Sociology is a more advanced science than is ordinarily believed, even among sociologists. Perhaps a good criterion of the position of a social scientist in his or her discipline might be how high his idea is of what he must master in order to be abreast of the achievements of his science. The propensity to evolve an unpretentious grasp of your scientific capabilities cannot but increase as your knowledge of the most recent achievements in matters of method, techniques, concepts or theories, grows. But sociology is yet little codified and little formalized.

Pierre Bourdieu, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, p. 223

**Introduction**

Does sociology expand the theoretical knowledge of social phenomena, or does it merely codify and formalize repeated social practices explored through empirical methods; either way, regardless of whether it deals with social structures, mechanisms, or mere social actors, the term “sociology” legitimately evokes a science of society: a science that reveals the “true logic” and “true nature” of that which we call “society”. However, that which (theoretical) sociologists truly know—or could and should know about a given society in real time and space—cannot be contained in a single universal sociological theory or a single general principle that applies to all theoretically and em-
pirically possible (social) worlds, nor for that matter in a single extensive discipline derived from such a principle. Only together can social sciences and the humanities offer an intensive or fundamental exploration or demarcation of human nature, and broaden it to an exploration of the general nature of human relationships. People continuously create their own (social) relationships, while (social) relationships in turn create them (people). People and social relations create people and social relations: a trivial claim responsible for the emergence and growth of an entire library of sociology—a never complete collection of theories, paths in sociology, and schools.

What is indeed implicit, or imminently invisible in relations/practices of social actors/subjects, and how do we make it explicit and visible/knowable in the concepts of an acceptable theory? How can we even conceptualize the social and cultural content of the lifeworld of individuals, groups, or entire societies, and rationalize it despite anomalous social causality and heteronymous intentionality, which only partially overlaps with collective intentionality? What is the real content and meaning of relations masked in the form of social action (hence social relations), and the use of signs and symbols in social communication and representation?

Sociology is not merely a descriptive science that explicates the outside of social phenomena the way it encounters them in real time and space; it is simultaneously a science of the normative and prescriptive bases/structures of social relations that enable the recurrence of phenomena and states of affairs in social practices; in other words, a science of the social norms and sanctions, conventions and rules, semantic stereotypes and symbolic representations functioning within society. Particular social sciences like sociology, economics, law, psychology, communication studies, can be partially understood through their external history; their inner connection and unity is revealed only through an identification of ontological and epistemological assumptions, fundamental or universal logical and semantic relations that endure in the forms of existence of the facts with which they deal.

This bipolar status of each social science—the simultaneous parochialism and principlism (Brandom 1994/2001: 3) of social phenomena, the state of affairs and relations—has led post-modern (post-traditional, post-national, post-Marxist, or, according to Jürgen Habermas, post-metaphysical) sociological theory, originating in the work of philosophers and sociologists, legislators and economists, writers and artists in both America and Europe, to understand socio-cultural relativity as a fluctuating process in the social context, as imprecise information about those processes, as an ambiguous vocabulary in
which social phenomena, social processes, and the social interactions of people are interpreted. Similarly conceived is the need to introduce the pluralistic relativity standpoint (methodological consortium) in the study of social reality. The new methodological approach and the new epistemological standpoint, which mutually constitute (and subsequently homogenize) knowledge of the objects of social science, must bear in mind their dynamics in a live context, their partiality, and their contamination of possible interactions through various active contexts of social actors and through various idioms of identification and representation of social phenomena.

In Bosnian social theory, which arose in the wake of the furious aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide committed against Bosniaks (1992–1995), there emerged a need to reflect upon social phenomena from the standpoint of pluralistic epistemologies capable of seeking consensuality and innovation in resolving problems and making decisions that touch upon identity reflexes, as well as status and collective social functions, deontic values, concepts of institutions and institutional facts. Certainly, Ivo Komsic, philosopher and sociologist, author of the widely noticed The Social Power of Mind (2012), is a thinker with the ability to explore the most complex (variable, imprecise, unstable, dynamic, granulated, particular) layers of contingency of modern society and, at the same time, using his philosophical background and vocabulary, arrive at the deepest (ontological, structural, fundamental) answers to questions of the universal and fundamental existence of social processes, facts, and states of affairs.

Numerous Bosnian authors in the social sciences and especially sociology are guilty of what is known as hysteron proteron—or where what is last comes first. In numerous books they have presented their understanding of B&H reality as true, general, and necessary (universal) understanding, but without ever beforehand scientifically determining the methodological position, the epistemological and ontological basis of the principles underlying the interpretation of the reality which they dealt with in a descriptive way. Hence, a great number of studies fell beneath the dignity of science, even if they were not uninteresting as types of narrative, essay writing, and personal views based on the “principles” of some “general knowledge”, which in fact produce folk-sociology and folk-psychology as the “most certain” pillars of political epistemology. However, politics always takes itself as its epistemology, as its own system of truths (political or ideological dogma) where justification for its own truths is established. So for all who make use of it, it remains its own path to its own truths, which is not a scientifically relevant path.
Ivo Komsic, unlike many of his contemporaries in Bosnian sociology, has chosen the more difficult road to explicate his ideas, conceiving his research, entitled *A Theory of Social Pulsations* as a tractatus that transcends/plunges into the case study. Thus, he truly resorts to a theory of (the social) world in which concepts are homologized from the wholly innovative sociological standpoint of the author while simultaneously avoiding theorizing which neglects (social) cases, (social) facts, (social) states of affairs, (social) reality. The form of the tractatus is exacting because it demands of the author, aside from the homologization of propositions by turning them into axioms, also their argumentative granulation into lemmas, theorems, and definitions. However, the case study enables entry into the semantics of the concrete and offers material/sensual evidence of theoretical utterances. This semantics of the concrete, according to Komsic, always functions as an illumination of the contradictory reality of Bosnian society.2

**A Sociological Tractatus Philosophicus**

In social and political ontology, anything that can be explicated—anything with its own “invisible” logic, or “real” nature and “real” meaning—can be explicated through various strategies: either through the terminology of the phenomenology of perception, or through the terms of transformation of the conceptual into cognitive content (“from knowledge to understanding” in Hegel’s terms, or from “sense to reference” in Frege’s terms), or through the terms of conceptual relations, or through terms of deontic or value judgments, or through terms of linguistic practices of communication, or through terms of causation, or through terms of inductive redescriptions, re-interpretation, or rationalization. Social phenomenology—whose principles were laid down by Alfred Schutz by sociologizing the fundamental concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology and Weber’s theory of action, thus creating “the foundations of phenomenological sociology” (Schutz 1973: 3)—had from the beginning its own notion of the “examination of the social world in its various articulations and forms of organization which constitutes social reality for men living within it” (Ibid. 79), as in a “web of social relationships, of systems of signs and symbols with their particular structure of reference, of institutionalized forms of social organization, of systems of status and prestige, etc.” (Ibid. 80). According to Schutz, as a whole man takes this as given, but in fact it is the meaning of the elements, which constitute social reality, that is interpreted and
communicated with the other as a symbolic exchange of identity (the identifications and representations which constitute the basis of social relations).

In this sense, Komsic’s approach is synoptic and synergetic: nothing is explicated until everything is explicated through all possible sequences of inductive explication of the primary reason or multiply causality of the social world; all aspects of the implicit should be explicated synoptically and synchronically on various planes of appearance in the building blocks of social ontology as multiply variables of functions that determine one another. Social phenomenology must bind together all convergent conceptual blocks of social facticity with axioms (whatever these may be) into a single edifice or a single thought construct that deals with the reflection of unstable and changeable social reality (Giddens’s concept of a runaway world) in an uncertain and unstable manner, and whose particular practices are, in spite of everything, rationally and inferentially articulated (Brandom’s concept), though not finally (once and for all) fixed, which is why they can never be fully complete nor the functions of their relations absolutely consistent (“ω—consistent” according to Tarski).

In the work before us, The Theory of Social Pulsation (2015), where a new theory from the standpoint of social phenomenology and of philosophy of social sciences is presented, Komsic has developed his own approach in explaining social phenomena, the actions and interactions of social actors, and proposed an authentic conceptual framework for a web of concepts which function interactively within that framework and extend to experiential phenomena and background mentalities. Namely, social phenomenology, the implicit basis in Komsic’s The Social Power of Mind (2012), is here taken as explicit content in his endeavors to articulate a new methodological approach to a general social theory. This book deals with a kind of sociological tractatus philosophicus constructed in five theses, or five propositions that have the function of “unstable” or “impure” axioms from whose explanation and commentary new theorems of an inferential social phenomenology must follow. It must offer a rationalization and redescription of the anomalous causality of social phenomena; or rather, it must render explicit their unstable ontology, which incessantly transforms itself within the semantic and structural/institutional relations of social actors in real space and time, explicit.

Komsic’s decision to present his theory of social pulsation to the scientific world should be seen as an attempt to egress a possible end of sociology as a collection of great finished and monolithic sociological theories of the likes of Weber, Durkheim, Comte, Marx, Mill, and come up with a starting-point for the application of the post-modern pluralistic methodology of reflexive ex-
plication of the social process (the task of sociologization), which is relative to and contingent upon culture, rationalization, type of intentionality, reflection, the type of rational and communicational competency of social actors, but also upon interpretation, interiorization and innovation. In short, it deals with processes which depend on multiply functions of inductive variables that refer to unstable and ambiguous social processes, as well as unstable axioms by means of which the theoretical construction of data, like the temporally determined knowledge of structure, mechanism, and the function of social facticity, is axiomatized. The reflexive explication of action is possible as a rationalization and redescription which leads inductive sequences that function as co-causal factors.

An additional value that Komsic introduces to social theory (and especially to sociology) is his drive to find, within the limits of his own interest in political epistemology and political ontology, an adequate rationalization of social processes, and in particular the processes taking place within Bosnian society. He does not see this rationalization in the repetition of inductive/empirical sequences and their expansion and accumulation, but rather in the redescription of social inferentialism or in the unveiling of the innovative role of the human mind/rationality that could be realized by collective consciousness if its intentionality were led by deontic values as socially recognizable potentials and if it were realized through the institutions of a functioning nation or open society without enemies/opponents of its existence. In fact, this is an additional motive in Komsic’s theoretical and practical concern with social phenomena. These forays into the semantics of the concrete, into case studies, into the political ontology and political epistemology of Bosnian society, which are constant to Komsic’s work, are not an aesthetic ballast to be dispensed with from the theoretical heights of thought abstraction; on the contrary, dealing with Bosnian conditions/examples enables strong illumination of social ontology that is imprisoned within unresolved contradictions.

Now, in The Theory of Social Pulsation, Komsic analyzes social processes, social facts, and social states of affairs through three critical and analytical idioms: one is sociological, communicational, cognitive world of social relations determined by collective (“objective”) values and individual (“subjective”) capabilities; another is philosophical, profound, that reveals the ontology of social phenomena in the contingency of social processes; the third is political, contextual, pragmatic, that reveals the logic, or rather political ontology and political epistemology of actors who construct ideological systems as “structures of structures of society,” (Ibrulj 2005) incorporating within them the
social actors and their relations. Here, we will test all three critical and analytical idioms using the instrument of comparative methodology.

