University of East Sarajevo, which consists of a significant number of faculties (Faculty of Philosophy, where *Logic I* and *Logic II with Methodology* are taught), University of Banja Luka, which also consists of a number of faculties, including Faculty of Philosophy, have all been formed in the smaller entity. Interestingly, simultaneously with the formation of universities in Bosniak cantons, the Faculty of Islamic Science (Bihac) and the Islamic Pedagogical Academy (Zenica) have been also formed.

Apart from the universities mentioned, a number of private universities and schools of higher education have opened.²⁵ Not a single of the universities mentioned is characterized by a systematic treatment of any of the branches of logic as science, while the subject Contemporary Philosophy provides only the basics in the field.

However, in spite of the developments, there are still parts of the society and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina that remain multicultural and multinational, both in the sense of the policy of enrolment and curricula. The University of Sarajevo is one such institution, especially the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy, with all its departments. That enabled the works of Aristotle and Porphyry to be studied in Greek; as well as the study of mathematics (symbolic) logic in works of Cantor, Frege, Russell, Gödel, Carnap, Wittgenstein; the study of philosophical logic, philosophy of language and analytical philosophy in the original works of Quine, Austin, Strawson, Davidson, Putnam; the study of cognitive science in the works of Searle, Churchland, Dennet, Block, Minski, Fodor; all regardless of the pressure of nationalists and apartheid followers, who seek ethnically clean education, based on their (by genocide or by ethnical cleansing conquered) territory, and in spite of the demands to teach, for example Arabic logic, not some “third-grade thinkers,” who are (for younger researchers) “foreign and unfamiliar traditions,” the study of which would be “rehashed over and over.”²⁶ Certainly, this program does not fit the idea of “comparative philosophy” which is used by the evil laymen to orientalize the contemporary moment and who help islamization of the new generations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6.2. Authors and Works in Logic

In 1999, *The Philosophy of Logic* by Nijaz Ibrulj was published in Sarajevo. The book raises a number of questions in a new way on logic and its three main fields (starting from of ontological and epistemological presuppositions): (I) the field of ontological or metaphysical concept of logic (the basic concepts of pre-Socratic henologic, Plato’s dialogism/dialectics, Aristotelian syllogistics and Porphyrian isagogics); (II) the field of atomistic concept of logic (the basic in-

sights into symbolic logic of Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Tarski), and (III) the field of holistic or holophrastic concept of logic (logic and philosophy of logic of Quine, Austin, Strawson, Davidson, Putnam). In this book three different critical and analytical idioms are put in relation to the way of problematising the question of the representation of the multiple-logical generalization.

The fourth part of the book is entitled *Principle of the Logical* and is the author's heuristic analysis of the problem of conceptual scheme description²⁷ [19].

In the seventeen chapters of the book entitled *Philosophical Research: Logic, Philosophy, Language*, Academician Muhamed Filipovic²⁸ presented the internal relation between logic and history of logic, history of problems of logic and its relations with other fields of science, primarily its relation with philosophy to which it necessarily belongs. In the *Preface*, Filipovic situates logic as a philosophical discipline and its place in the system of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, influenced by the Ottoman culture and language, noticing that logic of that period was tied to the theological discourse (exegesis) in both Catholics and Muslims. On the other hand, the connection between logic and other disciplines, primarily mathematics and linguistics, resulted in the detachment of grand flows of philosophical thinking and logic [27].

As part of research within the European Programs (6 EURP) a monograph by Nijaz Ibrulj entitled *A Century of Rearranging: Essays on Identity, Knowledge and Society* (Sarajevo, 2005) was published. The book is dedicated to conceptual research on *logic of social triangulation* which consists of identity, knowledge and social ontology. The essays selected in the monograph deal with interaction of the basic logical notion, the notion of identity and knowledge in logical, linguistic, scientific, technological, social, metaphysical, mathematical, ontological and literary area.²⁹ The book mentions for the first time the importance of Zadeh's *fuzzy logic* and *soft computing* in the sphere of cognitive and psychological research, and, for the first time also, *nanotechnology* and *nanoscience* are brought into connection with philosophy, metaphysics and social ontology, via their connection with logic and artificial intelligence, Computing with Word and Computing with Perception.