In terms of modal logic, it is not impossible to introduce a standpoint of comparative methodology to the reception of a possible scientific theory, or rather, in relation to such a layered interpretation and particular methodological approach/standpoint to social theory as is presented by Komsic in The Theory of Social Pulsation, construct a specific methodological relation or project a new logic of reception of this theory. The principle of comparative methodology evokes various methodological practices or convergent conceptual strategies, and with it ensures the parallel-distributed redescriptions that are indispensable to elucidating phenomena that are determined behaviorally, psycho-socially, idiomatically, and socio-culturally, which are factually relative, contingent, and anomalous, and for which we need to find a “primary reason” (Davidson) and understand the difference between formal and material intention.

Likewise, it is not impossible to enter into a projective semantics of social relations through a consortium of methodologies of various sciences, like the analytic philosophy of the social sciences, cognitive science, and the philosophy of natural science itself. This approach to social phenomena, primarily proposed by John R. Searle and Anthony Giddens, had already been successfully advocated in some prior research published in Bosnia (Ibrulj 2005). It is imperative to understand cognitive models and models of language use in the explication of social phenomena, as well as models of interpretation of those very models of explication, as social. As W.V.O. Quine avers in the first sentence of his World and Object: “Language is a social art” (Quine 1960: ix). Searle believes that language “constructs social reality,” since it is in fact “essentially constitutive of institutional facts,” (Searle 1997: 5) or rather “language is itself an institution” (Ibid. 51). Furthermore, cognitive models of social relations, too, are social acts or contextually conditioned reactions of communication and interpretation of cause-and-effect relations in social action.

The conceptual framework that emerged in relation to Komsic’s theory of social pulsations is composed of notions we will deem convenient in the reception of this theory: the anomalous character of social causation, implicit normative inferentialism, projective semantics of social relations, projective sociology, projective social phenomenology, inferential explication of social relations, social inferentialism, and many others. This conceptual framework is part of a “partial doctrine” itself, or a counter-factual position within sociological theory that could legitimately be called projective sociology, or connectionistic social theory, that is founded on a new projective semantics of social relations. If we
are able interpret Komsic’s approach to social theory through the conceptual framework presented here, then the evidence of its sustainability lies in the constructability of this new conceptual framework, that is in the mapping of structures which the two sets of propositions, or claims, produce when and if brought into resonance.5

**Social Structure vs. Social Actors**

In Europe, the development of social theory, especially its classical period in the works of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, was many times cross-fertilized under the influence of the American theory of social pragmatism developed by John Stewart Mill and John Dewey, social psychology as developed by G.H. Mead, and later the effects of social ethnocentrism in the form of the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. Its development has simultaneously been influenced by an ever deepening *reflective sociologization* of all aspects of social and cultural reality via the entry of *critical theory*: first with Adorno’s efforts to consider philosophy as an organon of sociological reflections, then with the upgrading of this instrument into a hermeneutic and informal argumentation in the work of Habermas and Giddens, and then with the development of sociology in the post-communist era, especially in central and eastern Europe.6 Gerard Delanty holds that the *social sciences* at present are a strong “inter-disciplinary” and “diffuse field” (Delanty 2006: xix), which has changed the self-understanding and character of the modern; he notices that there is a trauma of self-understanding in European social theory and in the field of sociology, noticeable in questions of culture, identity, knowledge, science, globalization. The connection of thought with actual processes and actual social phenomena produces both an expansion of sociology and an *expansion of social constructs* that eventually become its case studies. For instance, the dramatic acceleration of an Adorno-like critical social theory as a *philosophization of sociological concepts* was supplied by an empirical or factual event: the holocaust of European Jewry.

Along the same lines, we can say that the contemporary drama within European social theory at the beginning of the new millennium (to which the theory which has developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina also belongs) has been determined by processes of accelerated enlargement and unification of the European Union, as well as the coeval disintegration—both in form and content—of existing unions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the genocide
against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, concentration camps, and killing as an ethno-national project of national identification and politico-geographic representations of people sharing territory in Europe. The genocide, which stands at the threshold of Europe’s entry into the new millennium, is the responsibility of both the architects and the ground-technicians, both the academics and the killers, but also of all those who are watching and approved it from various European centers, not only the Serbian militants who carried it out. Twenty years after the pre-meditated genocide, Srebrenica already looks like the starting point of a process gripping the entire continent. The progressive growth of Islamophobia and xenophobia within Europe is a clear omen of a new holocaust.7

The right of an other to exist as different (within a single species) has never been more cloaked in negative facticity and negative practice than today. The imperialistic campaigns of coalitions led by NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, the “Arab” spring in Egypt and Libya, the perpetual Zionist aggression and terrorism of people in Palestine, the perfidious terrorist activity of shelling civil neighborhoods in Israel undertaken by Hamas and Hezbollah, the creation and support of chaos in Syria, the military intervention of Russia in Ukraine, the growth of right-wing politics in Europe, of Islamophobia (the PEGIDA movement in Germany) and xenophobia (the program of the Golden Dawn party in Greece), the public denunciation of multiculturalism by European chancellors, and, on the other side of the coin, intensifying Islamic ideologies and their ideological transfer from the Middle East, followed by terrorist practices across Europe and America, the terrorist activities of Al Qaida, frontal Jihad terrorism in the name of the so-called Islamic State (projected by the talibanization and Islamization of Middle Eastern countries, and even some Balkan states), processes which have an impact on the entirety of the Muslim population around the world; all this determines the factual and political ontology of global society as a continuous chain of cause-and-effect relations of negativity. Factual negation of negative facticity is still nowhere in sight, while the theoretical looms in the conflict of the left with the policies of neo-liberalism and neo-imperialism.8

The growth of aggression conducted by negative facticity and permanent drama—associated with ethnic, national, and individual identity—has vastly influenced the change in both form and content of social research, the notion of social theory and its borders, and especially the role and place of a sociology that has long been insufficient in and of itself to explain its own position within science, nor the reality it studies.
Social theory thus occupies an uncertain ground between, on the one hand, the domain of a post-disciplinary sociology and on the other an interdisciplinary mode of theorizing that is connected to political (what kind of society?) and philosophical questions in epistemology (the nature of truth, questions of method and knowledge) and ontology (the nature of social reality). In this sense it has a less clear-cut identity than the more disciplinary specific endeavours of political theory and sociological theory. As a critical social philosophy, social theory concerns reflection on the social world in the broadest possible sense of the term (Osborne 1998). It is then probably best distinguished from sociological theory in the narrow sense and from the history of sociology. It is unavoidably bound up with critical and normative questions. (Dellanty 2006: xxi)

Every social theory strives to offer a new solution to the problem of relations between social structure and subject(s). Social factors affect the behavior of individuals and groups—it is the basis for imputing existence to a social structure that is above the natural and volitional capacity of individuals. Just as Marx’s avers that “it is not consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness,” so too the numerous value-determined theses proposed by Durkheim and Weber speak to the epistemological and methodological priority of the social over the individual. From Durkheim, through Weber and Marx, to Mead and beyond, there is a clearly established potency of the social over the individual.

We have a statement of the human animal as having reached a situation in which he gets control over his environment. Now, it is not the human animal as an individual that reaches any such climax as that; it is society. This point is cogently insisted upon by Hegel, the last of the Romantic idealists. The human animal as an individual could never have attained control over the environment. It is a control which has arisen through social organization.

The very speech he uses, the very mechanism of thought which is given, are social products His own self is attained only through his taking the attitude of the social group to which he belongs. He must become socialized to become himself. (Mead and Strauss 1956: 16)

The social structure and social subjects, along with their cause-and-effect relationships as well as the conditions under which social change is possible, is a vast and longstanding theme of all philosophical and sociological social research, from Weber and Durkheim to Marx’s social theory, from critical social theory to the linguistic-psycho logical characterization of these relations in the works of Jean Piaget, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, to those of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, G.H. Mead, John Searle, and others. However,
this dichotomy collapsed in postmodern pluralistic epistemologies and ethnocentric methodologies in the theories of socio-cultural relativity, so that the post-structuralist determination of the object of social science led to functionalist, constructionist, reflexive, and relational concepts in which scientific rigidity within sociology was abandoned for scientific rigor.

The theoretical positions that co-constitute Komsic’s philosophical and sociological standpoint in his theory of social pulsation are not assumed uncritically nor are they formally cited for the purpose of bibliographical notification. They are part of Komsic’s theoretical demarcations and his abandonment of the “methodological” vs. “epistemological” division through the separation of the empirical from the theoretical in the classification of facts and construction of evidence. Komsic believes that the foundation of sociological knowledge is an understanding of the active mechanism produced (cause, change, stop, cause again, stop again, etc.) by historical events of social change. What is it that is active in such a way, and in what way does it transfer its activity in space and time?

The complete understanding of the action of an eightfold causality, which Komsic introduces into his theory as a matrix of variables of a function that could present the real activities of social actors, is of paramount importance to understanding the entire theory of social pulsation. Rather, in the contexts that explain the action of the aforementioned variables, Komsic performs a conceptual demarcation of his theory from the social theories presented by Hegel, Marx, Weber, Habermas, and Giddens, among others. Thus, Komsic boldly enters into the “battle over the (social) substance,” or rather into the clear and established determination of what constitutes the real or true object of sociological understanding or social sciences. Of course, this battle is not even vaguely won within the social sciences, while changes in the context (social change) in which it is waged merely exacerbate disagreements.

These disagreements over the role of social structure are nothing less than a battle for the heart and soul of sociology; and indeed of the social sciences more generally, since just the same issues arise in any discipline that seeks to examine what happens in the social world. The social sciences look completely different through structuralist and individualist spectacles. Are they to be concerned with explaining social phenomena purely in terms of the contributions of individuals, or are there characteristically social forces that affect social phenomena? (Elder-Vass 2010: 3)

Objectively speaking, it must be said that with Komsic there is now an author in Bosnia and Herzegovina who dares outline a new approach to social theory
that redefines binary relations: *social structure* and its nature and *social actors* and their nature. European social thought has already realized that this dichotomy must be overcome and abandoned in the name of descriptive roles of multiply *fuzzy distinctions* that are real, with a real impact in the social world.9 There is not much chance of introducing a new concept into social phenomenology that has not already contributed to the development of social theory in one way or another, by one author or another, at one time or another. Novelty lies in a theoretical standpoint, a beginning that imbues social studies with a new perspective on things. Every new scientific standpoint, every new beginning of critical thinking, is expressed through a new idea that needs to be either developed or explicated by a given method or a given consortium of methods.

In Komsic, the interfering concepts (a) *social actors*, (b) *social facts*, (c) *social state of affairs*, represent a triad that is greater than the sum of its parts, namely the *triangulation* of a conceptually adequate set of elements that he takes from his theory of social pulsation. In fact, social pulsation is a completely new concept in social theory, and the proposition, “Pulsation is a state in which we find social actors—individuals, social groups, institutions, systems. It is an active state”—is a new methodological starting-point, a new ontological groundwork in need of a new epistemological theory! It isolates the internal properties of all three elements of the triad which emerge as an internal cause-and-effect of its synchronized activity in real space and time. There is no triangulation—as a structure of social pulsation—until each part of the triad is capable of action, capable of social pulsation, and until certain types of rationality either precede or follow that action. One type of rationality corresponds to *purpose-driven* action, while a different one corresponds to *value-driven* action. *The consensus-driven* action of actors has yet another type of rationality, as has *innovation-driven* action. All this prevents Komsic from basing himself on traditional sociology, which utilizes an already established fixed structure in relation to social actors and social practices. On the contrary, he follows Mead’s approach on this topic.