In 2005, at Sarajevo Faculty of Engineering (Information Technology), Nedžad Dukic defended his dissertation *Equivalence of Fuzzy Functional and Fuzzy Polysemic Dependencies with Fuzzy Logic*. Author of this doctoral dissertation set a task of finding equivalence between the parts of two fields: the fuzzy relation bases on the one hand and a part of fuzzy logic on the other. He achieved his goal through formulas in fuzzy logic, by conjoining certain fuzzy formulas with the fuzzy dependencies, that is, he proved that if fuzzy functional dependency is true, then it meets the conditions of the conjoined fuzzy formula and vice versa. Furthermore, the author of this doctoral dissertation proved that "if from one set of fuzzy dependencies follow some other dependencies, than it follows that from that set of fuzzy formulas some other, suitable fuzzy formula follows and, of course, vice versa" [26, p. vi].

A group of researchers, assembled in the society *Academia Analytica*, showed interest in artificial intelligence, cognitive science and fuzzy logic. The book *Fuzzy Logic in Engineering Applications* by *Zikrija Avdagic* (Sarajevo, 2008) represent such interest. *Zikrija Avdagic* is the professor at the Sarajevo Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Department of Computer Science and Informatics, where he teaches artificial intelligence and bioinformatics. Focus of his research is methods and algorithms of fuzzy computing, neural networks, evolutionary computing, biomedical engineering and real time systems.³⁰ The book *Fuzzy Logic in Engineering Applications* focuses, in the form of technical-technological handbook (or university textbook), with complex issues of technological procedures, description of methods and techniques of operating with phenomena of logical designing and informational production of intelligent systems and with logic and mathematics, which support that description by offering representative evidence for them. The author speaks of origin and application of the fuzzy logic, on rules of concluding and approximate reasoning, on fuzzy models and algorithms, on fuzzy management, on computer modeling, on fuzzy control in different technological applications [30].

7. CONCLUSION

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is not only one truth or theory, true or false, on anything, including education and development of individual sciences. That fact is not, by itself, negative, but has not been accepted or realized as a need for radical interpretation of identity³¹ of the other and of the different; an interpretation which would open a possibility for *interpreting* the other identity the way it interprets itself and to *re-interpret* it in intercultural coexistence. The study of logic in different ideological and political systems, in the environment of confessional and cultural differences, within differently based and oriented traditions and educational paradigms, could not have offered more than the local (“*ejalet-like*,” “*provincial*”) adoption of some regional forms and contents, that were adjusted to the local milieu and educational system defined by a ruling regime.

If some compatible elements have ever existed in educational agenda and form in any period of time, in *an interactive reaction* that was the medieval period in Europe, in Mediterranean, in Byzant and Near East in the time of the Middle Age, or in the midst of differently composed matrix within a culturally, ethnically, politically, nationally, linguistically diverse and interactively formed “*geographical*” compression such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and its history, then Aristotelian logic (syllogistics) and Porphyrian propedeutic classification (*Isagogic*), as part of the ancient heritage, played a significant role in the educational base, which, again, was used differently in the process of development of ethnical and confessional identities through education, giving, in the end, different civilization results. One could conclude that Aristotelian logic (syllogistics) and Porphyrian *Isagogic*, which were primarily discussed here, had influenced the development of Christian and Islamic culture in general, to a greater extent

than the Christian and Islamic culture contributed the development of logic and classificational *Isagogic* (logical propedeutics).

The basic insight into education, into the content and forms of education in the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463–1878), shows that the paragon or paradigm for all ethnical and confessional communities was in a culture and in a political system of a regional character; while those paradigms were implemented locally, under cultural and political conditions of a territory in which members of ethnical and confessional communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina lived. That was the situation in education as well, and with the development of logic: works on logic written by Islamic authors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Arabic, were extracted from the Arabic logic, or, better yet, from the logic in Islamic tradition, which consisted of Al-Kindi's, Ibn Sina's or Al-Farabi's comments of Aristotle's or Porphyry's manuscripts that were transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina through comments of those comments; more precisely, through works written by Sadudin Taftazani, Al-Fenari, Al-Ebheri, Al-Urmevi, Al-Kazvani (all pupils and followers of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd). Those works were available to Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during their schooling in Istanbul / Constantinople.

In the same way, works on logic written in Latin by our people (Franciscans, lecturers, philosophy professors) had a paradigm of their own, namely, in the works studied in Rome, Vienna or in Venice; works that were also written by commentators of Aristotle and Plato, or works of medieval scholars like Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Peter Lombard or Peter of Spain, all of whom wrote *summe* and *summulae logicales*. Those were mostly textbooks, notes, systematizations, theses, syllabi for lectures, rather than the original and author works in the field of logic.

One can only conditionally speak of originality and authorship of the manuscripts written in both Arabic and in Latin. Those are compendiums, textbooks, notes of lecturers or student notes and transcripts from books. Their only purpose was in the teaching process in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. However, they are an important testimony on the kind of educational agenda available to the people in education. Apart from that, the existence of these manuscripts, both in Latin and in Arabic, testifies of a significant advantage of studying logic compared to the other branches of philosophy and (non-theological) science. It is possible that this focusing on logic (syllogistics) and its application in the frame of theological issues, contributed the interruption of development of Islamic sciences, while the Renaissance and humanist issues outside that circle of questions contributed the development of modern positivistic sciences, as well as humanistic and social sciences in the Western world, with logic playing one of the leading roles both then and today.

As we can see from the above-presented account, one cannot trace an individual development of logic and authentic contribution to the science of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the fact that logic had become a part of the teaching process in both confessional and state schools is very important. Rise of interest in logic in today's time (works on logic written in *the Bosnian language*

and translations of works on logic from Classical Greek) are more of an exception to the rules of scholars of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose interest has been higher in confessional than in expert activities, in historical, metaphysical and speculative knowledge, confessional dogmas and political practice; in other words, in ideology which has always been a speculative structure (structure of the structure of the society) within which there is a possibility of realization of a society which would contain social groups or individuals who are beyond the effect of social principles they themselves defined as valid.³²

The regimes that would come and go in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose origin has almost always been regional, beyond the country itself, favored one confessional or political community and subordinated schools and cultural institutions of the community by the decrees and activities in the field of education: the Ottoman empire favored the Islamic confessional community with mektebs, medresahs and ruzdijas; the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy favored the Catholic confessional community and, in part, the Orthodox community, encouraging the work of seminaries and divinity colleges; the Socialist Republic favored the Communist party, whose programs (dialectic materialism) were used to derive university and school curricula and their secular (once secularist) orientation. The Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territory of which, as a whole, does not have a single regime or ideology, has opened a Pandora's box in the field of education: satisfying single-national, confessional paradigm in its territory, under the authority of its own, without any criteria and at any cost.

At the end, what can be said of works on logic written in Arabic and on manuscripts from the Bosnian monasteries written in Latin? What can be said about the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, about the fuzzy logic and about Bosnian translations from Classical Greek and works on logic written in the Bosnian language? What should the relationship towards heritage and what should the relationship towards the contemporary times be like? They are a part of our culture and a part of our intellectual and spiritual world, showing by their mere existence that Bosnia and Herzegovina is capable of interaction with forms and contents that appear and disappear within the world, global, civilizational community of the peoples who, apart from the periods of mind depravation, know of the great eras of humanistic, spiritual and social development in which logic plays a decisive role.