Considering social relations and social practices as products of already established or determined structures and mechanisms embodied in social roles, which then determine the behavior of social actors (the so-called “structural conception of human society”), is something altogether different from foregrounding the actions of social actors as *formative* in the development of social structures and mechanisms. The concept of *symbolic interactionism* has significantly contributed to the critique of traditional structural concepts in
sociology. G.H. Mead, in particular, urged a critique of understanding as an established system composed of social roles and not of real actions of actors and social relations that emerge in various social practices. Mead, by means of his symbolic interactionist perspective, refuted the so-called structural conception of human society which, according to Herbert Blumer,

views society as established organization, familiar to us in the use of such terms as social structure, social system, status position, social role, social stratification, institutional structure, cultural pattern, social codes, social norms, and social values. (Blumer 1969: 74)

By contrast, Mead, without rejecting the existence of structural properties of human society, foregrounded the formative actions of social practices produced by social actors.

Mead’s scheme definitely challenges this conception. It sees human society not as an established structure but as people meeting their conditions of life; it sees social action not as an emanation of societal structure but as a formation made by human actors; it sees this formation of action not as societal factors coming to expression through the medium of human organisms but as constructions made by actors out of what they take into account; it sees group life not as a release or expression of established structure but as a process of building up joint actions; it sees social actions as having variable careers and not as confined to the alternatives of conformity to or deviation from the dictates of established structure; it sees the so-called interaction between parts of a society not as a direct exercising of influence by one part on another but as mediated throughout by interpretations made by people; accordingly, it sees society not as a system, whether in the form of a static, moving, or whatever kind of equilibrium, but as a vast number of occurring joint actions, many closely linked, many not linked at all, many prefigured and repetitious, others being carved out in new directions, and all being pursued to serve the purposes of the participants and not the requirements of a system. I have said enough, I think, to point out the drastic differences between the Meadian conception of society and the widespread sociological conceptions of it as a structure. (Ibid. 74–75)

Social pulsations of social actors (social pulsators), or the active social states of social actors (social pulsations) of varying intensity, which Komsic discusses in his five propositions of theory, do not derive from some abstract concept of social structure or some monolithic/phantom notion of society; rather they are taken as a characteristic or essential trait that social actors have in actions in which only they possess social structural power. These structural powers, which reveal themselves in the actions of individuals, groups, societies, institutions, have cause-and-effect implications that are partially anomalous, or
rather, not necessary in the sense of natural causation. Thus, Komsic places the causal power of social structures in social actors, and their actions in their practices.

The task of sociology, as a general social discipline, is to offer a novel and unique theoretical groundwork for understanding social structures and all their given conditions, as well as social activities and all their subjective-value presumptions. This understanding, with a distinct theoretical and methodological preposition, would avoid the dichotomy of the social structure and social actors, determinations and intentionality that (dichotomy) has been burdening sociology from its inception till present. True, that same dichotomy enabled a wide development of sociology, through its disciplines in both directions, but the problem of that interrelation still remains. (Komsic, p. 2)

**Implicit Ontology of Social Facticity**

Do concepts and terms that describe and explain the social matrix of the life-world have a purpose and meaning already in themselves or do they acquire them only through use, in a context determined by socially symbolic phenomena? Apart from knowledge of the pragmatic nature of human relations, the social sciences have an obligation to account for the things they know about themselves and the grounds to which they refer. Naturally, they cannot accomplish this from within. In fact, the *philosophy of the social sciences*, and the *analytic philosophy of the social sciences* in particular (Giddens), must render *explicit* what in these sciences is *implicit*: answer the question of the true nature of “that which is social” (social practices), the true nature of what the science of society itself examines as a facticity that is constructed historically, naturalistically, psychologically, cognitively, politically, linguistically, and, these days, virtually (through information technology). The true nature of social practices, whose cognitive, conceptual, and logical-linguistic content fills social relations, must become accessible through a social phenomenology that would have the opportunity to explicate them as *rationally justified, semantically constructible, and inferentially articulated* strategies.

In our opinion, the contemporary philosophy of social science needs to construct a *projective semantics of social relations* that would capture the web of interactions of social actors, individuals, groups, societies, and types of contexts (“social milieus” according to Blumer) in which they occur. Such a *projective semantics* could have the role Robert B. Brandom imagined for the *logic of inferentialism* in the interpretation of linguistic and conceptual practices.
(Brandom 2001), or perhaps the role of social (status) functions that have meaning and significance and show what is “projected in (social) things” and “prejudged in (social) relations” (Wittgenstein). Each new approach to the construction of a formally and substantively acceptable social theory is again analyzed from the standpoint of its originating social context regardless of the extent of its impact and application. It is only possible to demonstrate that a new social theory has been taken on board when that very theory, by its own action, produces a critical reflection in new concepts and new approaches: only then does it instigate the process of a new reflection on its “construction and reconstruction,” or rather the process of its “redescription” (Davidson 1984: 105).

Indeed, it is possible to talk about an invisible ontology (Searle’s phrase) (Searle 1997: 3) of social facticity made up of relations and states of affairs whose existence is objective only because they are produced by man in his being and acting. Social phenomena, social processes, social states of affairs, and social facts, are not God given. Besides, they are neither produced, controlled, nor influenced by laws of nature, except incidentally and indirectly. They appear, disappear, or are repeated only in human activity, in multiplied interaction of communication that is ruptured and renewed, that is ever what could (accidentally) happen and not what necessarily, eternally, and unconditionally exists. An absence of such necessity indicates that the (social) world is all that is the (social) case (possibility)—that social facts area social reality only in the social world. The use of this term, or the “grammar of the word ‘social’,” clearly indicates that this term is distinctly self-referential and that, paradoxically, every definition of this concept must refer back to its (social) content outside of which there is no other reference. Besides which, social ontology is unstable ontology, and the axiomatization of facts about its structures and phenomena is unstable, dialectical, modal, and many-valued.

Thus, it appears that the term “social” is actually without objective reference! Actually, it might be said: the variable that contains all its values, all the meaning of its predicative parts. Some economic process, some legal event, some physical or mental content becomes a social fact only when interpreted in a web of relations which constitute a social context, and not otherwise. Even the biological and genetic, gendered and neurological, neuropsychological and cognitive, might cease to be such in an interpretation that depends on the subject and its semantic and moral history in which its social meaning and social significance is determined. Mead insisted, especially in his social psychology, that there needs to be a minimum of the social present
in the biological individual if only for the symbols necessary to communicate
with other members of society, or rather “because the individual himself be-
longs to a social structure, a social order” (Mead 1972: 1).

Thus, “what is in itself social” can neither be thought nor spoken of with-
out referring to “what is social” in each of its exemplifications, in each pos-
sible world, in each of its predicative parts! Something that is “social” is true
if, and only if, it is social! Analytical philosophy of social science may start
from (Tarski’s) convention of truth of (social) statements: “Statement ‘X is
a social phenomenon’ is true if and only if (if it applies! if taken as! if taken
into account! if it holds! if taken as such!)—that X is a social phenomena.”

However, according to Komsic’s synoptic glossary, in order for something to
be a social phenomenon or social pulsation, it must bear at least eight essential
characteristics/traits in its concept: it must, (a) be intentional, (b) be reac-
tive, (c) be reflexive, (d) be communicational, (e) be institutionalized, (f) be
interiorized, (g) be structured, (h) be innovative. So, if we were bold enough
to propose a function of multiplied social interaction, which embraces a large
number of variables or semantic projections of varying degrees in the realization
of the concept-web “social,” then this representation of multiplied generalization
of social originality must take into account Komsic’s explicative concepts (a–h)
interlaced in the theory of social pulsation. These concepts are actually a type
of indexation or discrimination or conceptual demarcation of causality of what is
and what is not a social phenomena.

Komsic has produced an interesting and, in a theoretical sense, functional
web of concepts which he applies to the conceptualization of society per-
ceived as lifeworld, which is sufficiently theoretically/ axiomatically unstable
that it communicates effortlessly and clearly with experiential facticity as well
as spatially and temporally singular and specific givens, deprived of abstrac-
tions and indifferent toward theoretical generalizations and classifications. It
is impossible to remain indifferent to this web of concepts that Komsic in-
troduces through his theory of social pulsation, and avoid the question: does
this theory have the critical energy to produce corresponding concepts in the
process of its reception?

The formation and demise of social and value structures are the inner and
outer limits of social pulsations, or semantic projections of social relations;
individual cases, concrete societies, and individual social practices, like the
example by means of which Komsic seeks to prove his theory, are all realized
within those limits.
Then, something happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina that rarely happened in the history of any other society—the collapse of the social structure with its independent elements entering into conflict with one another, as well as the absence of a value system that previously permitted and directed the social activities of the social actors. Social practice had the carpet pulled from under its feet, and lost its head as well. In that sense, the nature of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian conflictuality, in all its forms, has become a historical experience for the world. The examination of those events lends itself to a general understanding of human activities, but not from transcendental presumptions of consciousness or its intentionality, nor from ontologically given social facts whose “necessity” is also of a metaphysical character, rather from social practice which simultaneously constitutes both social actors and social facts.

We are in such a situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina because our state of conflict encompasses all social givens and all values, both subjective and collective. Too, we are part of the very social practices we are examining. For the first time in our social theory, we have the opportunity to draw theoretical conclusions of general significance from our own historical position. To completely understand the historical event of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must begin from the collapse of the social and value structure. How could it be that all previous social mechanisms that reproduce society and initiate social activities wither away? How could it be that the destruction of the social and value system becomes the primary social practice, and what is its initiating mechanism? (Komsic, p. 3)

If we were to further follow Searle’s ontology of institution and the properties of institutional facts according to the models of their existence (Searle 2005), we would have to claim the following: social processes objectively exist when social actors act; before or after that, they do not; social facts and states of affairs objectively exist when their collective validity is affirmed; before and after that, they are bare/brutal physical facts. But this objectivity of existence of social facts is absolutely dependent on human will, upon human collective intentionality, upon human collective representation or the demand for validity claims of status functions, upon the human psycho-physical, mental, moral, cultural habitus, upon human relations and attitude, upon human institutions, norms, rules, conventions, and laws passed in parliament—for these social facts to exist at all.

Social relations are anomalous in their semantic character, in their spatial and temporal facticity, in their unstable causality. Despite that, the ontology of social relations is objective in its structures and in the mechanisms that produce and maintain them. The concepts that Komsic introduces in his theory describe an ontology available to a social phenomenology because social relations thus understood, as social pulsations are the real content of a projective semantics of social relations because of the possibility of redefinition,
reconstruction, redescription built into them, which rationalizes them in an innovative manner. This innovative rationalization, which Komsic designates as a function of innovative reason, can also be regarded as a semantic projection of social relations with a capacity of multiple transformations.