Bosnia Porphyriana is not a *heretic metaphor* for the Bosnia and Herzegovina, although in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina, claiming that a civic, multi-national and multicultural society is possible is a matter of the greatest heresies. That is neither a *unitarian metaphor*, such which centered one nation and one identity as basic for the past and the present days using a privileged national monologue or contrafactual historiography. Here is rather a call, no matter what national or confessional for an interactive participation in a civilization favoring freedom as the goal and instrument, rationality, ethics of responsibility, tolerance, radical interpretation of identity and transnational socialization as means; all this regardless of confessional and ethnic affiliation; all at the same time and in the same territory. *Bosnia Porphyriana* is a *cultural metaphor* for an *open*

sources country; the sources which should be kept open for all the people, whether Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist, atheistic or for any other “language” of today’s time. In spite of all, or because of all, this text emphasizes that part of the heritage and that moment of contemporariness of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which logic was or is a part of philosophical educational agenda and in which the work of Porphyry, *Isagoge*, was taught at schools and is taught at universities today, by all ethnic and confessional communities. That is the reason why I added the title *Bosnia Porphyriana* in the index of the notions which characterize this country.

NOTES

1. The famous sentence used by the Arabian theologians against philosophers favoring the Hellenic thought, who introduced the logic of Aristotelianism into discussions on topics in Quran. The sentence originates from a medieval discussion while Ibn Taymiyyah, in his treatise *Against the Greek Logicians* repeats this sentence, attacking the logic of Aristotelianism.

2. A complete study on the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which contains broader methodological and content-wise presuppositions for valorization of the existing material, which also introduces *critical* in place of *counterfactual doxography* in interpretation of the above-mentioned materials and which discusses the influence of ideological systems on the inception of content and form of the material, will be published by Nijaz Ibrulj in a book entitled *Bosnia Porphyriana—A Cultural Metaphor* during 2010.

3. Association ACADEMIA ANALITICA—Society for Development of Logic and Analytical Philosophy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (<http://www.academia-analitica.org>) was founded in Sarajevo on July, 2, 2007. Founder and President of the Society is Dr. Nijaz Ibrulj, professor of logic, analytical philosophy, theory of knowledge, philosophy of languages, cognitive sciences and methodology at the Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy. *The Logical Foresight* is a journal published by the Society. One of the ongoing projects is also *Philosophical Textbooks: Logic 1—4*, that is to be published by 2012, and which will contain the following parts: *Book 1: Dialectics. Syllogistics. Logic Terminorum* (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Boetius, Porphyrius, Ammonius, Dexippus, Simplicius, Philoponus, Averroes, Ockham, Duns Scotus, Hispanus, Aquinas); *Book 2: Logical Atomism* (Boole, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Tarski, Quine, Gödel); *Book 3: Logical Holism and Pragmaticism* (Wittgenstein, Austin, Sellars, Strawson, Dewey, Quine, Davidson, Searle, Putnam, Rorty); *Book 4: Logic and Artificial Intelligence* (Turing, Denett, Minsky, Searle, Putnam, Churchland, Fodor, Newell, Simeon, Zadeh). In the same year, 2007, Nijaz Ibrulj founded ZINK—the first Scientific and Research Incubator in Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.ziink.wordpress.com) at Sarajevo Faculty of Philosophy.

4. See the register of mektebs and more detailed information on each of the mektebs in Sarajevo, Novi Pazar, Mostar, Foca, Travnik, Banja Luka, Zenica and other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Dr. Ismet Kasumovic's work [20].

5. This study focuses solely on the main works of Bosnian commentators and we assume the reader has the information on the status of Aristotelian logic and Porphyry’s isagogics within the Islamic cultural tradition determined by Quran, Hadiths, the Sharia law, theological discussions etc., at the disposal.

6. The Terminological coin “Porphyry’s isagogics,” which I have introduced here, can be applied in the sense of “classificatory propaedeutics” which became, after Pro-

phyry's *Isagoge* a canonic part of logical discussions which obligatorily preceded Aristotelian logic and was placed in the introduction of the *Organon*.

7. Greek commentators used some minor terminological changes to pass on almost entire sections of the pattern to be commented. For example, a significant number of Aristotle's writing entitled *Categories* starts with an introduction which contains the ten questions, answered in that introduction in the way that an introduction to a commentary is longer than the writing commented on! For example, introduction to Ammonius' (435/445–517/526) commentary entitled *Prolegomena to Ten Categories according to Philosopher Ammonius* (Greek: ΠΡΟΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ ΤΩΝ ΔΕΚΑ ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΩΝ ΑΠΟ ΦΩΝΗΕΣ ΑΜΜΟΝΙΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥ) states:

Since we want to delve into Aristotle's philosophy, as a useful introduction to it for us, let us raise some questions, ten in number. (1) Where do the names of the philosophical schools come from? (2) What is the division of the Aristotelian writings? (3) Where should one begin the Aristotelian writings? (4) What obvious utility does the Aristotelian philosophy have for us? (5) What will guide us to it? How should an auditor of philosophical lectures prepare himself? What is the form of the narrative? Why has the Philosopher obviously made a point of being obscure? (9) How many and what sort of prerequisites are there for the study of each of the Aristotelian writings? (10) What sort of person should a commentator on them be? [Translation according to the original text: Ammonius In Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarius. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV 3, Berlin 1891. Translation: Nijaz Ibrić.]

The ten questions, although distantly related to Aristotle's *Categories* had been passed on until the late 6th century, through the works of other Greek commentators, as a constant part of the commenting pattern work. Only after this section, which was supposed to provide an introduction to the entire philosophy of Aristotle and its origin, does the first theme of *Categories* appear, together with a comment. The ten questions and such form of organization of the comments was taken over by Philoponus in his scholia on Aristotle's categories (cf. Philoponi in Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium. Vol. XIII), Simplicius in his commentaries on Aristotle's Categories (cf. Simplicii in Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium. Vol. VIII), and by others. Arabic commentators of Aristotle's *Categories* do not contain such an introduction, which is completely lost in Latin commentators (cf. Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. Princeton University Press, 1983).

8. This formal compatibility within educational systems of different confessional communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is taken by Amir Ljubovic as evidence that the

. . . case here is of a unique history of logic, existent in two parallel flows or language expressions and cultural or language expressions: one which developed in Arabic and within the Arab-Islamic spiritual and cultural tradition, and the other in Latin (in a significantly smaller scope and in languages of the peoples), within the West-European philosophical tradition [17, p. 172].

One can only tentatively speak here about "creations" in the field of logic. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that there existed *two flows of the reception of the ancient philosophical and scientific heritage*, which were *interactive* only during a *period* of medieval cultural, political and civilization connections between philosophy and theology.

9. At this point and for the first time, I introduce into our spiritual life the term *Bosnia Porphyriana*, with the aim of expressing the centuries-long presence of Porphyry's work *Isagoge* in education and in logical thought of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of religious and ethno-national affiliation.

10. Aurelius Augustinus, one of the most important apologetes of Christianity in the 4th century AD, stated in his work *De Civitate Dei* that Porphyry is "the most intelligent of all philosophers, although the most fierce enemy of Christianity" (doctissimus philosophorum, quamvis Christianorum acerrimus inimicus) [16, pp. 72–3]. He called him "a great enemy of Christianity" (Christianis inimicissimo) or "Photinian heretic" (Photinianus haereticus) [16, pp. 76–7], for acknowledging Jesus Christ as a person, not divinity; for Porphyry, Hebrew God Jahwe יהוה (The One Who Is) was a true and acceptable example of monotheistic God.

11. Data on authors and works on logic from this period, written in Arabic are taken from Amir Ljubovic's work *The Works in Logic by Bosniak Authors in Arabic* Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut. 1996.

12. See: Tony Street's *Arabic Logic*, in: *Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 1. Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic*. Edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods. Elsevier, North Holland, 2004, pp. 523–97. Because of many cases of reservation in connection to uncritical usage of the syntagm Arabic Logic, Tony Street holds necessary to make the title precise: 'Peripatetic logical writings in Arabic produced in the realms of Islam between 750 and 1350, with special reference to the syllogistic' (p. 526). See also: Lagerlund, Henrik. *The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic up to the Later Thirteenth Century*, in: *Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 2. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*. Edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods. Elsevier, North Holland, 2008, pp. 281–346.