Pulsations, or interactive pulsating of one actor towards another, is, according to Komsic’s insight, the activity of actors or the active state of actors that is determined by their intentions. However, the type of activity in which social objects and social relations are produced does not solely depend on the intentionality of actors; it is determined by an eightfold causality that is part of convergent phenomenologies of social causality, without which there is no action, not to speak of innovative action. Regardless of whether we interpret this relation from Hegel’s phenomenology of the movement of consciousness and mutual emergence of the objectivization of self-consciousness and the substantiality of being, or through Marx’s self-actualization of production as relation in which the subject and the object of praxis and history emerge, or from the perspective of Habermas’ theory of communicational action as social activity, or, in Mead’s terms, observe it as a product of the movement of social reflection of self from “I” to “me” and “me” to “I” through a series of social reactions between the individual and the environment—the innovation of an individual actor is not external to social relations and semantic transformations which are possible within the development of context, nor is it external to the actions of causality to which every action abides. Komsic concludes his explanation and application of his third thesis of the theory of social pulsation in the following way:

Each social actor is within a web of social pulsations. Each social actor coordinates a multitude of social pulsations in which he finds himself—he is simultaneously the bearer and part of social causality. But one social state cannot be transferred to another because each has its own causality. Social causality can only be transferred within a given social state, from one social actor to another; it cannot be transferred externally. The web of social interactions enables social actors to simultaneously dwell in two social states of varying causality. (Komsic, p. 36)

The implicit ontology of social facticity becomes visible only through action, or rather through movement, self-movement, procrastination, semantic and structural oscillation, semantic projection, and pulsations in which actors relate to one another in real space and time where in formal intentional attitudes (hopes, convictions, beliefs, expectations, desires, things considered true), without real object reference, are transformed into material intentions
through singular or multiplied semantic projection of social relations that can be objectified in space and time with real object reference. Regardless of the type of projection or pulsation that one social relation could possess in an actual state \( A \), or potentially/implicitly in projected states \( A_1, A_2, A_3, \ldots A_n \), their causality cannot be substituted with the causality that determines the state of social relation \( B \) and its semantic projections in states \( B_1, B_2, B_3, \ldots B_n \). The causality of a given social relation can act on the emergence of numerous and diverse states projected in that very relation (they are liberated under different conditions, in different states of affairs, in different normative demands, in differently established or interpreted deontic connotations), but it cannot determine semantic projections of another social relation.

Different social facts require different intentions, reactions, reflections, and different communications which result in different institutions. Social actors cannot simultaneously internalize different social facts, different values, different rules; such a social state would be unbearable, and for individuals, schizophrenic. (Komsic, p. 37)

Thus, conceptual demarcation, deontic demarcation, the demarcation of practice, and demarcation of strategy of semantic projections of social relations are necessary for the demarcation of the action of social causality and for the correction of its anomalous nature in the actors’ immediate actions:

A healthy society makes sure that social causalities are separated from one another and that their limits of activity do not transgress. Likewise, healthy individuals keep their social pulsations separate, but they do unify and guide them rationally. (Komsic, p. 37)

Komsic tests and applies his theoretical insights to the semantics of the concrete, to the social situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, his preferred case study.

A social state of undifferentiated causalities was produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the signing of the Dayton Accord. Social structures, which should have “meaningful content” and be the subjective purpose of its citizens, are in fact in contradiction with one another, overlapping and self-defeating. Social actors are in one society while “meaningful content” is in another, in a social state not their own. They are, then, in constant conflict with themselves because the social facts in which they act cannot be internalized, their intentions provoke reactions which cannot be internalized through communication. The existing social facts, as parts of their social state, seem imposed, and not subjectively appointed “meaningful content”. (Komsic, p. 37)
Social pulsations can be seen as social relations produced by social actors, and in order to comprehend them we must understand the possibilities of their semantic and pragmatic projections and transformations, all the while keeping the anomalous character of social causation in mind. Indeed, a single theory of the projective semantics of social relations, which would be the basis of a projective social theory, could become the basis of the scientific prediction of projective transformations of social states. The greater part of states and relations produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina was apparent to anyone able to interpret the projections of formal intentions that were erroneously oriented towards the destructive forces of a particular group, which, like any group, has within itself contradictory deontic, political, moral, and economic practices.

The social context, as a communicative, reflexive, active collection of unequal potentials and status functions of social actors (the phantom “community of equality of opportunity” never existed anywhere), is the result of the projective compatibility and balance of two vectors: normative social relations and formative social values. If the normativity of social relations, or rather formativity of social values, is absent or falls apart, so in turn the boundaries of the social context (both external and internal) collapse, together with the institutions that are expressions of normativity and formativity in which the “social” is based, resulting in a chaos out of which a new social structure may arise, or actors (individuals, groups, ethnicities, nations) completely vanish from the scene as a constituent power capable of decisively influencing its own survival. The question is: to what extent can the Bosniaks, following the genocide perpetrated on them, constitute themselves in an ethnic and national sense, or rather, to what extent can they influence their own survival?

Unstable/Empirical Axioms

In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke introduces a philosophically ironic syntagm: a priori based on experience!12 Thereby he actually asserts that every model of experience and every model of meaning that is possible in the logical and semantic sense (on the basis of logical and semantic necessity/ logical and semantic constructability of relations) is ontologically real and epistemologically legitimate, therefore valid due to the model of inference, not due to the natural necessity of the connection between the sign and the signified, or
reference! When applied to the social world or the lifeworld, Kripke’s *model of possible worlds* enables us to clearly understand the cognitive or epistemological or even the political, ethical, economic concept in which contexts or models of relations model objects and meanings assigned to them, and not *vice versa*. However, if all possible models (behavior, communication, interpretation, reaction, reflection, interiorization, etc.) are inherently inferential, so much the better for the rigidity of reference! In that case, the pragmatism of social relations, as Davidson argues, enables even reality without (objectively related) reference, and a partial theory of truth—a truth from a single case! (Davidson 2001: 215).

However, in contrast with the philosophical theory of interpretation and communication within communicative society, in the sociological notion of lifeworld the concept of necessity in relation to cause-and-effect and the concept of *a priori* or transcendental structures is not acceptable as a rigid *a priori* that could function in all possible worlds or models of social relations: social relations are *a priori* contingent, not *a priori* transcendental! They appear and disappear, changing not only in empirical space and time but also in their normative basis which determines the *type of necessity* enabling them: from necessity as certainty or truth/truthfulness, through necessity as correctness/regularity, to necessity as a pragmatic model of utility, or necessity as justification of activity or foregoing of activity: each type of necessity based on rules or conventions (ethical, logical, economic, political, methodological, cognitive, epistemological) functions in the social context, all except natural necessity.

Komsic, in a rather hermetic text, based his explanations and commentary on five fundamental propositions that function in his theory of social relations. These propositions should *axiomatize* all that appears in the field of interactive communication of social actors and in that way determine the kind of non-contradictory logical structure exhibited in social phenomenology, which he aims to formulate in his theory of social pulsation. Isolated and encompassed in a single set, these axioms characterize an *implicit ontology of social facticity* as a possibility of mapping the *factually*-truthful and *logically*-truthful within social phenomenology in the very structures of utterances about social reality. Thus, when the five propositions, or five theses that constitute Komsic’s theory are placed in a single, axiomatically-arranged vertical, then we simultaneously obtain an ontological and epistemological scenario of this theory.
Proposition I. Pulsation is a state of social actors—individuals, social groups, institutions, systems. It is an active state.

Proposition II. Pulsating towards each other, social actors produce social facts—social relations, institutions, values, rules, laws.

Proposition III. Social actors contain and determine the possibilities of all their states.

Proposition IV. The social state is a pulsation of social actors of varying intensity.

Proposition V. A new social state begins when the pulsation of social actors wanes or completely loses the purposes that kept its intentions in motion.

This kind of “axiom,” which resides in the logical construction of socially conditioned knowledge about social processes, states of affairs, and facts, also denotes the nature of that to which social theory refers: the facticity of these processes, these states of affairs, these facts, does not possess the static objectivity of physical things, the physical objects of natural sciences, nor is a causality of an absolutely necessary relation of cause-and-effect at work in this kind of facticity. Facticity, such as the social one—dependent on language, on reflection, on interpretation, on the actors’ intentionality, on time, on space, on culture—can only be contingent facticity with anomalous causality in its composition, and with anomalous inferentialism in the cognitive reconstruction of the subject. Facts or states of affairs in social processes are not isolated objects or things, they are what is projected (social relations) in social processes, what is deontically-prejudged (social values) in social objects. That which is projected and prejudged (or anticipated) in social processes belongs to an implicit ontology of social facticity, regardless of whether we refer to structures, to mechanisms, to functions of social processes. And, everything points to the fact that ontology might be primarily semantic and symbolic.

Komsic’s motives in presenting to the scientific community a new conceptual projection as a possible means of explicating social relations are those of a researcher. The aforementioned theses or propositions determine social actors as active and innovative, their purposeful and intentional activity in the production of social relations as social pulsations, social pulsations as immanent social states and not as transcendental sources of knowledge, social states as pulsations of social actors of varying intensity. The explanation of and commentary on these five theses functions as definitions, theorems, and consequences bound together by mapping the contents of these five theses or
propositions on micro and macro levels. Social pulsation is actually an actively or functionally, rationally or rationally established relation of social actors that is also deontic because it puts forward validity claims for institutional (collective) norms through recognizing institutional facts and status (collective) functions within society.

At the very base of visible social facticity, whose position is marked like a chessboard, functions an implicit ontological structure that invisibly, like executing a move or establishing relations, determines social relations or status functions of actors and the character of their moves. In such mutual and recursive activity of altering positions, use of rules, and innovative combinations of possible moves/relations, emerges a production of social phenomena and social notions that have very different ontological, logical, and linguistic statuses that both congregate and clash around social facticity, while words still manage to more or less express thought, and words and notions together manage to more or less signify, describe, and present phenomena and facts, or rather the social state of affairs. The onus is on the humanities and social sciences to explain “how everything is held together” (J.R. Searle) and how it is applied to an individual sociological theory about modern society.

The philosophy of social science should ask the following: is the notion of “the social” a normative notion or not? In what way, with what semantic transfers (semantic transformation of a given conceptual content) do social actors comprehend/determine that social connections are really normative demarcations that function within every act of social actors as deontic values present in every social stereotype or social practice? Should this be determined in connection with the vocabulary in which that notion is reflected or in connection with (social) facts and (social) states of affairs to which that notion applies: are social processes normative processes, are social facts exclusively a product of normative-social processes, are relations of social actors normative relations because they are produced by institutional facts, relations in which deontic notions are engrained and in which validity claims appear? A normative vocabulary and normative pragmatics (of which Brandom speaks) of social actors in their activities could, with or without the analytical philosophy of social science, point to what constitutes social relations in communication, while designating what is for them constitutional and enables communication as a priori-experiential!

If, in fact, relations of social actors are kinds of pulsation that contain validity claims, as Komsic avers in his theory of social pulsations, then we could claim that this kind of pulsation is normative and that its content is a type
of deontic value understood through a web of social actors and their mutual actions, their mutual validity claims that function as their normative currency which they exchange as value in communication.

Objectively, there are facts that, to exist, require the existence of a subjective decision, or human institution, without which they would not exist. These are, according to Searle, institutional facts (Searle 1997). Let us assume the following, in an idiomatic vocabulary: being married to Maria is an institutional/social fact that would not exist if there was no (human) institution of marriage; being a father and grandfather is an institutional/social fact because there is a (human) institution of the family; being an owner of a piece of land in Kiseljak is an institutional/social fact that would be impossible without a (human) institution of land ownership; being a mayor of Sarajevo is an institutional/social fact that exists only if a (human) institution of mayor exists; being a professor of sociology at the University of Sarajevo is an institutional/social fact only because there is a (human) institution of university; being a Member of Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 at the time of the bloodiest aggression on an internationally recognized country is an institutional fact only on condition that there is a (human) institution of president and parliament of a nation.