13. See: Burnett, Charles. *The Transaltion of Arabic Works on Logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, in: *Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 1. Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic*. Edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods. Elsevier, North Holland, 2004, pp. 597–607.

14. At the same time, we need to talk about different forms of comments. *Comentaria* is an umbrella title in Latin which somehow covered differencies in reception of some work. We can make distinction between 10 types of the Greek comments (cf. *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*), like: 1. introduction; 2. dialogues; 3. sentences; 4. reminder; 5. paraphrasing; 6. prologue; 7. exegesis; 8. questioning and answering; 9. designation, and 10. explanation.

15. Having exhausted the list of data on authors and manuscripts he held important, Amir Ljubovic, in his excellent study (doctoral dissertation), gives the final opinion:

. . . it can be seen that notwithstanding the different structures and types of works, or more precisely, different mutual identification of questions that are analyzed in certain chapters, sections, subsections, etc., they all (apart from the glosses that represent a special form of individual opus) display common general themes and a clear orientation towards the basic problem area. The second characteristic of all these works, which is also a characteristic of the entire opus influenced by Ibn Sina, is that all the questions treated, regardless of the different classifications, are only parts of the whole of the *Arabic organon* (italics N.I.).

Still, the existence of *Arabic organon* is questionable, the same way the term *Arabic logic*, used for partial inclusion of Aristotle's scripts within corpus of Islamic theological

thought which was always given the primacy, is questionable. Many of the so-called critical terms used in this field are a result of counterfactual doxography and creation of categorical (top-down), rather than attributive (bottom-up) analogies.

16. All data on the manuscripts enlisted and on authors who wrote in Latin, and who belonged to Catholic confessional and cultural circle of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the period in question are taken from the work of Academician friar Serafin Hrkac, *Philosophical Manuscripts in Latin in Bosna Argentina*. Mostar: Ziral. 1998.

17. Introduction of Porphyry Phoenician, Pupil of Plotinus from Licopole (*Isagoge*), a parallel edition of original text in Classical Greek and translation into Bosnian. Sarajevo, *Dijalog* 1/2008, pp. 1–50. Edited and translated by Nijaz Ibrulj.

18. In preparation of his translation, Dr. Nijaz Ibrulj consulted many other translations of this text into different European languages: *Latin translation* (Porphyrii Isagoge. Translatio Boethii. Aristoteles Latinus. I 6–7, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, ad. B. G. Dod, Bruges-Paris. Desclée de Brouwer, 1966). *German translation* (1) Porphyrius, Einleitung in die Kategorien, in: Aristoteles Organon, übersetzt und erläutert von Eugen Rolfes. Band I, Felix Meiner Verlag. Unveränderter Abdruck 1948, der zweiten Auflage von 1925. *German translation* (2) Porphyrios, Einführung in die Kategorien des Aristoteles (Isagoge), in: Aristoteles Organon. Band 2: Kategorien/Hermeneutik oder vom sprachlichen Ausdruck. Griechisch-Deutsch. Hrsggegeben, übersetzt, mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen versehen von Hans Günter Zekl. Velix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp. 155–88. *Italian translation*: Porfirio Isagoge. Prefazione, introduzione, traduzione e apparati di Giuseppe Girgenti. Testo greco a fronte. Versione latina di Severino Boezio. Rusconi Libri, Milano, 1995. *French translation*: Porphyre Isagoge. Texte grec et latin, traduction par Alain de Libera et Alain-Philippe Segonds. Introduction et notes par Alain de Libera. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1998. *English translation* (1): Porphyry, The Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W. Warren. The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1975. *English translation* (2): Porphyry, The Phoenician, the Pupil of Plotinus of Lycopolis Isagoge. Translated and Edited by Paul Vincent Spade, in: Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals. Porphyry. Boethius. Abelard. Duns Scotus. Ockham. Hackett Publishing Company. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994. *English translation* (3): Porphyry's Introduction by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford University Press, 2003.

19. Josip Stadler, the Archbishop of Vrhbosna, was accused in many controversial cases of conversion from Islam into Catholicism. One such example was christening of underage Fata Omanovic in Mostar, which triggered the national uprising of Muslims in Herzegovina.

20. University of Sarajevo has a prehistory in pre-university forms of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are compatible with the institutions of the West. The Bosniak sources state that

in 1531, Gazi Husref-bey founded Hanikah in Sarajevo, which is a higher school of Sufi philosophy and which was supplemented in 1537 by an institution in which Islamic sciences were studied. In that sense, three disciplines of the classic Catholic universities were fostered here: theology, law and philosophy, with the addition of the university library. In the Austro-Hungarian period, more precisely, in 1887, the Sharia Law Judiciary School was founded as a five-year collegiate school. The newer history of Sarajevo University started with opening of the first civic institutions of higher education, just before and during the World War Two (Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, 1940; Faculty of Medicine, 1944 its work had been revived in 1946; Faculty of Law and Col-

legiate Pedagogical School also opened. In 1948, Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry started working again. In 1949, Faculty of Technical Engineering opened. On December 2 that same year, appointment of the first Rector marked the beginning of University of Sarajevo. With the opening of Faculty of Philosophy in 1950 and Economic Faculty in 1952, the initial stage of formation of the Sarajevo University was completed" (<http://www.unsa.ba>).

21. Kenan Sljivo has so far published an article *Quine's Ontological and Epistemological Relativity* (Sophos, 1/2008, Sarajevo). His other two articles are being edited: *Intentionality and interpretation; Representation and Communication. A research on Structural and Semantic Essences of Communication*. So far, two of his translations have been published: *On Referring* (P.F. Strawson), *Dijalog*, 1/2008, Sarajevo; *The Mind—Body Problem* (W. G. Lycan), *Sophos*, 1/2008, Sarajevo. Another two translations of Kenan Sljivo will be published soon: *Entity and Identity* (P.F. Strawson), *Dijalog*, Sarajevo. *Intentionality and its place in nature* (John R. Searle), *Sophos*, 1/2009, Sarajevo.

22. In the monograph edited by Ljubovic, Amir/Nametak, Fehim (1999), Hasan Kafi Pruscak. Sarajevo-Publishing, authors state the following on pp. 26–7:

The emergence of first translations of Aristotle's logical discussions and Porphyry's *Isagoge* is mostly thought to date back to the first half of the 9th century. However, some researchers emphasize that Ibn al-Muqaffa (d. cca 757) was first to translate Aristotle's *Categories* (Al-Maqlat), *On Interpreting* (Al-Ibara) and *Analytics* (Al-qiyas).

Authors here refer to Carl Brockelmann and his work *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, Vol. I, Meimar 1898, p. 158. At this page, Carl Brockelmann speaks of Ibn Al Muqaffi as of a translator of *Khalila and Dimna*, works from Indian tradition (panchatantra).

23. It is interesting that a copy of Frege's book *Begriffsschrift* appeared in Sarajevo not earlier than 1989. The copy was brought to Sarajevo by the author of the masters thesis, having found it in Zagreb, at School of Engineering. That was, at the time, the only copy of this book in libraries of former Yugoslavia. After that, the author collected and brought other Frege's works from Germany and England. Until then, nobody had written a monography on Gottlob Frege's philosophy in former Yugoslavia. In 1989, author's translation of Frege's study entitled *Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchungen*, published in 1966 in a collection *Logische Untersuchungen*, edited and published by Günter Patzig, was published in Sarajevo (*Dijalog*, 1/1989).