According to Searle, then, we the people, not gods or nature, produce institutions, and institutions, in normatively codifying bare(brutal facts of life, produce institutional facts that we experience when we fulfill their normativity or their validity claims. If we do not acknowledge them, if they do not have the collective recognition and acceptance of deontic values which institutions symbolize in their existence, if they are not formative in the behavior of actors and their interaction, then we destroy social institutions. Then, the validity claims they emanate bind no one. Then, institutions represent nothing, no deontic claims.

The question that has always motivated sociology, and motivates it still, is how institutional facts are possible, what is the structure of those facts, and what is the nature of status functions that fulfills that structure? This question has always been transformed into: what is an institution (Searle 2005), what is the nature of validity claims emanating from it, what types of relations exist between actors who are architects of institutions and actors who are bound by a web of institutional facts that classify them as employed, unemployed, single, married, theists, atheists, educated, uneducated, rich, poor, proprietors, owners, laborers, students, professors, magistrates, physical beings, etc.
Beneath routine, and more-or-less unreflectively/automatically executed social functions/practices, which transpire daily and in which millions of social actors participate, there is a deep, wide web of invisible social ontology whose peripheral/exterior layers pulsate above the action of a normative and invisible backdrop of causations, whose elucidation demands a complete theory. Behind a banal trip in a Sarajevo tram no. 2, from Marijin Dvor to Latinska Cuprija, which begins with some intention to carry out an activity at the other end of town, with a physical purchase of a ticket at a ticket office, with the entrance onto the tram via the front doors and not the back, the punching of the ticket in the machine, looking for an empty seat, asking if a seat is available, offering of a seat to an older person, grabbing the handrail, showing the ticket to the transit monitor, the egress from the tram at a designated station, etc., stands a whole invisible, normative ontology of economic and legal relations, ownership, legality, traffic regulations, the budget for public transport, the legal status of the public transport system, the rules and norms of using public transport, methods of payment in the vehicle, codes and rules of civic culture, etiquette and upbringing, ways of behaving, of observing, the manner of sitting or standing, of communicating with other passengers, of getting on and getting off, verbal and non-verbal communication, use of signals and symbols, traffic infrastructure, symbolic interaction, body language, often pugnacious physical acts, and so on to murder (the case of murder in the tram of an elementary school student Denis M.) which the degrades and destroys the entire normativity of social relations and formativity of social values. An ordinary trip on an ordinary tram on an ordinary route becomes a visible collection of elements of unequal potential and status functions, a time and space in which norms of behavior are simultaneously regarded and disregarded, and social values are pertinent and not pertinent. Because of such instability in the activities of social normativity, it is possible to understand social causality as anomalous causality and social inferentialism as anomalous inferentialism.

The normative or ontological basis of social reality resides in its invisible construction or in its structure which, in its normative claims (norms plus sanctions), enables actors to act mechanically and consistently or, at least on the surface anomalously, to intentionally or at least unconsciously produce positive or negative social pulsations as long as rules and norms still apply, as long as institutions exist that produce institutional facts, as long as actors that communicate as social actors fulfill towards each other validity claims mediated by the validation of norms and sanctions. In social relations, nothing is essential in the same way as the action of gravity is essential: in fact, everything is ac-
cidental and anomalously possible in its existence because norms can change and laws can cease to apply. Social norms maybe imposed, embraced, broken, but they can also fail to apply.

**The Anomalous Character of Social Causation**

Social relations have their physical, cultural, psychological, semantic, and moral history that accompanies them, partakes in their constitution, that is multiplied and modified depending on the interpretation and pragmatism to which it is subject. In the social context, events can only be determined as degrees or levels of process, while their conceptualization must include partiality, granulation, oscillation, particularity. The methodologies that need to be applied to research and interpretation of social phenomena have no use for binary two value logic, they are rather necessarily directed towards probabilistic and possibilistic methodologies, toward the logic of probability, fuzzy logic, epistemological logic, temporal logic, situational logic, deontic logic, modal logic, and logics that includes para-consistent constructions.

For an interpretation of social relations it is necessary to introduce the concept of actions of social actors, and to have a concept of social causation. However, the character of such causation is not the same as the character of causation in natural processes. In nature, too, many processes and developments occur in a dynamic and elemental manner, but the basic laws of physical, chemical, and biological processes remain fixed in the production of unambiguous consequences and they do not depend on the polysemy of the “language” of nature, on the “discourse” of nature, on the “free will” of nature, on the “choice” of nature, on some “spiritual” or “social” elements of nature. Everything depends on the world that man creates and is responsible for, and everything can have consequences: erroneous or evil acts towards others can be justified by good intentions, good intentions can have evil consequences, the collective will can destroy individuals, public discourse can be hate speech, the semantics of natural language can produce semantic paradoxes, decision-making and problem-solving can produce beneficial or damaging consequences, dropping the atom bomb on two Japanese cities can be justified as the desire for peace!

Komsic’s idea to call social actors *social pulsators*, who, through their social pulsations, realize the web of social pulsations that makes up the content of social practice, carries certain connotations that we find neither in Habermas’s, Weber’s, nor in Mead’s theory of social relations.
Indeed, it is important to recognize that causality is not of a fixed intensity. Moving from one place to another, from one subject to another, it loses its intensity, its strength in action. Social actors, as bearers of social practice, must be observed in the context of this transfer of causality and its varying intensity. Social actors are the social pulsators, and as such, are the subjects of social practice. Their relation is the web of social pulsation of varying intensity. (Komsic, p. 79)

Namely, the decisive observation here is that we are dealing with transferable causality, which acts upon those who themselves act in social relations, that this action is not merely external and transitive, but rather transferable and interactive in the substantive sense: without such action, without this kind of causality and without these kinds of social actors/social pulsators, neither society nor knowledge about social relations would be possible. The idea of social pulsation puts everything into motion and offers the possibility of thinking about invisible dimensions of social space whose existence can only be proven by reflection based on modeling possible social worlds such as an innovative mind is able to produce.

The anomalous inferentialism of social actors can correspond to the anomalous nature of causality of social facts. What is anomalous in this causality and this inferentialism in which we assume that logic is the semantics of social relations? Social facts, social states of affairs, social processes, do not produce identical intentions, identical reflections, identical reactions, identical interiority, identical communication, in all social actors. Identical social facts that have the same causal power do not produce identical consequences. Where social causality acts on social pulsators/actors, its anomalous nature acts also; where there is transferable causality there is also differentiated intensity, appearance and disappearance, fatigue and loss, or renewal and accumulation among other social actors. These are the conclusions which follow. What we here call the anomalous character of social causation applies equally to the relation social-social and social-physical as to the relation psychological-physical and psychological-social, which Donald Davidson discusses (Davidson 2001: 214).

Do social pulsations, as social states, as described by Komsic, have the anomalous character which we attribute to social causality in general? What would comprise that anomaly/anomalousness if an actor, either as a subjective subject (individual) or objective subject (the collective), was involved in some process, some event, some state of affairs? According to Searle’s understanding of social ontology, what is epistemologically subjective, such as social institutions, must be recognized as ontologically objective, real, and existing, and all social facts, states of affairs, phenomena, and processes have such a status.
But, taking into account Komsic’s theory of social pulsation, that which is epistemologically subjective and ontologically objective must pass the test of the semantic projection of the concept of “the social,” evidence constructed in eight ways (a-h). What Searle did not mention, but which we could include here on account of Komsic’s theory, is that social concepts (epistemologically objective) have their own social reality and value (ontologically subjective) only when they are able, through their very existence, to offer individual or collective evidence (ontologically objective) in a semantic projection of multiplied correspondences, which are in fact identity reactions of social actors.

Sociology, as we already said, has understood its topic from unevenly placed causality since its very beginning until the present—whether it was placed in the social structure, or in the interaction between social actors; in both cases it was a question of “principal cause.” Sociological theories rarely, if ever, overcome this dichotomy. Because of that, we must introduce a new concept which will prevail over this dichotomy. We propose the concept of transferable causality. In fact, it is rather difficult to locate the so-called principal cause of the social action and the social system. Whether we place it within the social structure, whether we place it with the social actors, social practice is never completely enclosed. It seems there is not an unambiguous determination by which it could be determined and explainable by either one cause or another. If we were to analyze only the political behaviors we would realize that they are caused, on the one hand, by socially-valued givens and collective interests, while on the other hand, those same values and social givens are caused and situated by a particular political practice. That is how, the perspective of the country and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be examined from the existing institutional divisions and their non-functionality, but we must simultaneously realize that these divisions and non-functionalties are caused by the practice of political actors—both as individuals and political organizations. The “principal cause” of the social and political situation is always being transferred from one social position to another, from one social actor to another; however, social actors are not only individuals (as we have come to know them in all interactional theories), but social gatherings and institutions as well (yet not in a structural sense). Not one social actor permanently maintains the meaning of the principal social cause. The cause is transferred from one to the other, changing social position and direction of action. That phenomenon could be understood and explained through the notion of transferable causality. (Komsic, p. 5)

The production of social relations is the way man produces himself, or, as Marx says, the way man produces his kind. Values are at the centre of this production, and deontic axioms do not always produce the same state of affairs, the same facts for the self and for others. Ethical inferentialism, contingent upon “the strategy of conceptual demarcation” (Brandom) in both depth (synon-
ymous predication, homologisation) and breadth (homonymous predication, granulation), does not here correspond to natural causality which dominates the facticity of physical acts in time and space. Values attributed to self and other—in the acts of the self and in the acts of the other—are always given in every act of consciousness and every act of conscious evaluation, and they make previous experience (experiential knowledge that precedes action in experience) the background, both as a moral and semantic history of social actors.

When we talk about the goal-instrumental operation, it does not elicit dilemmas. However, when we talk about value-rational operations, or about man’s actions toward himself and others, causality starts losing its firm and fixed ground. Values and social institutions are not the results and effects of social interaction, they are rather a conscious element of the social actors, therefore the causality of their social actions cannot be one-sidedly determined. Value-social givens have both an objective and subjective validity, and a reciprocal relation too, making them sometimes the framework and sometimes the goals and means of social actors. (Komsic, p. 6)

There are two key characteristics of social causality or causality that exists in the acts of social actors in real time and space, which Komsic directly associates with goal-instrumental and value-social causality. First, in both cases there is a frequent transfer of causality from one sector to another, from value neutral (“the objective”) into distinctly valued (“the subjective”). Second, the transfer of causality moves towards things and ends with commodification. Third, and perhaps most important, the weakness of causality, or rather the weakness of causal idioms of identification and representation, is reflected not only in the physical but also cognitive, moral, and psychological state of actors, their mentality, which is reflected in change of choice, in change of technology for solving problems and making decisions. This is all evidence for the anomalous character of social causality and its instability. Komsic argues:

Both the goal-instrumental and value-rational action retains meaning for as long as they are rational, that is, for as long as they achieve their ends. Those ends are achieved through a repetition of actions and procedures because their results are affirmed as useful, valiant, and good. Utility and value of those actions and procedures are confirmed through their results—tools, actions, techniques, as well as values, norms, rules, laws, etc. Their need for repetition, affirmation, and perfection stems from this. An exchange of action levels occurs when “rationality” disappears, when causality wanes. The transfer of causality from one type of action to the other is evidence that the ends have lost their potentiality and strength. This can be overcome with the introduction of new ends. How do we achieve that in a case of social pulsation with little or no intensity? It is possible only with a new creative power of mind. (Komsic, p. 10)
Social phenomenology, which Komsic borrows to establish a relationship between social actors and social mechanisms, is actually granulated through convergent phenomenologies which include or exclude an eightfold causality. Komsic has referred to this eightfold causality as an eightfold phenomenal given through which social mechanisms act.

Social pulsation is an complex state of action that cumulatively encompasses all its phenomena: intention, reaction, reflection, communication, institutionalization, internalization, structuration, and innovation. (Komsic, p. 11)

The way in which Komsic explains the nature and actions of the aforementioned phenomena-causes establishing and changing social states testifies to the functional states of consciousness which, in Marxist thought, determines what is and in what way it is a social being. Social phenomenology, which takes nothing social as a transcendental condition of social phenomena, is forced to granulate itself into a bigger or smaller number of convergent phenomenologies that can indicate how different sequences of social consciousness determines different sequences of (social) being. The phenomenology of the lifeworld, in which endless causal elements are at work, cannot subsume them under a single transcendental scheme of identification and representation, it must rather explicate the meaning of those elements in their convergent practices and agency. Thus, “a single phenomenological sociology” (Schultz) is possible only as a practical system of convergent phenomenologies.

The Dialectic Character of Social Inferentialism

The inferential model of social syllogism can only be anomalous, or rather dialectic, with likely or merely possible premises because they are based on people’s convictions, on the consideration of truth, on the thoughts of authorities or groups (Aristotle’s dialektikos syllogismos), that is on the collective recognition/acceptance of their deontic content. However, this very “recognition” and “acceptance” is multiply relative, contingent upon the socio-cultural, political, economic, psychological, and other formative conditions of each individual. Thus, the conceptual demarcation of such inferentialism does not possess a necessary categorical identification of the entire notional content, it does not homogenize all antecedents and all consequents apophantically (Aristotle’s apofantikos syllogismos), it is not completely logically founded (L-truth in Rudolph Carnap’s terms) because it is not derived by logical rules
and laws from necessarily truthful premises which logical and cognitive syn-
onymy sustains, but rather is only semantically and homonymously determined
characterization of facticity (F-truth in Carnap’s terms) in representations
and multiplied transformations of meaning of deontic value judgments that de-
pend on the social, psychological, mental, historical, and moral background of
each individual, as well as different collectives. This type of proposition about
facticity cannot be axiomized, and the upper premises of dialectic syllogism
are those which we here call “quasi-axioms” or “unstable axioms.”

Which concept of rationality then is it possible to represent, which type
of human rational action is it possible to predict under relative conditions
and from beings that are fallible in their every domain? The perspective of
“God’s eye view” (Putnam phrase) is least likely in the social sciences where
everything depends on people, on their actions or in-actions, on their morality
and sensual constitution, on their perceptions, on their fallible nature. Social
syllogism, with probable premises, is almost always deontic syllogism; deontic
logic is present within it via deontic operators: “it follows that…”, “it is allowed
to…”, “it is required to…”, “it is necessary to…”, “it should mean that…”, and
via quasi-epistemic operators: “we accept that…”, “we concur that…”, “it has
always been that…”, “it is normal to…”, “the majority thinks that…”, “intelligent
people believe that…”, “it is unthinkable to…”. Then, how is it possible to append
to deontic logic and anomalous social syllogism, whose premises are never
necessary but rather approximately truthful, and whose judgment pertains to
possible states of affairs and future events as well as possible processes, a dia-
lectics of innovative reason that would go beyond the experience covered by
the vocabulary of these operators and beyond deontic value-judgments that
are moored by unstable dialectical “axioms” of conviction?

What is, finally, the social theory outlined here in the theory of social
pulsation, perceived from the standpoint of social inferentialism and the
types of rationalism that operate within in? It should be noted that Komic’s
approach is a social theory based on criteria, values, and activities of active
(socio-active) reason or social reason that culminates in the phenomena of
creativity of communication, in the innovation of action, in the technologies
of projective semantics whose implicit pulsations are explained by the logic
that explicates them in real space and time. This also means that, in this
book, a new role is given to innovative-creative rationality as an organon
of social illumination in which social relations are conceptualized and in
whose cognitive vocabulary the open webs of interactive symbolic action
are explicated. Here, logic is actually a semantic theory of interpretation of
praxis implicitly contained in linguistic practices, in communicative practices, in the multiplied practices of social actors in which validity claims of the deontic content of social relations are either proposed, accepted or rejected, or realized.

Validity claims/social norms/social conventions are a special class of the social/collective status of actors which are recognized through symbolic interactionism as socially justified, but which are, primarily, as deontic content, built into the foundations of institutions and subsequently activated, referred to, discovered in action, again recognized in stances and actions, taken as a measure and measured, realized in individual social practices. In social practices, regardless of their source or application, it is automatically a matter of social vocabulary and social inferentialism where social norms, presented to deontic operators, become the main premise (universal premise) of social syllogism which is, in nature and source, in fact dialectic (producing possibly truthful claims, not necessarily truthful claims) and discursive. Social practices contain culturally relative and socially relative idioms that are not universally conceptualized, institutionalized, normativized, rather they are conventional, traditional, sometimes neither valid nor socially justified models of behaviour or communication either generally or globally, they are relative to ethnic and cultural ensembles/structuration, but which enable the activity of social actors in sub-social interactions, which are idiomatic or anomalous life forms, to inhabit/pulsate what is implicit in them.

However, social inferentialism enters idiomatic structures as the logic of interpretation and explicates them in the vocabulary of phenomena that are standardized and institutionalized. What pulsates in the anomalous idiomatic life form, whose structure and semantics is the result of anomalous social monism, must be explicated by social inferentialism in some collection of stereotypic social behavior—social reactions in social cases—in order to arrive at a social theory. Social phenomenology, as presented in Komsic’s theory of social pulsation, has pretensions to conceptualize the implicit anomalous and idiomatic social being that is produced by social actors through several key concepts: intention, reaction, reflection, etc.

The strategies of social inferentialism, which function via communicational nodes/social syllogisms (inferential stereotypes), point not only to conceptual demarcation but also to the activities of semantic stereotypes which retain that demarcation within themselves: it is not possible to act intentionally or reflexively in society without the internal activity of semantic and moral, spatial and temporal, stereotypes that actors transfer among each other.
in a communicational community. The inferential stereotypes and semantic stereotypes that members of social communication transfer to each other are the very centre of transferable causality that acts on social actors.

The theory of communicative action, as developed by Habermas, includes aspects of social inferentialism as a specific pragmatism in communication that is based on the use of language (a community of language) and (Mead’s) concept of action/activity (community of action/activity). The communicative community itself is no absolute whole composed of its parts, but of action, and therefore even the lifeworld in which it operates is relative to the variables by which it expresses this action. Habermas writes:

The communicative concept of the lifeworld breaks with the idea of a whole composed of parts. The lifeworld is constituted from a network of communicative actions that branch out through social space and historical time, and these live off sources of cultural traditions and legitimate orders no less than they depend on the identities of socialized individuals. Thus the lifeworld is not a large organization to which members belong, it is not an association or a union in which individuals band together, nor is it a collectivity made up of members. Socialized individuals could not maintain themselves as subjects at all if they did not find support in the relationships of reciprocal recognition articulated in cultural traditions and stabilized in legitimate orders—and vice versa. The everyday communicative practice in which the lifeworld is centered issues equiprimordially from the interplay of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization. Culture, society, and personality mutually presuppose one another. The normative concept of a legal community as an association of free and equal consociates under law, a notion that philosophical discussions still retain, is too concrete for social theory. (Habermas 1996: 80)

However, inferential social phenomenology, which implies communication of actors as well as the social, cultural, and personal relativity of interactions, must answer complex questions of social theory: in what way, under what conditions, in relation to what variables do the stances/attitudes of social actors arise, do those stances/attitudes have a binding character for all participants in social relations or only for the group that prefers certain social, political, ethical, aesthetic principles that it takes into account when making a decision; are judgments of social facticity (which we could also call the inferentialism of pulsation of social actors-social pulsators, to borrow Komsic’s terms) the functions of variables that constitute a web of interactive concepts/variables without which the notion of “social” or “the social” cannot be understood: (a) intention, (b) reaction, (c) reflection, (d) communication, (e) institutionalization, (f) interiorization, (g) structuration, (h) innovation?
Connectionism of Social Facticity

Social theory should not be a descriptive interpretation, nor can descriptive sociology delve deeper into the granulations of variables that determine social facticity. Indeed, a new social theory should contain an inferential theory of society that indicates or makes explicit the logic of relations that emerge between social actors—the logic of relations that can exist between social phenomena—and especially the logic of relations that can be a part of the inferential web of notions that cover or conceptualize both the actions of actors and the existence of social phenomena, as well as the emergence and disappearance of social relations. In the communicational theory of action, of both Habermas and Brandom, “logic is the organ of semantic self-consciousness” (Brandom 1994: xix).

What does it mean to construct a projective semantics of social phenomena, and how should it be introduced into the theory of social inferentialism within which fundamental notions and fundamental actions, which bear (or, better said, place before them) the request for normativity that should be realized amid the anomalous and relative context formed by the phenomena of political ontology, would be made explicit? A projective sociology, which would be the logic of prediction of parallely distributed connections of semantic and symbolic effects of anomalous causality of social phenomena, could be part of a social phenomenology which would not seek dichotomies but specify distinctions (fuzzyfication) in social pulsations. All social relations that currently act in a social context act simultaneously and in parallel toward each other, influence each other, increase/include each other, or annul and eliminate each other. The concept of globalization expresses only that this transfer of social action takes place on a global scale. Political economy, which wishes to penetrate the processes which are no longer a transparent as in Marx’s time of class stratification, must construct a connectionist approach.

It was stated earlier that a single adequate connectionist theory of society, which would have a projective semantics of social relations as its own primary instrument, could offer an adequate explication of the interactions of social actors if we ensure that social structures are perceived as social webs of the lifeworld in which anomalous causality is corrected by projective transformations within symbolic and pragmatic practices and strategies of action. If social practices are established, as we here claim, on anomalous causality and anomalous social inferencialism, then the connectionism or parallel distributed semantic projections of social relations means that all actors and all their rela-
tions are simultaneously brought into relation within a single context. This means that the multiplied social relations are explained from the multiplied connections of social actors, their models of identification and representation in the social context. Only a system of convergent phenomenologies can attain such a connectionist form of social phenomena in the lifeworld.

However, would even that definition of lifeworld be complete and absolutely consequent? A single assemblage/context of social relations, which a single sequence of social relations \((r)\) could constitute, cannot constitute a system \((S)\) of actions and reactions, intentions and interiorizations, reflections and innovations (a system of action) in which we could prove/predict that all relations are attainable \((S, (r))\): there is at least one unrealizable/unpredictable social relation that cannot be deduced/predicted from unstable dialectic axioms present in every social syllogism. All consequences and relations which social facticity produces through actors' actions can never be fully known, and such a system is never complete and finite, which means it cannot be completely consistent/predictable. All social relations within a single model of communication, which presupposes them, do not ever have to be realized. The non-provability of the consequentiality of implicit deduction of propositions within formal systems is not reserved only for logical and mathematical entities (symbols), but sooner and the more so for the functioning of the context/structure of social relations that are in themselves dialectical/possible and inconsistent/anomalous. Connectionism is here determined by para-consistency, similar to how Tarski's \(\omega\)-consistency is moored in a semantic paradox: "everything is possible, except this and that."\(^{15}\)

If a theory creates ideal stereotypes (Putnam), or ideal types (Weber), or ideal structures (Giddens), then it establishes principles, axioms, and rules for derivative interpretations: from top to bottom, from the normative to the real, which maybe anomalous and idiomatically relative, (un)determined by causality in space and time, by character and will, by associational and psychological limits whose interpretation would only mean some beginning in some theory! It would mean that the theory of social reality would be a collection of sub-theories that would multiply until the very last one would have the lowest degree of generalizations and axiomatizations, and the largest degree of the semantics of the concrete. But the question is: could it "lean" a little lower in order to skip over an ideal theoretical state into an anomalous practice and there take on the appearance of truth? The anomalous theory of truth—the theory from a single case—which some philosophers (Davidson) and sociologists have advocated—is based on a partial theory of truth, on a pragmatic
model that can function normatively in a possible world of relations! This is of course not supported by metaphysical philosophy because its operating software of generalization lacks these possibilities.