24. Two schools have been formed within the *Catholic School Center "St. Paul" in Zenica*, which opened in the fall of 1995. They are the Primary and General High School, counting 545 pupils at the beginning of 2001–2002 school year. *Catholic School Center "St. Francis" in Tuzla* was formed in the fall of 1995. Then, the general High School was opened and in 2001 the Primary School was also formed. In 1998, the *Catholic School Center "Peter Barbaric" in Travnik* was formed and is still active in the building of once widely-known General High School of Travnik. Teaching process is conducted in two schools: Primary and General High School. Along with the General High School, a seminary was opened for priest candidates, as well as a boarding school for pupils from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *The Catholic School Center "Don Basco" in Zepce* was formed in 1999. It consists of Vocational School, attended by cca 250 pupils, General High School with about 240 pupils, and the General High School branch in Usora with about 100 pupils and about 40 professors.

25. Private institutions of higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina are: International University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, American University in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Faculty for Public Management, Sarajevo; International University of Central Europe, Sarajevo; the Philip Noel-Baker International University, Sarajevo; Sarajevo Graduate School of Business, Sarajevo; Franciscan Theology, Sarajevo; the Aperia University, Banja Luka; Faculty of Communication Sciences, Banja Luka; Faculty of Business Engineering and Management, Banja Luka; Faculty of Cosmetics and Esthetics, Banja Luka; Faculty of Safety and Protection, Banja Luka; University of Business Studies, Banja Luka; Faculty of Entrepreneurship and Business, Prijedor; the “Janjos” College for IT and Management, Prijedor; The “Sinergija” University, Bijeljina; Faculty of Service Management, Doboj; the Gradiska College for Business Management; the “Slobomir” University, Bijeljina.

26. See the article by Nevad Kahteran: *Philosophical and Historical Context and Significance of the Arabic Plotinus: Transformation of Plotinus of Porphyry's Isagoge into Arabic*. *Dijalog*, Sarajevo, 1/ 2008, p. 50–63, in which the author, having attacked the academic community for not dealing with the Arabic logic, concludes the following:

But, the slightest of efforts to change such conditions is forcefully resisted within our academic community, dealing with such ignorance that I am afraid that a thick layer of dust will continue covering the corpus of this extraordinary literature, while our young researchers will be offered to rehash over and over the content that had long ago been rehashed, while studying the third-grade thinkers from foreign, to them—unknown traditions.

27. In that part, the author proposes several new views: principle of the logical is an ideal matrix of identification and re-identification of the logical principles (identity and contradiction need to permanently be identified in each sentence); it serves for detection of logical stereotype in every construction of thought and language. Logical sequences (if—then) of the stereotype stimulate the language sequences of its expression. The stereotype is realized as a network of *intra*-conceptual, *inter*-conceptual and *extra*-conceptual aspects of content and true values that are determined sequentially. By multiplication of the notion content, by generalization and individualization of its form, we reach orthonimy, orthology and orthography of a logical stereotype.

28. Academician Muhamed Filipovic, professor of philosophy and logic at Sarajevo (from 1967 to 2002) is an author of numerous articles and books in the field of philosophy, sociology, historiography and political science.

29. Several basic and new conceptual syntagms have been introduced in the essays, such as: “knowledge-based society,” “intelligence space ambience,” “programmable substance,” “information technology,” “tolerance-lead society,” “transnational identity,” “century of rearranging.”

30. Professor Dr. Zikrija Avdagic realized, through international cooperation (UNCC Charlotte—U.S., Erlangen-Nuernberg-BDR, Paderborn-BDR, Bristol—UK), a number of researchs, the results of which have been published in collected papers, journals and books, all indexed at referential databases (IEEE—Explorer, Inspec, Ebesco, Mathscinet, ACM Digital Library and Eurographics).

31. On radical interpretation of identity, see N. Ibrulj (2008): *Radical Interpretation of Identity* (<http://www.academia-analitica.org>)

32. Contrary to some authors' claims, the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not divided, nor is the state unstable. The society is irrational (which does not mean non-rational) and that is why the state is dysfunctional. A society is irrational if it is inconsis-

tent and incoherent because it systematically endangers the principles it had, by itself, defined, which altogether leads to the loss of fact of the set of norms and rules and deontic values upon which the objects, facts and processes of social and political ontology are based (social and political institutions and their decisions). And because it does all that consciously.

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