As far as social innovativeness, which is a type of freedom, is concerned Komsic’s Theory of Social Pulsation offers more of a new approach than definite and monolithic solutions to the interactions of social actors; rather, it sees the innovation of social action as both ends and means. This approach has changed the understanding of social processes and social relations which are no longer seen as static, rigid points, or objects determinable by ideal types or by firm structures of social mechanisms, or by pragmatic models of social behaviorism. The phenomenology of social relations needs a projective logic as a semantic self-understanding of social determinism, social Darwinism, and social pragmatism which depends on anomalous inferentialism and the contingency of these very social processes.

Komsic’s theory of social pulsation has its own anchor in his theory of social reason: in Porphyrii’s terms, “reason is everywhere and nowhere,”\textsuperscript{16} both active and passive, collective gathering and dispersive, lawful and lawless, repulsive and attractive, it is the motor of social activities and it has the power to comprehend them in a contradictory social semantics which it produces through its own action as well as the actions of individuals and groups. The fate of humanity depends on the use of its reason—whose social action is never value neutral—while the values themselves are ethical and semantic variables that contain within themselves degrees of fuzzyfication, from the absolutely negative, moderately negative, negative, positive, moderately positive, absolutely positive.

This transfer of energy into the social field must be explained, from the individual to the group, from the group to the individual. This transfer of social pulsations is not an open exchange of energy in a given social space; it is determined and channeled through the construction of institutions which then begin to emanate types of validity claims (stereotypes) which the actors fulfill or fail to fulfill towards each other. If social pulsations, which Komsic discusses, are seen as parallel distributed relations between social actors, then we need a wholly new logic—different from two valued and dichotomous logics—to understand society. We need a modal logic that incorporates within itself both the possibilities of para-consistency and fuzzy logic in particular, which Lofty A. Zadeh, its creator, primarily attributes to the social sciences.\textsuperscript{17} The inaccuracy of social relations, the anomalous character of social processes, the gradation of social actions, the description and redescription and interpretation
of the communication of social actors, demands the appropriation of words, notions, and objects as variables whose meaning should be granulated (Zadeh's strategy of *Computing with Words*). Such granulation, or fuzzyfication, is possible not only through fuzzy functions but also through a *projective semantics of social relations* as the basis of a *connectionist social theory* that can emerge under the aegis of a *system of convergent phenomenologies*.

**The Rationalization of the Anomalous Nature of Social Facticity**

Analyzing the phenomena of the social world and lifeworld, which is not based on any transcendental I (in the sense of Husserl's phenomenological methods and epistemological approaches), is nevertheless, in the final analysis, motivated by Komsic's need to clarify and illustrate the dominant *concept of rationality* that acts in the activities of social actors. The implicit part of his approach to social theory is directed precisely at the concept of rationality, or the concept of reason, or the concept of rational action under the circumstances of "the function of social facticity" which rejects the logically-categorial measures of the subject and the concepts of natural causality. The work of the concept, in Hegel's sense of the mobile interaction of being and consciousness, and the function of facticity in the social world of anomalous relations which unfolds without the teleological monitoring of a world spirit, cannot be mapped in any social phenomenology: the "work of facticity" can guide the "development of society" towards an absolute non-unity of the general and the concrete, or rather in a completely opposite direction, towards the realization of unhappy consciousness and collective tragedy. Here, the concrete and the general continuously oscillate and frequently find themselves in different energetic/social states without the possibility of establishing dialectical unity.

According to Davidson, *redescription* (Davidson 2001: 105) is a *type of rationalization* where the intention of action of a given subject is revealed or explained through the constant supply of truth conditions. In fact, it reveals the primary reason of action: the reason why somebody (in a given context) raised his hand on the street is his intention to hail a cab, (in another context) to vote for or against something at some meeting, (in the third context) to participate at some auction, (in the fourth context) to get somebody's attention, (in the fifth context) to stretch his arm, (in the sixth context) etc.
Let us now turn this *inductive redescriptions* towards seeking the primary reasons of the social pulsations which emerge between social actors. Komsic, in his social phenomenology, places precisely *intentionality* in first place in his *matrix of eightfold causality*.

For Davidson, “intention is not a part of action, it is its outcome” (Ibid. 105). For Komsic, it is the *matrix of eightfold reality* in which each element of the mechanism of Action can play the role of primary reason. A reaction may be the cause of action as much as reflection. Thus, it is a matter of the *matrix of convergent causation* in which each of the eight causes of social pulsation could be the primary reason for a given social pulsation or for a *given transformation* of an existing social relation in its *projective appearance*. Thus, it should be added here that it is necessary, apart from the formal and material implications, whose differentiation is crucial for a pure logical form of inferentialism, to introduce a distinction between *formal and material intentionality* for the semantic content of inferentialism within which Komsic’s *eightfold causality* of social processes can be better situated. For social processes or social events themselves, and not just the actors that trigger and produce them, stir new social processes or social events, so in this case the primary reason of action will not be intentionality, but sooner reaction or even reflection. It is a matter of *transferable causality*, of which Komsic justly speaks!

In his first proposition of *The Theory of Social Pulsation*, Komsic determines what pulsations are: they are states in which social actors operate (individuals, social groups, institutions). These states are active and effective, which means that pulsations produce pulsations, social states produce social states, or rather there is an extensive web of social states, social pulsations, and social facts, which emerge in the interaction of social actors, social pulsators, and in communication. Second: social pulsation is an ordered active state which communicatively embraces all of its phenomena: *(a)* intention, *(b)* reaction, *(c)* reflection, *(d)* communication, *(e)* institutionalization, *(f)* internalization, *(g)* structuration, *(h)* innovation. For Komsic, the relationship between pulsations is synergetic, their mutual actions can be expressed through function and their impact on social phenomena can be analyzed.

Despite the varying affects of the phenomena of pulsation on a given social system, a strong relation can occur between them. The dynamics of pulsation is equal to the function as well as the functional connection of all its phenomena; it can be represented in the following equation: \( P = ph \ (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \). All phenomena from “a” intention to “h” innovation are changeable but calculable. (Komsic, p. 61)
The division of pulsations into functional and dysfunctional—that is those that have a positive and negative effect on social processes and change states of affairs—is likewise important.

The ideal state is when the dynamics of a social state is a function of all the phenomena of pulsation—that is, when they are all simultaneously represented. However, this is rarely the case. This departure from the ideal state imparts a particular character to the social state and relation that is determined within it. The differentiability of a given social state depends on the number of represented phenomena of pulsation. The functions within a single social state are determined by that number, and they can be calculated. Pulsation, then, can be functional and dysfunctional. The functional pulsation is a function of adequate number of its phenomena. It does not need to incorporate the entirety of its phenomena, like in the ideal state, but it should incorporate those that enable the social activity of actors as well as the maintenance of social institutions. (Komsic, p. 61)

Komsic has described the intentional relationship of social actors—who have mutual reactions towards that relation, who reflect that relation in communication and institutionalize it through internalization, thus producing some objective social structure—as a dialectic evolution of phenomena of social consciousness and self-consciousness that ends with an absolute negation of all previous degrees: in innovation that is a product of a creative mind whose actions become the source of new social energy. Here, Aristotelian and Hegelian understandings/conceptions briefly intersect in a naturalist phenomenology of social spirit. Individual pulsations, like individual social facts, have their source (or the source of their social energy) in the lifeworld, and they have their date of expiration in the ensuing changes; for the existence of society however, there needs to be an enduring, general, and necessary anomalous social interaction with its own social causality. With this, Komsic has introduced differentiation in form of rationalization to his theory: rational action based on attaining objectives (teleological, Aristotelian), rational action based on acknowledging values as parts of collective and individual consciousness (axiological, Weberian), rational action based on laws and abilities of linguistic communication (hermeneutical, communicational, Habermasian), and rational action that is innovative, creative, inventive (not determined by purpose, value, understanding).

Thus, an adequate nature of the social mind or social rationality should correspond to the temporal nature of social facts as a product of social pulsations of social actors. Social facts are a product of social pulsations, a natural state of social actors in real space and time. The communicative web of social
pulsations is not possible without anomalous inferentialism or without the semantics of social relations which are determined—rather, attributed to—facts and processes by the innovative social mind. The attribution of meaning to facts in an intentional way and the collective sustainability of validity of given meanings (the semantic transfer of causality) turns those facts into social facts; the function of collective reason and collective intentionality is to attribute or bestow meaning to facts and to accept them through the reception of status functions of given symbolic representations. Validity claims are claims for status functions to become norms of behavior for social actors—to become an institutional fact. This attribution of meaning and validity claims functions as a categorical identification of social values of a specific type of facticity (“Y is good,” or “Y is just,” or “Y is moral,” or “Y is obligatory”) and their symbolic attributive representation (“X represents Y,” or “X acts as Y,” or “X is taken as Y,” or “X is considered Y,” or “this piece of paper is a $20 bill” or “this piece of plastic represents money”).

Noting the difference in type of rationality and the difference in the ontological existence of facts, processes, states of affairs, Komsic introduces innovative reason to social communication and interpretation. Now the question becomes: if social relations are transparent, if the status of social actors is transparent, if “social play”—where workers could be taken for capitalists, where the poor can represent the rich, where attributive representation is impossible without being based in categorial identification—is not possible, then how is it possible for innovative reason to have a trajectory or direction in solving problems and reaching decisions that are neither ordinarily valued nor conventionally normative procedures?

How is the action of innovative reason possible from the standpoint of singular or multiplied transformations of meaning (Schutz) that social relations may possess? The projective semantics of social relations should answer the question: how is it possible for innovative reason to execute the rationalization or rational redescription of social processes and states of affairs under the conditions of incessant activity of eightfold causality? In any function of eight variables each reduction or absence of a single cause should be compensated by innovative singular transformations which would bestow the same meaning, but a different notion, onto the pertinent phenomena. How can innovative reason rival anomalous causality when it slips from the matrix of eightfold causality, or if one or more of the causers or transferors of (transferable) causation is inactive?
Here, we can call on the distinction between formal and material intentionality that corresponds to that between belief/conviction and action/function: intentionality that is directed towards impossible, unattainable, utopian goals or non-existing objects should be distinguished from intentionality that is geared toward real, attainable goals or existing objects and states of affairs. Komsic deals with this by considering the internalization of change in the ontological and epistemological status of social facticity.

However, we must ask, how is something internalized if it does not exist as a social fact or value? Such internalization emerges from the mind, the creative mind. The mind generates a new paradigm of action which the social actor must internalize and project as new, “meaningful content” and present it as a validity claim—it must become the content of communication.

The creative mind reflects upon the existing social facts and monitors the depletion of their “meaningful content”, their communicational limits, then, after determining their new “meaningful content”, transcends their boundaries. Innovation is the demand of the creative mind but it is the phenomena of social pulsation because it emerges in the inner boundaries of communication and structuration. It is not determined by existing structures because the creative mind liberates it from them, but it is still in part theirs because it manifests itself within their boundaries and insufficiencies, in depletion and in anomalies of their causality. (Komsic, p. 58)

Komsic has connected innovative reason with creative understanding wherein it would be possible to lose the anomalous character of social causality and the anomalous character of social inferentialism.

Aside from this theoretical and practical knowledge, another form of knowledge is essential—a form that will not meddle between them and that will go beyond the contradictions of blindness of immediacy and realized necessity. It is creative knowledge, not merely experienced and analytically-synthetic, but the possibility of the new. It must not be arbitrary or an escape from reality, but rather the power of reason that relies on experienced and analytically-synthetic knowledge; it is in some sense theoretical but it does not have the certainty of the general or the necessary, and it knows it. It applies the possible, not the necessary, because it is aware that action cannot be theoretically determined till the end. Creative knowledge is neither dogmatic nor utopian, it is simultaneously knowledge and action of the new—it is its reality as well as its request for realization. (Komsic, p. 53)

When it comes to the role of a new approach, a new conceptualization, or the production of new theoretical paradigms in social theory, Komsic avers that a new theory or a new approach is the optimal starting point for a new theory.
The theory of pulsation, as a new theory, does not only understand and explain them ("concrete ranges"), it presents them differently from how they were previously interpreted; this theory does not leave rocks unturned. Our contemporary experiences can no longer be explained in a conventional manner: a constellation of historical facts, real and structured relationships, or just intentions of social actors who trade those structures for new ones. They are explainable only through a new theoretical perspective in which historical facts, individual roles, and the emergence of new social institutions and laws, acquire new forms (of being). It only appears to be the old, familiar world, but it is in fact a new world and its newness only evident from the perspective of the new theory. (Komsic, p. 55)

A new theoretical perspective or a new viewpoint, a new approach to old understandings and explanations of social phenomena, is not possible without a projective semantics of social relations that, with its act of innovation, has the opportunity to unveil/produce transformations of social relations or new forms of transfer of causality within the scheme of eightfold causality, which Komsic discusses. The number of dimensions of causality that a theory of social pulsation, or a theory of projective semantics of social relations, discovers or unveils, depends on the innovativeness of the actors and the possibility of interpretation, rationalization, and redescription of anomalous forms of social inferentialism.19

Concluding Remarks

Komsic’s Theory of Social Pulsations needs to be critically analyzed by sociologists and social theorists who are prone to coupling the processes of social ontology with the processes of political ontology, to applying methods of research as well as the knowledge content of the theory of communicative action, the analytical philosophy of the social sciences, cognitive knowledge, the philosophy of natural sciences, and to enter, thus equipped, the semantics of the concrete, the reality in which they directly live and act.

The idea of projective sociology, or the theory of the projective semantics of social relations, whose conceptualization we constructed as a possible model of redescription and rationalization of Komsic’s theory of social pulsation, emerged spontaneously as a possible (in Kripke’s sense) Gedankenexperiment that refers to the theory of social pulsation. We believe it will attain its own expression very quickly in research that is already (partly) under way.

The attempt to explain a new theory in sociology and a new approach to social theory by means of its own terminology could not be anything other
than reflexive and innovative. If the theory of projective semantics of social relations is possible, then that fact points to the possibility and attainability of the innovation which the *theory of social pulsation* advocates. I am convinced that both approaches will serve as incentives for a generation of Bosnian philosophers and sociologists who will not turn their gaze from the cold conceptual abstraction of theory (Adorno) nor from the incendiary concretion of Bosnian reality as it is given to us or as it could be.

One assemblage of conceptual determinants (*anomalous causality, social syllogism, ontology of social facticity, anomalous inferentialism, projective semantics of social relations, semantic transfer of causality, deontic syllogism, heteronomous intentionality, inferential social phenomenology, unstable ontology, impure/unstable axioms, convergent conceptual strategies, parallel distributed redescription, conceptual demarcation of causality, logical and semantic necessity, convergent phenomenologies, the transfer of social pulsations, the matrix of convergent causality, semantic transfer of causality, etc.*), which emerged from the reception of Komšić’s *Theory of Social Pulsation*, have their own “convergent etymology” in the works of Saul Kripke, Donald Davidson, John R. Searle, Robert Brandom, as well as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Anthony Giddens, David Harvey, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, among others.

Komšić, as a philosopher and sociologist, a professor and a politician, has left the realm of sociology and trailed deep into the field of the social sciences, emphasizing in particular the possibilities offered by the philosophy of social sciences. The courage to side with free and independent interpretations of old sociological questions, without subjugating oneself to authorities and the handing down of the content of sociological textbooks, has led him to the construction of a significant theory and an original scientific perspective. Whenever a scientific perspective is rationally articulated, it expresses an idea that should then be developed through argumentation by an application of method. The idea that social relations are social pulsations, that the actions of social actors are social pulsations, etc., is explicated in *The Theory of Social Pulsation* at an admirable, scientific level.

The future of the social sciences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the future of sociology in particular, depend on the reception of this approach. Komšić’s *Theory of Social Pulsation* is a consistent work guided by the hypothesis of the social pulsation of actors, a work that does not contain contradictions and whose rebuttal, refutation, or criticism will unavoidable require the construction of a wholly new innovative hypothesis. Introduced for the first time here, and stitched into the theory of social pulsation, the idea of the semantic
projection of social relations is a ladder by which the principles of Komsic’s theory may be accessed. That ladder can lead down to reality, to the semantics of the concrete, onto the firm ground to which both theories refer, which would also be their greatest act and evidence of their “truthfulness.” We presume that this is one possibility of the communicational (academic) community within which there is interactive action, and not only autistic planning of the description of the past.

Notes

1. Robert B. Brandom and Robert Nozick agree that an important instrument of this demarcation is rationality, or rather the rational nature of man, even though Brandom believes (in Making it Explicit) that it is simultaneously obligatory for practices and strategies, which are rationally determined, and thus normative. Nozick also believes that rationality completely determines man: “The capacity to be rational demarcates humans from other animals and thus defines them” The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, p. xi.


3. This “conceptual edifice” or “conceptual construct” (or “axiomatic grid”) which serves the axiomatisation of data inside any science is what David Hilbert named “das Fachwerk” in a lecture titled “Axiomatische Denken”. The lecture was given before the Swiss Mathematical Society on September 11, 1917 in Zurich. It was first edited in Mathem. Annalen Vol. 78, pp. 405–415 (1918). The article was reprinted in D. Hilbert. Collected Essays (Gesammelte Abhandlungen), vol. 3, Berlin: Springer, 1935.

4. Cf. Anthony Giddens: The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. xvii. Discussing the orthodox tradition of researching social phenomena, Giddens explains the significance of structuralism and post-structuralism for the modern approach, arguing that “they accord a fundamental role to language, and to cognitive faculties in the explication of social life. Language use is embedded in the concrete activities of day-to-day life and is in some sense partly constitutive of those activities. Finally, the declining importance of empiricist philosophies of natural science is recognized to have profound implications for the social sciences also. It is not just the case that social and natural science are further apart than advocates of the orthodox consensus believed. We now see that a philosophy of natural science must take account of just those phenomena in which the new schools of social theory are interested – in particular, language and the interpretation of meaning” (p. xvii).

5. The indicated concepts are part of a conceptual framework contained in a work (Nijaz Ibrulj: Principles of Projective Sociology: Connectionalist Theory of Society), still in preparation. It is based on lectures for doctoral studies in sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo.


8. Particularly pertinent to this topic is David Harvey's book The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Harvey deems imperative the analysis of global capitalism within which the new imperialism plays a key role. The chapter “All About Oil” is particularly relevant. For the content of the concept of neo-liberalisation, whose chief mechanism is “accumulation by dispossession,” see David Harvey: A Brief History of Neo-liberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 160–165.


10. The conceptual model of convergent social phenomenologies, which we here introduced into the theory of projective semantics of social relations because of the anomalous nature of social causation, could be based on what Quine called the “convergence of indirect evidence” which is produced by the comparison of different causations of similar social phenomena or by comparison of similar properties of different social phenomena. (W.V.O. Quine: “Posits and Reality.” u: Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Random House, 1966, p. 233). Quine’s syntagm, „miscellaneous phenomena“, could be applied to the social phenomena which may be in convergence when they are compared.

11. Some of our intentions have a “standby” status (formal intentions) because the intended act or action is directed toward a nonexistent object of desire, hope, expectation, planning, premonition,… that is, the intended act or action is not achievable. Intentions which are directed to the objectively existent object and which are achievable could be named material intentions. This is a distinction based on Brandom’s distinction between formal and material inference (Brandom 1994: 104).


13. Herbert Blumer best defines what the concept of symbolic interactionalism refers to, and with this significantly contributes to our argumentation for a theory of projective semantic social relations. Blumer writes: “The term ‘symbolic interaction’ refers, of course, to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their ‘response’ is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another’s actions. This mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of human
behaviour.” Herbet Blumer: *Symbolic Interactionism*. University of California Press, 1969, pp. 78/79. Blumer argues that many sociologists and social theorists are responsible for formulating the view of society as symbolic interactionism. He writes: “Among the former we may note such scholars as Charles Horton Cooley, W.I. Thomas, Robert E. Parks, E.W. Burgess, Florian Znaniecki, Ellsworth Faris, and James Mickel Williams. Among those outside the discipline we may note William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead” (Ibid. 78).


15. Cf. Alfred Tarski: *Logic, Metamathematics, and Semantics*. Hackett Publishing Company, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 279–296. In the text “Some Observations on the Concepts of $\omega$ Consistency and $\omega$ Completeness” Alfred Tarski explains common deductive systems that are consistent and complete but not omega ($\omega$) consistent because they have expanded through consequences that emerge in metatheory, which means they are also not omega ($\omega$) complete. We can say that social systems, in a given political system, are consistent (from the standpoint of political epistemology of that system’s representatives) but that they are neither omega (completely, absolutely) consistent nor omega complete due to the consequences that emerge in their critical reflection in the political epistemology of their adversaries.


18. Davidson did not consider the dependence of physical process of intention on the context in which the intention is realized in such a way that one might claim, in the Wittgensteinian sense, that the notion/intention of a physical action is an intentional game/communication (just as the use of a word is a linguistic game). It should also be added that the case where somebody raises his hand on the street and in this way votes for or against some law, that is raises his hand in parliament in order to hail a cab, is not likely even though possible. Intentional communication presupposes a semantic or communicational stereotype, it does not construct it each time anew. But recognizing intention again is always part of the practice of interpretation of speech and physical action. For the functioning of principles of the logical as an ideal matrix of identification/repeated recognition of logical principles, see Nijaz Ibrulj: *Philosophy of Logic* (Ch. IV: The Principle of the Logical), Sarajevo-Publishing, Sarajevo, 1999.

19. The theory of social pulsations can be brought into analogy with string theory in physics, which has changed the relation towards the dimensions of space and time and the energetic states of objects in them. How many dimensions anomalous causality has in the social context, how the causations of a single phenomenon transform and distribute towards phenomena (social pulsations) is perhaps possible to represent through an artifical web of social pulsations.
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